

**Political Participation of Young People in  
Europe – Development of Indicators for  
Comparative Research in the European  
Union (EUYOUPART)**

**Deliverable 17: Final Comparative Report**

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## Introduction

The EUYOUPART research project aimed at developing a measurement instrument for the comparative research on youth political participation. In the process of indicator development we collected a plethora of data with very rich information about youth political participation. Thus we now are able to give a detailed overview on youth political behaviour and to highlight some of the aspects that contribute to different levels of political participation of European youth.

We succeeded in building a lot of indicators, which now allow us to measure political attitudes and behaviour comparatively among the eight countries within the project. The indicators may be applied for future comparative research. During the process of analysing the data, however, we had to cope with some challenges, but in the end only a small number of indicators remained which were not comparable for different reasons, like we have already outlined in the “Technical report on the comparability of indicators”.

A short overview on all the indicators and their amount of comparability will be provided in chapter 1. Taking this into account all incomparable items or countries are marked grey within the tables throughout the whole report. Chapter 2 then gives an all comprising overview on youth political participation in the eight countries within the study. “What makes them participate” is the heading of chapter 3 in which we have a closer look on youth motivation to participate. Our report closes with a summary on the main findings, which will be the basis for the formulation of policy implications in the End of Grant Report. All undertaken analyses are according to differences in age, gender, education and work status.

SORA was responsible for coordinating the work on this Final Comparative Report and for most of the analysis undertaken. All the chapters that were delivered by the consortium partners FNSP (France), IARD (Italy) and IISS (Estonia) are made visible. Each author exclusively is responsible for the content of his/her contribution to the Final Report.

# 1 Questions under Research

## 1.1 Which variables?

The entire EUYOUNGART questionnaire consists of 55 separate questions or question batteries. These questions can be grouped into three categories:

- Attitudinal variables
- Behavioural variables
- Socio-demographic variables

The attitudinal variables comprise questions concerning political interest of oneself and relevant others, left-right self-placement and placement of parents and the best friend, perceived effectiveness of several forms of participatory engagement, perceived capability of understanding politics, identity on various socio-geographic dimensions, statements about the resources for and importance of political engagement, distance to parties, expectations about the future, important problems in one's own country, satisfaction with the government, perception of politics, opinion concerning crime and punishment, immigration, women rights, market versus state solutions, trust in various national and international institutions and in NGOs and EU knowledge.

The behavioural variables ask questions concerning various ways of political activity and election campaign support, participatory activity at school and at the workplace, organisational membership or other ways of involvement, demonstration participation (self and relatives), political discussions, voting frequency of oneself and one's parents.

Finally, questions about the respondents' sex, age, nationality, country of birth, children, job status and weekly hours of work, highest educational level of oneself and of the parents, living situation and area of living, perceived standard of living, confession and religiousness, media use and politically oriented media consumption, voting eligibility and preference, job experience make up for the socio-demographic background of the respondents.

The aim of most of the analyses is to compare the results across countries in order to draw conclusions about what unites and what separates young Europeans with regard to political participation. However, this cannot always

be done easily. While the socio-demographic and most of the attitudinal variables proved to be comparable across countries, several behavioural variables caused problems. This will be described in detail now.

The non-comparability of items stems from

- failed or inaccurate translations of central terms used in a question
- different opportunity structures in the countries that facilitate or hamper a form of activity or
- different political cultures that embed an activity in a different institutional context

The result of the comparability analyses is summarized in the following tables. Items that do not appear in these tables can be used for cross-country comparison without any restrictions.

**Table 1: Incomparability of items: The attitudinal variables**

Attitudinal variables									
Nr.	content	A	EST	F	FI	G	I	S K	U K
Q1	Pol. Interest: general								
Q2_1	Pol. Interest: local								
Q2_2	Pol. Interest: national								
Q2_3	Pol. Interest: Europe								
Q2_4	Pol. Interest: internat.								
Q5_1	Pol. Interest: father								
Q5_2	Pol. Interest: mother								
Q5_3	Pol. Interest: best friend								
Q20_1	Left-right: self								
Q20_2	Left-right: father								
Q20_3	Left-right: mother								
Q20_4	Left-right: best friend								
Q27	Left- right: self								
Q31_1	Problem: pollution								
Q31_2	Problem: poverty								
Q31_3	Problem: immigrants								
Q31_4	Problem: racism								
Q31_5	Problem: less welfare								
Q31_6	Problem: unemployment								
Q31_7	Problem: drugs								
Q31_8	Problem: crime/ violence								
Q31_9	Problem: terrorism								
Q49_1	Politics= voting								
Q49_2	Politics: no important issues								
Q49_3	Politics: take care of social issues								
Q49_4	Politics: game of old men								
Q49_5	Politics= party activities								
Q49_6	Politics= way to solve conflicts								



Q49_7	Politics= empty promises								
Q49_8	Politics: way to create better world								
Q49_9	Politics= parliament discussions								
Q49_10	Politics: way to solve internat. problems								
Q49_11	Politics: just corrupt								
Q50_1	Death penalty								
Q50_2	More severe punishment								
Q50_3	Children: obedient, disciplined								
Q50_4	One strong leader								
Q50_5	Accept more refugees								
Q50_6	Too many immigrants								
Q50_7	Losing culture and traditions								
Q50_8	Women: no more rights								
Q50_9	More women in politics								
Q50_10	Different law for rich and poor								
Q50_11	Expropriation								
Q50_12	Privatise all companies								
Q50_13	Free market provides best solution								
Q50_14	Welfare state								
Q50_15	No job: own fault								
Q50_16	State support								
Q50_17	Big companies much influence								
Q50_18	Anti- Globalisation								
Q51_1	Trust in government								
Q51_2	Trust in parties								
Q51_3	Trust in parliament								
Q51_4	Trust in politicians								
Q51_5	Trust in EC								
Q51_6	Trust in EP								

Q51_7	Trust in Greenpeace								
Q51_8	Trust in AI								
Q51_9	Trust in Attac								

	failed or inaccurate translation
	different opportunity structures
	different political cultures
	“technical noncomparability” with no final sound explanation found
	not administered

Among the attitudinal variables, the incomparability is mainly due to different political cultures. In the case of item battery 31, this means that the perceived problems of each country are not necessarily related to those of another country. Even if the problems might be comparable, the awareness can differ substantially. Therefore, these items should only be analysed nationally. Concerning item battery 49, those items that refer to a rather neutral or conformist perspective cannot be interpreted in the same way for the former transition countries Estonia and Slovakia. Only few of the opinion items of battery 50 are comparable across all countries. As the factor structures cannot be reproduced this is taken as evidence that there are different political cultures within these matters.

Furthermore, the political interest questions are not comparable for the UK. This is a conclusion of the “Technical report on the comparability of indicators”, but no explanations have been found, that clarify why only the UK is different in terms of political interest. For the analyses in this report, the purely technical non-comparability of attitudinal variables will be ignored and the national results will be treated as comparable.

**Table 2: Incomparability of items: The behavioural variables**

Behavioural variables									
Nr.	content	A	Est.	SF	F	G	I	SK	UK
Q13_1	Voting								
Q13_2	Invalid vote								
Q13_3	Not voted (protest)								
Q13_4	Contact politician								
Q13_5	Public meeting								
Q13_6	Sign petition								
Q13_7	Collect signatures								
Q13_8	Political speech								
Q13_9	Distribute leaflets								
Q13_10	Product boycott								
Q13_11	Product buying								
Q13_12	Message/ graffiti								
Q13_13	Wear badge								
Q13_14	Legal demo								
Q13_15	Illegal demo								
Q13_16	Strike								
Q13_17	Donate money								
Q13_18	Internet discussion								
Q13_19	Write article								
Q13_20	Write letter								
Q13_21	Property damage								
Q13_22	Viol. Confr, police								
Q13_23	Viol. Confr, opponents								
Q13_24	Occupy buildings								
Q13_25	Block streets etc.								
Q15_1	Student council								
Q15_2	Speaker of class								
Q15_3	Students´ meeting								

Q15_4	Students' meeting								
Q15_5	Protest movement								
Q15_6	Organise pol. event								
Q17_1	Workers' council								
Q17_2	Workers' council								
Q17_3	Staff meetings								
Q17_4	Staff meetings								
Q17_5	Organise group								
Q18_1	Youth org./ ass.								
Q18_2	Party: youth org.								
Q18_3	Religious org.								
Q18_4	Trade union								
Q18_5	Party								
Q18_6	Environmental org.								
Q18_7	Animal Rights org.								
Q18_8	Peace org.								
Q18_9	Human Rights org.								
Q18_10	Charity org.								
Q18_11	Professional org.								
Q18_12	Consumer ass.								
Q18_13	Cultural org.								
Q18_14	Immigrants org.								
Q18_15	Women org								
Q18_16	Anti-Globalisation								
Q18_17	Sports Club								

■ failed or inaccurate translation  
■ different opportunity structures  
■ different political cultures  
■ "technical non-comparability" with no final sound explanation found

For the behavioural variables, all kinds of incomparability are found. First, "petition" and "leaflet" have not been properly translated into all seven languages used. Therefore, different associations were provoked resulting in different responses. Second, for some of the activity variables (Question 13) different political opportunity structures could be identified being

responsible for divergent results. For others, the statistical conclusion of non-comparability was not successfully translated into a sound explanation by content. Participation at school and at workplace diverges due to different opportunity structures resulting from different legal frameworks and administrative practices. The membership items (Question 18) are sometimes not comparable because certain types of organisations are more established and institutionalised in one country than in another. Further they are not comparable because too general wordings have caused different associations in the different countries.

All in all, at some stages of research not even the partners were able to come up with meaningful explanations for diverging results. These questions are left for future research.

## **1.2 Analysis according to**

### **1.2.1 Gender**

Question 33 of the questionnaire was renamed “gender” without any changes in the categorisation. The gender distribution by country looks as follows.

**Table 3: Gender distribution within the country samples**

Countries	Percent
Austria: male	51
Austria: female	49
Estonia: male	51
Estonia: female	49
Finland: male	51
Finland: female	49
France: male	51
France: female	49
Germany: male	53
Germany: female	47
Italy: male	51
Italy: female	49
Slovakia: male	50
Slovakia: female	50
UK: male	49
UK: female	50
UK: refused	1

Weighted data; percentages.

In the UK, 14 persons or 1% refused to indicate their sex. In all other countries, there are no missing values.

### 1.2.2 Age

Although in most countries under research the legal voting age is 18, it was decided to regroup the age distribution in those being 15 to 18 years old and in those being 19 to 25 years. This division corresponds to the fact that the differences in participation items usually start to become visible at ages 19 and older. The resulting age group distribution is summarized in Table 4.

**Table 4: Age distribution within the country samples**

Countries	percent
Austria: 15-18	37
Austria: 19-25	63
Estonia: 15-18	38
Estonia: 19-25	62
Finland: 15-18	36
Finland: 19-25	62
Finland: refused	2
France: 15-18	39
France: 19-25	61
Germany: 15-18	39
Germany: 19-25	61
Italy: 15-18	32
Italy: 19-25	68
Slovakia: 15-18	34
Slovakia: 19-25	66
UK: 15-18	36
UK: 19-25	64

Weighted data; percentages.

Slightly more than one third of all respondents are aged 18 or younger. The lowest value is 32 % for Italy and the highest 39% in France. In Finland, 2% of all respondents refused to reveal their age.

### 1.2.3 Education

Differentiations by formal education are done via a combination of several categories of the CASMIN-code framework. The Casmin Code accurately covers and ranks the whole range of educational statuses in each country. It attains maximum comparability and rankability of the various educational achievements of the eight countries within the sample. The successful implementation of the Casmin framework is the base for regrouping the educational attainments into the four broader groups that are introduced now.

The four groups constructed are first those who completed their compulsory elementary education<sup>1</sup>. The second group consists of those having obtained one out of several forms of vocational or intermediate training. The third consists of all those that reached one or the other form of maturity certificate<sup>2</sup> and the fourth of people already graduated at university. The result can be seen in Table 5:

**Table 5: Highest education achieved so far**

Countries	elementary	vocational	intermediate	university	missing
Austria	44	30	24	2	0
Estonia	43	14	37	6	1
Finland	48	20	28	4	0
France	23	44	20	13	0
Germany	25	46	26	1	1
Italy	36	11	47	5	1
Slovakia	32	28	34	6	1
UK	8	47	23	15	6
average	32	30	30	7	1

Weighted data; percentages.

On average, one third of the respondents across Europe do not have more than the lowest possible formal education, which should be regarded with concern. The highest percentage of young people who only completed compulsory elementary schooling is found in Finland with 48%, followed by Austria with 44% and Estonia with 43%. This educational status is least frequent in the UK with only 8%.

The next 30% of the whole sample achieved vocational training. In the UK, the comparatively small fraction of people having had no more than a compulsory elementary schooling is made up by the high fraction, 47%, of those with vocational training. Also, in Germany and France comparatively many people obtain further vocational training. Italy with its 11% has the relatively smallest fraction of young people with this kind of training, followed by Estonia with 14%.

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<sup>1</sup> Completed (compulsory) elementary education: corresponding to the “social minimum” of education that individuals are expected to have obtained in a society. This level of education is mostly of a general nature and generally can be obtained by following without selective procedures the least demanding courses of education up until the legally fixed age of compulsory schooling.

<sup>2</sup> Full general maturity certificate: consists in successfully passing those exams that mark the completion of secondary schooling (e.g. Abitur, Matura, Baccalaureat, A-level exams etc.), and which were obtained in tracks with a general, academic orientation.



Another 30% obtained a form of maturity certificate. The largest fraction is reported for Italy with 47% and Estonia with 37%, the lowest for France with only 20%, followed by Austria with 24%.

As far as university education is concerned, two frequency peaks stand out compared with the sample average of 7%: the UK with 15% and France with 13%. The smallest fractions are found in Austria and Germany with 2% and 1%. Note that because of the age limit of the sample, these frequencies rather tend to reflect the systemic differences in the duration of university education than the fractions of those finally graduating in each of these countries.

- There are huge differences with regard to the level of completed education across countries
- On average, one third of the 15 to 25 years old across Europe only possess the lowest possible formal education, ranging from 48% in Finland to 8% in the UK
- Roughly, the second third (30% on average) obtained vocational training, whereas this was the case with nearly half of the respondents in the UK and of 11% in Italy
- Usually, between 4 and 6% of a countries' sample reach a university diploma at an age up to 25, with France and the UK being two outliers.
- Note: great differences in educational systems, therefore rates are hard to compare!

#### **1.2.4 Work status**

The work status categories were regrouped into people in paid work, those in education, those unemployed and a group of all others. This is mainly due to the very small numbers in many categories, which cannot be taken into account for a sound analysis. The following table provides an overview on the different living situations of the interviewed youth and lines out the differences per country. In later chapters, where an in- depth analysis is necessary, the detailed categorisation of the original question is used again.

**Table 6: Work status**

Countries	In paid work	In education	unemployed	other	missing
Austria	51	41	4	3	0
Estonia	28	61	5	6	0
Finland	22	64	6	7	1
France	26	62	8	4	0
Germany	26	60	5	7	1
Italy	33	51	12	4	1
Slovakia	43	39	11	7	0
UK	45	42	6	7	0
average	34	53	7	6	0

Weighted data; percentages.

Clearly, the fractions of those still in education and those in paid work vary greatly among countries. Whereas in Austria 51% are in paid work at an age up to 25, only 22% are so in Finland. The UK and Slovakia with its 45% and 43% in paid work respectively also belong to those countries where labour market participation is rather frequent among the young. On the contrary Finland, France, Estonia and Germany belong to those countries where the majority of the respondents still are in education. The highest fraction of young people who are unambiguously either in paid work or still in education is found in Austria with 93% in sum and the lowest in Slovakia with 82% in sum.

The unemployment rate among young people is above average in Italy with 12% and in Slovakia with 11%. The rate is lowest in Austria with 4%. As the group of others is a heterogeneous mixture of several statuses, meaningful comparisons cannot be made at this overall level.

When cross- checked by the age distribution, remarkable result were found for Austria and the UK. While amongst those between 15 and 18 only between 1% (Finland) and 10% (Italy) already work, Austria (27%) and the UK (23%) show an astonishingly high percentage of young people under 18 who have already joined the work force. This means that the two countries with the highest overall labour force participation of young people in the sample also seem to be those with a comparatively high fraction of early labour force entrants.

- There is great variation of the labour market participation between the samples: it ranges from 22% in Finland to 51% in Austria
- Italian and Slovakian sample unemployment rates are above average, the Austrian unemployment rate is smallest
- Usually between 1% (Finland) and 10% (Italy) of those aged 15 to 18 already work, but Austria (27%) and the UK stand out (23%).
- The two countries with the highest overall labour force participation also seem to
- be those with a comparatively high fraction of early labour force entrants.

## 2 Youth Participation in 8 European countries

This chapter should give an overview about the most common and also most deviating forms of political participation in our 8 European countries.

### 2.1 Participation within the representative democratic system (IISS/SORA)


The overview first surveys attitudinal variables related to voting and then behavioural variables. Among attitudes, perceived effectiveness of voting as a means to bring about a change in society was included. Behavioural aspects of voting include eligibility to participate and actual participation in national and European elections. In addition, more general indicators of voting and two specifically voting-related forms of participation were surveyed: not voting out of protest and casting an invalid voting ballot.

#### 2.1.1 Perceived effectiveness of voting

In Graph 1 (below) one sees no strong gross differences across countries.

The highest perceived effectiveness is found for Germany (74%), followed by Austria and Italy (69%) respectively. In Estonia and the UK, the overall perceived effectiveness is lowest (52%).

**Graph 1 Perceived effectiveness of voting**



When differentiating by gender, age, educational and working status, the following significant differences are found:

**Table 7: Perceived effectiveness of voting**

country		low	medium	high
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>52</b>
	male	22	28	50
	female	12	34	54
	15-18	13	29	58
	19-25	19	32	48
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>64</b>
	In paid work	10	34	56
	In education	9	24	67
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>60</b>
	elementary	19	32	49
	intermediate	14	25	62
	maturity+	9	26	64
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>74</b>
	elementary	14	20	66
	intermediate	7	19	74
	maturity+	5	12	82
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>69</b>
	In paid work	11	26	63
	In education	7	18	75
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>57</b>
	In paid work	20	27	53
	In education	15	24	62
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>52</b>
	elementary	24	42	33
	intermediate	18	32	51
	maturity+	10	33	57

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%)

In Estonia, male respondents are less pessimistic (22%, “low”) concerning the effectiveness of voting than females (12%, “low”). Second, younger respondents not eligible to vote (15-18 years) believe to a higher extent (58%) in the effectiveness of voting than their older counterparts already eligible to vote (48%). The only difference worth mentioning for Finland is

found between those in education and those in paid work: the latter are more pessimistic on average (56% versus 67%, “high”).

The same gap by work status is found for Italy and Slovakia, where again those in education are more optimistic concerning the effectiveness of voting than those in paid work.

In France, Germany and the UK, perceived effectiveness is to a certain extent a matter of education. Given even the high overall level of perceived effectiveness in Germany, those who possess a form of maturity certificate or more hardly see voting as ineffective (e.g. Germany: 5%), whereas this ratio is much higher among those with elementary education (14%). The same, namely that young people with a higher level of education tend to perceive voting as more effective, holds true for France and the UK, but on a smaller perceived effectiveness level in absolute terms.

Altogether, there is no consistent pattern of differences in perceived effectiveness across all countries. In some the perception of effectiveness is a matter of education, in others one's own status plays an important role.

### 2.1.2 Eligibility to vote and turnout in last national elections

In order to assess the turnout in last national elections properly, one has to take into account the different dates when the last elections took place. The date determines the number of young people who were 18 or older at the election's day so that they were eligible to vote. The table below (Table 8) gives dates of the latest national elections in the participating countries; it also gives birth dates of the people who turned 18 in the month preceding the elections.

**Table 8: Dates of last national elections in 8 countries**

	Month and year of last national elections	Birth date <sup>3</sup>
Austria	November 2002	October 1984
Estonia	March 2003	Feb 1985
Finland	March 2003	March 1985
France	June 2002	May 1984
Germany	November 2002	Oct 1984
Italy	May 2001	April 1983
Slovakia	September 2002	August 1984
United Kingdom	June 2001	May 1983

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<sup>3</sup> Month and year of birth of persons who were 18 or older at the time of last national elections

### **2.1.3 Turnout**

Table 9 (below) gives turnout rates among those who reported themselves eligible to vote. Two findings draw attention. First, one sees striking differences across countries: while in Italy more than 9 young people out of 10 voted, not even 5 people out of 10 did so in the UK. Turnout in the other 6 countries is located between these two extremes. Second, one can see no systematic covariation between geochartal location, welfare system or the duration of democracy and the rate of turnout.

**Table 9: Turnout differences in national elections by education**

country		turnout
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>80</b>
	elementary	71
	intermediate	73
	maturity+	88
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>60</b>
	elementary	45
	intermediate	47
	maturity+	67
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>59</b>
	elementary	40
	intermediate	48
	maturity+	73
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>62</b>
	elementary	46
	intermediate	59
	maturity+	67
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>83</b>
	elementary	57
	intermediate	78
	maturity+	92
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>72</b>
	elementary	54
	intermediate	67
	maturity+	77
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>47</b>
	elementary	35
	intermediate	41
	maturity+	52

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%)

Educational differences in national election turnouts are found for all countries except for Italy, which is due to the extremely high overall turnout. First of all, there is a lower voting participation of people with only compulsory elementary education. In Germany (57% versus 83% on average) and Slovakia (54% versus %72), the least relative participation rates of this subcategory are found. Second, those with intermediate




education voted not more often than the average (e.g. Germany: 59% versus 62%), if not remarkably less often (e.g. Estonia: 47% versus 60%). Finally, those with a maturity certificate always tend to participate to a higher extent, which is most notable in Finland.

Altogether, two educational difference tendencies are found: in one group of countries, there is a gradual increase in turnout with higher education. Germany and Slovakia are good examples. In these countries, no clear particular mobilising effort concentration on one or the other educational subgroup can be recommended. For the second group of countries, the gap is located mainly between those with at least maturity and all others. This is clearly the case for Austria, Estonia and possibly Finland. In these countries, less effort to mobilise higher educated young people is needed relative to those with lower education.

#### 2.1.4 Turnout in European elections

The turnout in European elections was markedly lower than that in national elections (Graph 2). Participation rate was the lowest in Britain: only 1 out of 4 young people bothered themselves with going to the polls. Also, Estonia and Finland were characterised by a relatively low participation rate. In Italy, on the contrary, nearly 9 out of 10 voted (85%). Other countries managed to mobilise approximately 50% of the young people.

**Graph 2 Turnout in European Parliamentary elections**



Across almost all countries, an education gap in the EP election turnout is found, which is summarised in the following table:

**Table 10: Turnout differences in EP elections by country**

country		turnout
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>58</b>
	elementary	53
	intermediate	52
	maturity+	65
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>37</b>
	elementary	33
	intermediate	25
	maturity+	41
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>39</b>
	elementary	27
	intermediate	29
	maturity+	53
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>52</b>
	elementary	35
	intermediate	54
	maturity+	55
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>56</b>
	elementary	33
	intermediate	55
	maturity+	63
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>85</b>
	elementary	76
	intermediate	72
	maturity+	88
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>25</b>
	elementary	11
	intermediate	22
	maturity+	30

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%)

Whether the difference relative to the average is only a slight one or more pronounced, there is again a lower voting participation of people with only compulsory elementary education. Their relative abstention is most striking

in France (35% versus 52% on average), Germany (33% versus 56%) and the UK (11% versus 25%).

Second, for those with intermediate education the turnout hardly reaches the average (e.g. Germany: 55% versus 56%) and is often significantly below average (e.g. Italy: 72% versus 85%). Those with at least maturity are always above average in terms of turnout.

Altogether, there seem to be two educational difference tendencies partly diverging from what was found for national election turnout. In one group of countries, it is especially those with only elementary education vis-à-vis all others that abstained from the election in June 2004. This is the case in France and Germany, and less clearly also in the UK. In these countries, mobilising effort to raise the voting participation of their youngest voters should be concentrated on those with low education. For the second group of countries, the gap is again located mainly between those with at least a maturity certificate and all others. This is clearly the case for Austria and Finland and still recognisable for Estonia and Italy. In these countries, more general effort would be needed to raise the turnout among young people.

### **2.1.5 Continuity in voting participation**


A fundamental issue in democratic governance is associated with the number of politically active people. In the context of elections, and given that turnout in most countries and elections remains somewhere between 40% and 70%, the question is whether these were predominantly the same or different people who voted in national and/or European elections.

Results suggest that predominantly the same people did vote. Among those who voted in the last national elections, more than half did vote also in the European elections (Graph 3).

Nevertheless, the participation rates reported should not be regarded as hard facts. This can be demonstrated most easily by comparing the reported participation with the official turnout by country in the last EP elections. As this is a single and identical date for all countries, memory errors are at least more “standardised” - although not necessarily minimized - than for the national election question.

Although extraordinary participation of young voters is not impossible, it is doubtful. Therefore, strong differences between reported data turnout and official turnout can be seen as a strong indication for over-reporting because of social desirability effects.

**Graph 3 Turnout in last EP elections – sample and official percentages**



### 2.1.6 Party preference patterns

When it comes to the young people's voting behaviour in terms of party preference, several constraining factors come into play. The most significant impediment is that in each country the number of people who reported the party they voted for is rather small:

**Table 11: Total party preference\***

country		Percent national election	Percent EP election
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>

Weighted data; percentages.


\* percentage of respondents who indicated any party at all in questions 9 and 12

It ranges from only 8% in the UK to 37% in Italy concerning national elections and from 7% in the UK to 49% in Italy concerning the last EP elections. The small number of declared party voters brings about three consequences. First, such a small number does not guarantee representativeness in terms of variance and statistical error. Second, the small number is not representative for the youth in a particular country. Third, if only a majority of those who report that they did vote in the elections concerned declares a party, the rate of participants is inflated due to over-reporting related to social desirability (see above). In this case the overall declaration rate should not be interpreted. Or the results could also come from interviewer effects or other effects that lead to a heavily biased declaration of the actual party preference, given that one truly voted. In this case the party preference rates should not be interpreted. Generally, there is to be said that substantive results should be treated with caution.

### 2.1.7 Indicators of general and specific voting behaviour

The meaning of the first indicator – “have you ever voted and, if yes, then how many times during last 12 months” – included a much broader range of possible voting activity than the election questions analysed above. This can be inferred from the fact that it seems hardly possible that any person in any of the participating countries voted more than 3 times in political elections during the last 12 months. Nevertheless, we see that 5% to 19% had voted more than 3 times (Graph 4). So it remains unclear what was reported in responses to this question. Anything from parliamentary elections to elections of the speaker of the class could be counted. The same broadness applies to not voting out of protest and casting an invalid ballot.

**Graph 4 Percentage of those who voted 3 or more times during last 12 months; % computed among those who reported having ever voted**



As the general voting intensity is concerned (i.e. the percentage of those that voted at least once during the last 12 months), Italian (61%) and Austrian (48%) young people belong to the most intense voters. They are followed by Germany and Finland (46%). Young people in Estonia (30%) and the UK (26%) are the least frequent voters. In order to assess the reliability of the frequencies reported, they would have to be related to the voting possibilities of each individual during the last months, which is not possible with the data at hand.

**Table 12: Voting invalid ballot and not voting out of protest**

country		voted	invalid ballot	not voted: protest
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

Weighted data; percentages \* percentage of respondents who indicated any party at all in questions 9 and 12:

Austria, France and Italy show percentages of those casting an invalid ballot. Austria and France score high on the dimension of not voting out of protest, but the differences across countries were somewhat less notable because the overall frequencies are low. Austrians are also in the leading position in terms of abstention from voting out of protest (8%). Thus, a tendency can be seen: in countries where comparatively few voted, comparatively few also have cast an invalid ballot or abstained from voting. This is an indication that on average these items are not too heavily biased.

#### **2.1.8 Closeness to parties**

The following chapter shows how close the young people of each country feel to the various parties of each country's political spectrum and if there are any differences in the closeness among socio-demographic subgroups.

### 2.1.8.1 Austria

**Table 13: Closeness to parties**

Countries		Very close	close	neither nor	distant	Very distant
<b>SPÖ</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>ÖVP</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>FPÖ</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>48</b>
	15-18	3	7	32	16	43
	19-25	3	5	23	19	51
	elementary	3	4	30	18	45
	intermediate	3	11	28	16	43
	maturity+	2	3	18	18	58
<b>Grüne</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18</b>
	elementary	7	22	32	19	20
	intermediate	7	22	33	16	22
	maturity+	11	34	29	13	13
<b>KPÖ</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>HPM</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>51</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%):

In Austria the highest rate of closeness (i.e. summing up the first two categories) is found for the SPÖ with 36%, followed by the Green Party (Grüne) with 34%. On the other hand, young Austrians are very distant to the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) (last two categories summed up: 66%) as well as to the Communists (KPÖ) (73%) and to the list of Hans- Peter Martin (HPM) (66%).

Concerning the Freedom Party (FPÖ) younger Austrians who are not yet eligible to vote don't feel explicitly closer, but at least less distant to this party (59% distance versus 70% among the older). There are also more equidistant respondents among the younger ones (32% versus 23%). Especially Austrians having obtained a maturity certificate or more feel more distant to the FPÖ (76%) than Austrians with compulsory elementary or intermediate education (63% and 59%, respectively). Among the latter, there is also a higher rate of persons feeling close (14%).

As can be seen clearly, respondents who possess a maturity certificate or more feel closer to the Green Party (in sum 45%) than those with a lower educational level.



Given the levels of party closeness, one can ask whether the closeness or distance to each party indicates a general closeness or distance to the political system and its institutions or just a singular expression of sympathy that is not related to one's trust in the system and its institutions. Therefore, nonparametric correlations were calculated to find out significant relationships between (higher) closeness to a party and (higher) trust in the key institutions of a countries' democracy.

For Austria, these nonparametric correlations reveal that there is a significant relation between the trust in political institutions and the closeness to the ÖVP.

**Table 14: Trust in national political institutions**

Trust in...		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
<b>parties</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>Close to ÖVP*</b>	4	20	53	21	2
<b>parliament</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>3</b>
	<b>close to ÖVP*</b>	3	14	51	27	4
<b>politicians</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>close to ÖVP*</b>	12	28	47	12	0

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%). \* n=221.

The overall trust in political parties in Austria among the young people is rather low: only 13% (summing up categories 4 and 5) of the respondents trust them. Almost one half (48%) are indifferent and 40% distrust political parties. The latter fraction is only about half as large (24%) among young people feeling very close or close to the ÖVP and 23% of these trust political parties.

The overall trust in the parliament is slightly higher: 20% of all respondents trust this institution, 30% distrust it and 50% are indifferent. Those feeling close to the ÖVP show a much higher trust (31%), but the same high rate of indifference like all Austrians in the sample.

The trust in politicians is comparatively lower (11%) among young Austrians and there is comparatively less indifference (37%). Those feeling closer to the ÖVP are more indifferent (47%) than the average, but not necessarily more trusting (12%).

## 2.1.8.2 Estonia

**Table 15: Closeness to parties**

Countries	Very close	close	Neither nor	distant	Very distant
<b>Isamaaliit</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Keskerakond</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>
male	4	10	25	27	34
female	3	14	32	28	23
<b>Rahvaliit</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Reformierakond</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>24</b>
male	3	17	30	23	27
female	2	24	34	20	20
<b>Res Publica</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Sotsial-deemokraatlik Erakond</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>Muu Erakond</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>42</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

The Estonian youth feels closest to the Reformierakond (24% sum of category 1 and 2) and the Res Publica (23%). Moderate closeness is found for the Isamaaliit (12%) and the Keskerakond (15%) parties. Only 8% feel close to the Rahvaliit, 10% to the Sotsial-deemokraatlik Erakond and 40% to the Muu Erakond. The Keskerakond is preferred rather by females (17%) than by males (14%). The same goes for the Reformierakond: 26% closeness among females versus 20% among males).

**Table 16: Trust in national political institutions**

Trust in...		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
<b>parties</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>Close to Reformierakond*</b>	7	33	44	15	1
	<b>Close to Res Publica**</b>	9	31	44	16	2
<b>parliament</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>4</b>
	<b>close to Reformierakond*</b>	7	19	42	29	4
	<b>Close to Res Publica**</b>	4	24	42	25	6
<b>politicians</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%). \* n=197. \*\* n= 200

Concerning trust in institutions, Estonian young people seem to trust the parliament much more than politicians and political parties.

Only 9% express trust in parties, more than one third (38%) are indifferent and the majority (52%) trusts parties hardly or not at all. Significant rates of trust are found among those feeling close to the Reformierakond or to the Res Publica. Among the former, 16% trust and 40% distrust parties and among the latter, 18% trust and again 40% distrust parties.

About one quarter (24%) of all Estonian respondents trusts in parliament and only about one third (36%) distrusts this institution. Again, those feeling close to the Reformierakond and those feeling close to the Res Publica differ only a little bit: 33% of the former and 31% of the latter express trust in the parliament.

Trust in politicians is not very high in Estonia: only 9% trust them, but 59% do not do so. One third (32%) is indifferent. No significant correlations were found between this form of trust and party closeness.

### 2.1.8.3 Finland

**Table 17: Closeness to parties**

Countries	Very close	close	Neither nor	distant	Very distant
<b>Suomen Keskusta</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Soumen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Kansallinen Kokoomus</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Vasemmistoliitto</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Vihreä liitto</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>
male	5	19	38	22	16
female	7	32	34	18	10
<b>Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Soumen Kristillisdemokraatit</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Perussuomalaiset</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>
male	3	18	38	23	17
female	2	9	41	26	23
elementary	5	17	39	24	16
intermediate	1	18	48	20	14
maturity+	1	6	35	28	31

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

The Finnish young people feel closest to the Vihreä Liitto (32%), the Suomen Keskusta (25%) and the Soumen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (24%). The lowest feeling of closeness is expressed for the Soumen Kristillisdemokraatit (7%) and the Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue (3%). For the latter, the highest distance rate (71%) is found.

Significant differences in the subgroups are found for the Vihreä Liitto, to which females feel closer (39%) than males (24%) and for the right-wing Perussuomalaiset, to which females feel less close (11%) than males (21%). Education matters, too: those with a maturity certificate or more hardly feel close to this party (7%), whereas those with elementary (22%) or those with intermediate (19%) education do to a certain extent. Among those with intermediate education, almost half (48%) are equidistant to this party.

## 2.1.8.4 France

**Table 18: Closeness to parties**

Countries	Very close	close	Neither nor	distant	Very distant
<b>Lutte Ouvrière, LCR. Parti des Travailleurs</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>34</b>
15-18	3	10	28	19	41
19-25	3	14	33	19	31
<b>Parti Communiste</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>37</b>
15-18	1	7	26	22	43
19-25	3	11	27	26	34
<b>Parti Socialiste</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>22</b>
15-18	3	22	32	16	27
19-25	8	28	32	13	19
elementary	4	16	33	18	28
intermediate	6	23	38	12	21
maturity	7	32	25	16	20
university	8	38	23	14	18
<b>Mouvement des citoyens</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Les Verts</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>UDF</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>UMP</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>Mouvement pour la France</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>FN /Mouvement National Républicain</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Traditions</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Autre Parti/Mouvement</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>53</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

In France, the young feel closest to the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) (32%) and the Green Party (31%). Moderate closeness is reported for the Lutte Ouvrière-Party (15%), the Mouvement des citoyens (13%) and the Communist Party (11%). To all other parties, not more than 10% of the young French feel close. Young French feel least indifferent when it comes to the right-wing FN, with a vast distant majority (79%).

Older respondents feel closer to the Communists (14% versus 8%) as well as to the Lutte Ouvrière party (17% versus 13%) than their younger counterparts. Concerning the Social Democrats, first, there is also increased closeness by age (36% versus 25%), but also an education gap: people with elementary or intermediate education feel not as close as those with maturity or as university degree. Note that for France, the more detailed educational categorisation was used, because there is a large enough fraction of students in the French sample.

**Table 19: Trust in national political institutions**

Trust in...		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
parties	total	24	34	34	7	1
parliament	total	20	32	34	12	2
politicians	total	28	37	28	7	1

Weighted data; percentages.

Trust in the components of a political system mentioned in the table is not very widespread among French young people, too.

Only 8% express trust in political parties, a majority of 58% trust political parties hardly or not at all. 14% trust the French parliament, with again a majority of 52% being sceptical or distrusting. 8% trust politicians and in this matter there is relatively less indifference (28%), so that almost two thirds (65%) distrust politicians.

No significant differences concerning trust by party preference were found.

### 2.1.8.5 Germany

**Table 20: Closeness to parties**

Countries	Very close	close	Neither nor	distant	Very distant
<b>CDU/CSU</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>SPD</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>10</b>
elementary	5	24	42	17	14
intermediate	2	27	38	20	12
maturity+	5	43	33	16	3
<b>FDP</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Bündnis 90/Grüne</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>
elementary	3	17	33	24	23
intermediate	2	22	34	22	20
maturity+	10	32	31	16	11
<b>PDS</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>38</b>
15-18	0	7	36	26	30
19-25	0	6	23	28	43
<b>NPD</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>71</b>
15-18	1	5	18	16	61
19-25	1	2	10	11	77
elementary	0	6	21	18	55
intermediate	1	3	12	15	69
maturity+	0	0	6	5	90

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Young Germans feel closest to the SPD (35%), followed by the Green Party (29%). The CDU/CSU reaches 22% of closeness, the FDP only 9%. There is a remarkably strong distance to both the left-wing extremist PDS (65%) and to the right-wing extremist NPD (84%). Concerning the latter, none of the respondents feel very close and only 3% feel close.

For the SPD, an education gap is found: people with maturity feel closer (48%) than those with lower education (29% respectively). The same goes for the Green Party, to which 42% of those with maturity, but only 24% of those with intermediate education and 20% of those with elementary education feel close.

The age difference for the PDS is manifested mainly due to a stronger distance of the older respondents (71% versus 56%), without a higher closeness of the younger on the other side.

For the NPD, the age difference seems mainly to be due to a higher rate of equidistant respondents among those not yet eligible to vote (18% versus 10% among the older), but there is also 1% that feels very close to the NDP. The more striking difference arises when we differentiate by education: there is an almost unequivocal expression of distance (90%) among those who have at least a maturity certificate, whereas people who feel close to this party are only found among those with lower educational levels. At the same time, the rate of equidistance rises from 6% (maturity+) to 21% (elementary).



## 2.1.8.6 Italy

**Table 21: Closeness to parties**

Countries	Very close	close	Neither nor	distant	Very distant
<b>Forza Italia</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>40</b>
elementary	4	20	25	16	34
intermediate	4	22	27	18	29
maturity+	5	15	16	18	46
<b>DS</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>17</b>
male	3	16	30	29	21
female	4	25	32	26	13
<b>Uniti nell ulivo</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>18</b>
male	5	21	25	27	22
female	9	25	31	21	14
<b>Margherita</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>20</b>
male	1	17	29	29	24
female	4	23	36	23	15
<b>Alleanza Nazionale</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Rifondazione Comunista</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>31</b>
male	7	14	20	20	38
female	5	19	29	25	22
<b>UDC</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Lega Nord</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>56</b>
elementary	2	7	21	19	50
intermediate	0	7	27	22	44
maturity+	1	7	15	16	61
<b>Verdi</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Comunisti Italiani</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>31</b>
male	4	13	23	23	37
female	3	19	31	25	23
<b>Lista Emma Bonino</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Di Pietro Occhetto</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>Socialisti Uniti</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>33</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

The highest closeness is reported for the Uniti nell ulivo (30%), which is a party association. Among the parties, the highest closeness rates are reported for the DS (24%), Forza Italia (22%), Margherita (22%), Alleanza

Nazionale (23%) and the Rifondazione Comunista (22%). They are followed by the Green party and the Comunisti Italiani with 19% each. All other parties are small to negligible in terms of closeness.

For the Forza Italia, the differences by education are significant, but not easily interpretable: only 20% of those with maturity or more feel close to this party and 64% distant. So there is less indifference vis-à-vis the Forza Italia. With lower education, the rate of equidistance rises. People with elementary or intermediate education do neither feel closer nor more distant, but more indifferent.

Women feel closer to the DS (29% versus 19% of males) and to both communist parties.

The educational differences concerning the closeness to the right-wing Lega Nord follow the same pattern as for the Forza Italia: reduced indifference rates among those with maturity or more (15% versus 21% and 27%) and, consequently, difference mainly due to stronger distance than to increased closeness.

**Table 22: Trust in national political institutions**

Trust in...		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
<b>parties</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>Close to Forza Italia*</b>	13	32	34	19	3
<b>parliament</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>politicians</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%). \* n= 199.

11% of all Italian respondents trust political parties, 59% do not and 30% are indifferent. Trust is much higher (22%) among those feeling close to the Forza Italia and distrust is smaller (45%).

19% trust the parliament, but 39% are indifferent and 42% distrust it

Only 7% trust politicians in Italy. Again, this is the item with the relatively least indifference (20%), which means a very high overall distrust (73%).

### 2.1.8.7 Slovakia

**Table 23: Closeness to parties**

Countries	Very close	close	Neither nor	distant	Very distant
HZDS	4	12	28	21	35
SDKU	2	15	34	25	24
SMER	8	24	34	16	17
KDH	3	9	29	29	30
SMK	4	7	24	23	42
ANO	2	13	36	25	24
KSS	1	4	21	28	46
SNS	4	10	29	26	32
PSNS	2	7	26	26	39
SDL	0	5	26	28	39
SDA	0	3	23	29	45
DS	0	4	25	27	44
SF	0	4	28	25	42

Weighted data; percentages.

No strong significant differences among the subgroups were found in Slovakia.

Compared to the other parties and the high amount of parties, there is a rather strong closeness to the SMER (32%) expressed by the Slovakian young people. Then follow the SDKU (17%), the HZDS (16%), the ANO (15%) and the SNS (14%). The last four parties in the table are hardly of importance in terms of personal closeness among young people.

**Table 24: Trust in national political institutions**

Trust in...		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
parties	total	23	38	32	6	0
parliament	total	19	37	37	6	1
politicians	total	32	39	24	5	0

Weighted data; percentages.

The most striking difference between Slovakia and the other countries is that there is no “trust bonus” for the parliament, i.e. there is no comparatively higher rate of trust.

6% of the Slovakian respondents trust political parties, one third (32%) are indifferent and 61% express distrust. Not more than 7% trust the parliament, 56% distrust it. Finally, only 5% trust politicians with a relatively lower rate of indifference (24%), which translates into a high rate of distrust (71%).

## 2.1.8.8 UK

**Table 25: Closeness to parties**

Countries	Very close	close	Neither nor	distant	Very distant
<b>Labour</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Conservative</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>22</b>
elementary	1	0	42	26	31
intermediate	0	4	43	27	25
maturity+	0	11	47	26	15
<b>Liberal Democrat</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>20</b>
elementary	0	3	43	23	32
intermediate	1	6	46	22	25
maturity+	1	9	65	17	8
<b>Green Party</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>21</b>
elementary	0	3	41	25	31
intermediate	1	5	47	22	24
maturity+	3	8	56	21	13
<b>UK Independence Party</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Scottish National Party</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Plaid Cymru</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>SDLP</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Scottish Socialist Party</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Ulster Unionist Party</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Respect</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>41</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Given the overall small rates of expressed closeness and the very high rates of equidistance - more than one third throughout the whole range of parties - the Labour and the Green parties manage to reach 9% and 8% closeness, respectively. Then the Conservatives follow with 7%. For all

other parties, the closeness is marginal or even not existent and there is a lower rate of equidistance. The extreme case is the Scottish Socialist party, where none of the respondents expressed closeness.

Among the British young with maturity or more, there is a higher rate of persons feeling close to the Conservatives whereas among those with lower education, there are hardly any. The same tendency of increased closeness with higher education is found for the Liberal Democrats (10% closeness among those with maturity) and for the Green party (11%). At the same time, the rate of equidistance increases among respondents with at least maturity in comparison to the subgroups with lower education.

**Table 26: Trust in national political institutions**

Trust in...		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
<b>parties</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>parliament</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>politicians</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>

Weighted data; percentages.

First, high trust (“very much”) in all three components of the political system is low to not existent among young people in the UK. 6% trust political parties, 41% feel indifferent and 52% do not trust them. Again, trust in the parliament is comparatively higher: it reaches 18% trust, but also 44% of distrust and 38% indifference. On average, Politicians are not trusted very highly: 9% of trust in contrary to 56% of distrust.

Across all the party landscapes of the eight countries, the following general tendencies can be pointed out that do not prevail in every single country in a significant way, but are also not just singularities of a certain party landscape:

- Right-wing (extremist) parties are generally regarded with greater distance than most of the other parties and this distance is more explicit the higher the educational level obtained is (see Austria, Finland, Germany and Italy)
- Green parties attain higher rates of closeness among the higher educated (see Austria, Germany and the UK)

- Social democratic parties also attain higher rates of closeness among the higher educated, although this tendency is less clearly visible (see France and Germany)

Across all countries, two tendencies concerning trust can be pointed out:

- Trust in the parliament is higher than trust in political parties and politicians in all countries, with Slovakia being the exception.
- Young people are least indifferent when it comes to trust or distrust persons, i.e. politicians compared to institutions like parties and the parliament.

### 2.1.9 Party work

Another form of political participation the EUYOUNG questionnaire asked for was party work (Q14), consisting of the items “supported an election campaign” and “tried to convince others to vote for a candidate or a party”.

**Table 27: Party work**

Countries		campaign support		Convincing to vote	
		no	yes	no	Yes
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>26</b>
	elementary			85	15
	intermediate			74	26
	maturity+			62	38
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>16</b>
	15-18	96	4		
	19-25	86	14		
	elementary	96	4		
	intermediate	88	12		
	maturity+	85	15		
	in paid work	86	14		
	in education	94	6		
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>5</b>
	15-18	98	2		
	19-25	96	4		
	elementary			98	2
	intermediate			97	3
	Maturity+			90	10

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

The highest rate of young people having ever supported an election campaign for a political party is found for Italy (13%) and Finland (11%). Then Slovakia follows with 10%. In the UK, however, supporting the campaign of a political party is a rare activity: only 3% have ever done so.

There are two countries, where there is significant heterogeneity in the rate across the subgroups, namely Slovakia and the UK. A stronger support rate of older respondents is found to be significant in Slovakia, where 14% of the young ever supported a campaign, and in the UK, where 4% of the older respondents ever did, compared to 3% on average. In Slovakia, there is also an education gap. Especially, there is one between those having only obtained elementary education, where 4% ever supported a campaign, and those who have a higher level of education. Among the latter, 12% of those with vocational training and 15% of those having obtained a form of maturity certificate or more have ever supported a campaign. Note also that in Slovakia young people in paid work significantly engage more often (14%) in a political campaign than those still in education (6%).

The more personal or informal way of campaign support, trying to convince others to vote for a candidate or a party, is most practised by young Italians (34%) and young Germans (26%). For Austria and Finland, rather high overall rates of one quarter respectively are found. In the UK, only 5% of the young ever personally tried to convince others to vote for somebody or for a certain party. Concerning the effort to convince somebody, there is a significant education gap in Germany: 15% of those with a compulsory elementary education level, but 38% of those who possess at least a maturity certificate have ever tried to convince others. A similar gap is found for the UK: especially those with maturity or more have ever tried to convince others much more often (10%) than the UK average.

Altogether, in terms of party work, there is first the UK, with an overall low level of party campaign support as well as convincing effort. Estonia and France seem to show the same pattern, but less pronounced. Second, there are countries with a high rate of active young people in both dimensions of party work, like Italy and Finland. Third, there are Austria and Germany, where party work does not take place too often via campaign support, but more via more or less informal convincing effort. Fourth, the pattern for Slovakia seems to be inverted: there is a relatively high level of campaign support, but only a mediocre convincing effort.

#### **2.1.10 Participation at school**

Because of great differences from country to country in both the system of representation in school in general and the understanding and meaning of the key words in the questions about political participation at school, the results are not comparable. Differences in participation rates therefore



reflect different opportunity structures, which has been discussed in the “Technical Report on the Comparability of Indicators” (p 63ff). The following three countries are taken as examples for such diverging opportunity structures that lead to great variance in the reported activities.

#### 2.1.10.1 Case 1: Finland

**Table 28: Participation at school in Finland**

Form of participation	no	yes
<b>Member of a student council</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>28</b>
Interested in politics	56	44
Not interested in politics	80	20
<b>Speaker of the class</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>Attended a students’ meeting</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Taken an active role in meeting</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Protest movement at school</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Organisation of political event at school</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>4</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

First, in Finland a regular student council does not exist, at least not at school level. Activity comes from students’ or pupils unions with compulsory membership or other organisations of less political tightness and commitment. So 28% of the Finnish respondents have been active in one of these forms of organisations. Second, there is no such thing like an official speaker of the class as for example in Austria. Therefore, the engagement of those 33% of Finns who say they have done so have to be interpreted as occasional, informal engagement of a limited time and thematic horizon. The lack of formal representation makes the term “meeting” most likely a catch-all-phrase for anything from party-like gatherings to demonstrations or more official happenings. These 60% cannot be clearly interpreted. The same goes for the question about active roles in these meetings. The rather low rate of protest activity stems from the negative connotation of the term and from the rareness of organised protesting activity at Finnish schools. All the background mentioned as well as the rather negative connotation of the term “political” in school matters seem to explain the low rate of 4% having ever organised a political event at school.

Given the Finnish opportunity structure, the question remains if the activities reported can be interpreted as being motivated out of political interest. There is evidence supporting this hypothesis for the student council membership: Of all Finns interested in politics (categories 1 and 2 of question 1 summarized), 44% have been a member of a student council, whereas only 20% of those not interested in politics have been.

#### 2.1.10.2 Case 2: France

**Table 29: Participation at school in France**

Form of participation	no	yes
<b>Member of a student council</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Speaker of the class</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Attended a students' meeting</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Taken an active role in meeting</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Protest movement at school</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>38</b>
male	66	34
female	57	43
15-18	70	30
19-25	57	43
<b>Organisation of political event at school</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>9</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

France has both a formal and homogeneous representation system and a well- defined official role of a speaker of the class. This is why the 8% of student council members and the 40% having ever been in the role of a speaker of the class during their school life can be interpreted as a valid answer to what question the designers had in mind. Regular activities of pupils' unions against the government's school or general policy explain why 24% have ever attended a students' meeting with almost half of them being in an active role as well as the 38% of participation at protest movements at school. For the latter, it is found that females and older pupils or students participated in protests more often. Although less sensitive concerning the idea of political influence at school in general, French pupils cannot easily organise explicitly political events or invite politicians. This constraint most likely explains the relatively small rate of 9%.

Given the content validity of the participation questions, one can proceed to the core questions of whether participation at school is associated with higher political interest and whether it is related to overt political behaviour like voting, product boycott or persuasion effort and finally, whether the integration of politics in the family life leads to increased activity. The results concerning these questions are reported in the following table:

**Table 30: Participation rates of active pupils**

Form of participation or attitude	n	Speaker of the class	Attended students' meeting	Protest movement participation
<b>total</b>		<b>40 (397)</b>	<b>24 (241)</b>	<b>38 (382)</b>
<b>interested in politics</b>	355	57	37	50
<b>Voted in last general elections</b>	284		31	66
<b>Voted in last EP elections</b>	317	48	34	
<b>Boycotted products</b>	105	67	49	68
<b>Bought products for political reasons</b>	117	73	54	73
<b>Convinced others to vote for party/candidate</b>	148	62	51	64
<b>Always/often discuss politics with father</b>	120	63	43	56
<b>Always/often discuss politics with mother</b>	102	63	48	55
<b>Always/often discuss politics with friends</b>	107	60	47	61

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

As mentioned in Table 30, 40% or 397 of the French respondents have ever been a speaker of the class throughout their school life, 24% attended a student meeting and 38% participated in a protest movement. Of those being very much or much interested in politics, 57% have ever been a speaker of the class, 37% attended a student meeting and 50% protested. Therefore, general political interest clearly coincides with all these forms of participation at school in France.

As far as actual voting in the last EP is concerned, there was a higher-than-average turnout amongst former speakers of the class (48%) and of former attendants of student meetings (34%). Nevertheless, there is no significantly higher rate of participants at protest movements at school. On the other hand, speakers of the class did not vote more often at national elections

than the average (grey field), whereas the attendants of student meetings and especially the protesters did.

Product boycott and product buying for political reasons are again activities, where those participating in the forms mentioned are found to a much larger extent than those not participating. Especially, a vast majority of the participants at protest movements and the speakers of the class (73% each) are also boycotters.

The ones willing to protest also make up the majority (64%) of those that personally try to convince others to vote for a certain candidate or party. Therefore, it seems that participants at protest movements are more inclined to vote in national elections, but do not vote more often in European elections than the French average.

Among those who discuss politics with their parents or with their friends always or often, again all three forms of participants are found to a much larger extent than the average. The integration of politics into family life, therefore, seems to play an important role for political participation at school.

In sum, the majority - or at least a higher fraction than the average - of those that have been speaker of the class and those that attended student meetings show a higher general political interest as well as an increased level of political activity. Furthermore, there is a relation between the political socialisation at home in the sense of discussion frequency and participation at school. The same goes for those that have ever participated in a protest movement at school, with the only exception that this form of participation does not necessarily translate into actual voting on a European level.

### 2.1.10.3 Case 3: UK

**Table 31: Participation at school in the UK**

Form of participation	no	yes
Member of a student council	89	11
Speaker of the class	89	11
Attended a students' meeting	80	20
Taken an active role in meeting	88	12
Protest movement at school	94	6
Organisation of political event at school	94	6

Weighted data; percentages.

The possible forms of participation in British schools are those of staff-student committees or as representatives in the sense of prefects. Also, alternative forms exist and are rather frequent. Most likely, the terms used in the questionnaire were not well understood. This is the reason for the low rate of positive responses (11%).

These semantic difficulties may also have caused the low rate of speakers of the class (11%), which is a function usually known as representative for the year group in the British school system. The term "student meeting" may have made evoked the association of social or sports events rather than purely political or administrative gatherings. Therefore, certain heterogeneity stands behind the result of 20%. The same heterogeneity of associations may have caused the rather small 6% of protest and organisational activity.

### 2.1.11 Participation at workplace

Different opportunity structures make it impossible to compare the results of political participation at the workplace between countries ("Technical Report on the Comparability of Indicators", p 70ff). Therefore, again only three examples are discussed in this chapter.

#### 2.1.11.1 Case1: Austria

60% of all Austrian respondents report having work experience in a steady, paid job. First of all, there are no significant gender differences in this rate.

Not surprisingly, only one third (33%) of those aged 15 to 18 report work experience, but already 76% of those aged between 19 and 25 do.

By educational level, the highest work experience rate is found for those with intermediate education (90%), then follows the category of higher educated (maturity+) with 62%. A low rate of only 39% is found for those with only elementary education. At a closer look, it can be seen that there are still 31% without a regular work experience in the sense of question 16 among those with elementary education being 19 to 25 years of age.

While on one hand all (100%) of those being in paid work and on the other hand only 14% of those being in education report work experience, 55% of the young Austrians who declare themselves unemployed do not have experience in a steady paid job.

For the results that follow, it is necessary to keep in mind the Austrian legal framework concerning participation at workplace: whenever there is a minimum of five permanent employees in a company, the legal precondition for the foundation of a workers' council ("Betriebsrat") is fulfilled.

Representatives must be employed in the company for at least 6 months (see also "Technical Report on the Comparability of Indicators, p 70).

**Table 32: Participation at workplace in Austria**

Form of participation	no	yes
<b>Election for a workers' council</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>23</b>
male	73	27
female	81	19
15-18	91	9
19-25	73	27
<b>Member of a workers' council</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Attended a staff meeting</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>38</b>
15-18	73	27
19-25	59	41
<b>Taken an active role in meeting</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>8</b>
15-18	98	2
19-25	90	10
<b>Organisation of group to influence management decision</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>7</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

23% of the Austrians who reported job experience have ever participated in an election for a workers' council. Male respondents (27%) and older ones (27%) have done so more often than their counterparts. Only 4% are members of a workers' council. This figure shows that is rather unusual to become a member in the first years of working life in Austria, which is most likely due to the necessity of a member to be experienced with the legal and personal matters of a company. 38% attended a staff meeting. This figure leaves space for at least two interpretations: either, for the majority of the respondents, there has not yet been an occasion to attend a staff meeting or there have been enough occasions, but the young people didn't attend those meetings. However, older respondents attended such a meeting more often (41%) than their younger counterparts. 8% have taken an active role in such a meeting, with a clear age difference in the activity, where only 2% of those aged up to 18 ever did. 7% report having taken part in the organisation of a group to influence a management decision.

In search for relations between participation at workplace and other forms of political participation similar to the analysis conducted in chapter 2.1.4, the following significant group differences were found for groups still large enough to be included in the analysis:

**Table 33: Participation rates of actives in Austria**

Form of participation or attitude	n	Workers' council election	Attended staff meeting
<b>total</b>		<b>23 (128)</b>	<b>38 (220)</b>
<b>Voted in last EP elections</b>	331	32	
<b>Boycotted products</b>	151	32	
<b>Bought products for political reasons</b>	191		48
<b>Convinced others to vote for party/candidate</b>	247	36	48
<b>Always/often discuss politics with friends</b>	191	32	

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

First, participation in workers' council elections is related to voting: among those that did vote in the last EP elections, 32% also participated in workers' council elections. Second, there is a relation to political consumerism: 32% of those who boycotted products also took part in workers' council elections. Third, the same goes for the political and the

personal convincing effort (36%). Finally, voting in workers' council elections is also a matter of the political climate of the peer group: 32% of those that always or often discuss politics with friends also vote in workers' council elections.

Higher rates of staff meeting attendants are found first among active political consumerists (48%) as well as among those who ever tried to convince others for a political party or candidate (48%).

#### **2.1.11.2 Case2: Estonia**

In the Estonian sample, the rate of work-experienced young people is 42%, with no significant gender differences. Of those aged up to 18, only 7% report work experience, whereas 63% of those aged 19 to 25 do. The vast majority (86%) of those with elementary education do not have work experience. When differentiating further by age, it can be seen that there are still 51% of the older without any higher education than elementary who do not have work experience. Among those with intermediate education, 69% and among those with at least maturity certificate, 60% are experienced. On the one hand 6% of those in paid work report that they don't have experience in a steady paid job, on the other hand 18% of those in education already have that experience. Among the young unemployed Estonians, only 37% report that experience.

Before interpreting the participation rates in Estonia, one has to know that participating in a meeting and taking an active part there is closer related to each other in Estonia than in the other countries (see "Technical Report on the Comparability of Indicators", p 75). Because of the country's history, trade unionism has a very short tradition. The perception of trade unions as interest representation groups vis-à-vis the management are not yet deeply rooted.



**Table 34: Participation at workplace in Estonia**

Form of participation	no	yes
<b>Election for a workers' council</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Member of a workers' council</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Attended a staff' meeting</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Taken an active role in meeting</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Organisation of group to influence management decision</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>15</b>

Weighted data; percentages.

9% of the young Estonians with working experience have ever taken part in a workers' council election and only 4% declare themselves members of such a council. The possible misunderstanding of the meaning of "staff meeting" is reflected by the relatively high rate of attendants in the Estonian sample. The highly active character of Estonian meetings described above is also reflected by the figures of Table 34. The relatively high rate of group organisers among the young Estonians could also be interpreted in the light of the short trade unionism history of the country.

No significant relations between workplace participation and other forms of political participation are found for groups large enough to be significant.

### **2.1.11.3 Case 3: Finland**

45% of the young Finns have experience in a steady paid job, without significant differences by gender. 18% of those between 15 and 18 of age and 60% of those aged 19 to 25 report this experience. By education, 75% of those with elementary education do not yet have work experience. Further differentiated by age, it can be seen that also in Finland, there is a majority of 51% of older young people with elementary education but still without work experience in the sense of question 16. The relative highest rate is found for those with intermediate education with 70%, and for those with maturity or more the rate is 59%. For Finland, there is also a fraction of 10% among those in paid work, who do not report having work experience, but there are 31% of those in education who already have that experience. Two thirds (66%) of the unemployed young people in Finland do not yet have working experience.

Finland among the most highly organised countries: in some production fields 90% or more of the workforce are union members. Trade unions are

well organised and structured and deeply rooted in the everyday working life. Nevertheless, the representation by a workers' council with responsibility for all workers is not generally found in all companies. The impact of unionism is most likely not reflected very well by the Finnish EUYOUNG respondents, as many of them are part time workers or people with a short working life history ("Technical Report on the Comparability of Indicators", p 76). The interpretation of the responses to the term "staff meeting" has to be carried out with caution, as the answers might subsume both the more usual work place based trade union activities as well as staff meetings that are less related to collective action or practised only by the non-unionised workers.

**Table 35: Participation at workplace in Finland**

Form of participation	no	yes
<b>Election for a workers' council</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Member of a workers' council</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>4</b>
male	93	7
female	99	1
<b>Attended a staff meeting</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>31</b>
elementary	80	20
intermediate	68	32
maturity+	61	39
<b>Taken an active role in meeting</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Organisation of group to influence management decision</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>11</b>
male	85	15
female	94	6

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

The possible lack of representativeness of the Finnish sample for the situation of full time workers could be seen as one reason why, despite the high unionisation in Finland, only 12% of the respondents have ever taken part in the election of a workers' council. Again, only 4% are members of such a council, with a diminishing membership rate (1%) among the female respondents. Almost one third (31%) have attended a staff meeting. Here, an education bias can be seen: the higher the educational level, the higher the participation rate. Concerning activity in such a meeting, the rate is again relatively low (8%). Groups to influence management decisions have

been organised by 11% of the respondents with higher activity of males (15%) relative to females (6%) in that matter.

**Table 36: Participation rates of actives in Finland**

Form of participation or attitude	n	Attended staff meeting
<b>total</b>		<b>31 (137)</b>
<b>Voted in last EP elections</b>	253	39
<b>Boycotted products</b>	240	44
<b>Convinced others to vote for party/candidate</b>	254	39
<b>Trade union member</b>	152	48
<b>Always/often discuss politics with friends</b>	100	48

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Voting and staff meeting attendance are related in Finland, too: 39% of those that did vote in the last EP elections also attended a staff meeting. Even higher (44%) is the rate of attendants among product boycotters. Personal convincing effort is also related to attendance (39%). As there is a large enough number of trade union members for Finland, a significant difference between these and the non-members with regard to staff meeting attendance was sought and found (48%). Finally, almost half (48%) of those young people that discuss politics with their friends at least “often” also attend staff meetings.

### **2.1.12 Membership and activity within Interest Organisations**

The analysis concerning comparability of organisational involvement detected two clusters that were comparable across all eight countries.

- Cluster 1: Immigrants organisations, women’s organisations, professional organisations and anti-globalisation organisations, consumer associations, political parties, youth organisations of a political party and trade unions
- Cluster 2: Organisations fighting for peace, human rights, environmental protection and animal rights protection.

Five categories remained and did neither seem to belong to any of the formed clusters nor to form their own cluster. The following chapter only analyses those forms of membership and activity within organisations that were part of one of those clusters and are comparable at least between five countries. Due to a very small number of cases we are not able to show statistically significant differences for gender, age, education and work-status (with the exception of Finland concerning membership and activity in trade unions).

**Table 37: Membership and activity in Youth organisations of a political party**

Countries (total numbers)	Membership	Participated in an activity	Done voluntary work
Austria	6	5	3
Estonia	4	3	2
Finland	3	2	1
France	1	1	1
Germany	2	3	1
Italy	3	4	2
Slovakia	1	2	1
UK	0	0	0

Weighted data; percentages.

- Austria shows the highest number of young people being a member of a political party's youth organisation: 6% of the Austrian youth sample responded positively to the request concerning membership. Almost 5% have already participated in an activity of a party's youth organisation.
- On the contrary, in the UK, young people are neither members of nor do they participate in any activities of youth organisations of a political party. Also French and Slovakian young people seem to be less involved in the youth organisations of political parties.
- In general, engaging in voluntary work seems to happen less often than participating in an activity of a political party's youth organisation.

**Table 38: Membership and activity in Trade Unions**

Countries (total numbers)		Membership	Participated in an activity	Done voluntary work
Austria		7	3	1
Estonia		1	2	1
France		1	1	0
Germany		4	3	0
Italy		3	2	1
Slovakia		3	2	1
UK		2	1	0
Finland	total	15	4	1
	15-18years	5	2	
	19-25years	21	5	
	Elementary	7	2	
	Intermediate	23	4	
	Maturity+	23	6	

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

- Estonia, France and the UK show lower levels of membership and activity in trade unions in comparison to the other comparable countries.
- Remarkable is, that in Austria 7% have already been a member of the trade union, Germany follows with 4%. An equivalent number of 3% have participated in trade union activities during the last twelve months.
- Due to the outcome of the cluster analysis, the Finnish result of this item cannot be compared with the other countries. 15% of Finnish youth have ever been a member in trade unions. The older and the better educated the Finns are the more likely they become a member in a trade union and the more likely they participate in an activity. Membership reaches outstanding high figures in Finland.

**Table 39: Membership and activity in Political Parties**

Countries (total numbers)	Membership	Participated in an activity	Done voluntary work
Austria	4	4	2
Estonia	2	2	2
Finland	2	3	1
France	1	1	1
Germany	2	3	2
Italy	4	3	2
Slovakia	1	3	1
UK	1	0	0

Weighted data; percentages.

- 4% of young people in Italy and Austria are members of political parties. In Austria 4% have already participated in an activity of a political party, in Italy it is 3%.
- France and the UK show the lowest levels of membership and activity in political parties.
- It is worth mentioning that the Slovakian results show that more people participate in activities of a political party than have been members of a political party.

**Table 40: Membership and activity in Environmental Organisations**

Countries (total numbers)	Membership	Participated in an activity	Done voluntary work
Austria	7	5	3
Estonia	1	3	3
Finland	2	4	2
France	2	3	1
Germany	4	4	2
Slovakia	1	6	4
UK	2	1	1
Italy	3	4	2

Weighted data; percentages.

- Especially the Austrian data, but also the German data reveal higher levels of membership in environmental organisations in comparison to the other countries.

- Again, it seems interesting that while 6% of Slovakian adolescents participated in an activity of an environmental organisation and 4% did voluntary work, only 1% said they were actually a member of such an organisation.
- A similar pattern can be found in the Estonian, the Finnish and the French data set.
- According to the result of the cluster analysis the responses of the young Italians are not comparable with those of the other seven countries.

**Table 41: Membership and activity in Animals rights/protection group**

Countries (total numbers)	Membership	Participated in an activity	Done voluntary work
Austria	7	3	4
Estonia	0	1	1
Finland	2	4	2
France	2	3	1
Germany	4	2	2
Slovakia	1	6	6
UK	2	2	1
Italy	4	5	2

Weighted data; percentages.

- Once more - in comparison to other countries - Austria shows the highest amount of young people being a member of an animals' rights/protection group: 7% are a member of such an organisation.
- Again, Slovakian respondents are more actively engaged in such institutions in comparison with the rest of the countries: 6% have already participated in an activity of or done voluntary work for an animals' protection group.
- Estonian young people are barely involved in any way in animals' rights/protection groups.
- According to the result of the cluster analysis, the responses of the young Italians are incommensurable: 4% are a member and 5% have already participated in an activity.

**Table 42: Membership and activity in Peace Organisations**

Countries (total numbers)	Membership	Participated in an activity	Done voluntary work
Austria	3	3	2
Estonia	0	1	1
Germany	0	4	1
Italy	2	10	1
UK	1	1	0
Finland	1	2	1
France	1	2	1
Slovakia	1	2	1

Weighted data.

- Attention should be drawn to the fact that 10% of young Italian have already participated in activities of peace organisations.
- Again Austria shows the highest number of members of peace organisations.
- Young people from Estonia and the UK show the lowest level of involvement in peace organisations.
- Finland, France and Slovakia cannot be compared with other countries due to the cluster analysis results. Engagement is low in those countries.

**Table 43: Membership and activity in Human Rights Organisations**

Countries (total numbers)	Membership	Participated in an activity	Done voluntary work
Austria	6	4	5
Estonia	1	1	1
Finland	3	7	3
Germany	2	4	2
Italy	3	10	4
UK	1	1	0
France	2	3	1
Slovakia	1	3	2

Weighted data; percentages.

- Young Italians and Finnish adolescents have participated in activities of human rights organisations more often than their peers in other countries.



- Once again, Austria shows the highest membership rate regarding human rights organisations in comparison to the other countries.
- Estonia and the UK show the lowest level of involvement in human rights organisations.
- The responses of the young French and young Slovaks are incommensurable. And again, in Slovakia participation and volunteering seem to be more likely than being a member.

**Table 44: Membership and activity in Professional Organisations**

Countries (total numbers)	Membership	Participated in an activity	Done voluntary work
Austria	2	1	1
Estonia	2	1	1
Finland	2	1	1
France	0	0	0
Germany	1	1	0
Italy	1	1	0
Slovakia	1	1	1
UK	1	1	0

Weighted data; percentages.

- In general, participation and voluntary engagement within professional organisations are rather low.
- Young Austrians, young Estonians and young Finns have slightly more memberships in professional organisations in comparison to the other countries.

**Table 45: Membership and activity in Consumer Associations**

<b>Countries (total numbers)</b>	<b>Membership</b>	<b>Participated in an activity (1)</b>	<b>Done voluntary work (2)</b>
Austria	0	1	1
Estonia	2	0	0
Finland	0	1	0
France	1	0	0
Germany	0	0	0
Italy	1	1	0
Slovakia	1	1	1
UK	0	0	0

Weighted data; percentages; (1),(2) Results over countries are not statistically significant.

- Membership in consumer associations between our eight countries is significantly different.
- Participation and voluntary engagement within consumer associations, however, are similar in all countries.
- In general, all three forms of engagement produce very low figures.

**Table 46: Membership and activity in Immigrants Organisations**

<b>Countries (total numbers)</b>	<b>Membership (1)</b>	<b>Participated in an activity</b>	<b>Done voluntary work (2)</b>
Austria	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0
Finland	0	1	1
France	0	0	0
Germany	0	1	0
Italy	0	2	1
Slovakia	0	0	0
UK	0	0	0

Weighted data; percentages, (1),(2) Results over countries are not statistically significant.

- There is hardly any membership in Immigrants organisations.
- Participation in an activity of an immigrants' organisation differs among countries.
- Doing voluntary work (and being a member) is similar between all countries.

**Table 47: Membership and activity in Women's organisations**

<b>Countries (total numbers)</b>	<b>Membership (1)</b>	<b>Participated in an activity</b>	<b>Done voluntary work (2)</b>
Austria	0	1	1
Estonia	0	1	0
Finland	0	1	1
France	1	0	0
Germany	0	1	0
Italy	0	2	0
Slovakia	1	1	1
UK	0	0	0

Weighted data; percentages, (1),(2) Results over countries are not statistically significant.

- There is only a minimal amount of membership in France and Slovakia.
- Participation in women's organisations is statistically different between countries
- Membership and voluntary work are similar in the eight countries

**Table 48: Membership and activity in Anti-globalisation Organisations**

<b>Countries (total numbers)</b>	<b>Membership (1)</b>	<b>Participated in an activity</b>	<b>Done voluntary work (2)</b>
Austria	1	1	1
Estonia	0	0	0
Finland	0	1	0
France	1	1	0
Germany	0	1	0
Italy	1	5	1
Slovakia	0	0	1
UK	0	0	0

Weighted data; percentages, (1),(2) Results over countries are not statistically significant.

- Remarkable is that the Italian youth show higher levels of participation in anti-globalisation organisations than all the other countries
- Membership and voluntary work are similar in all eight countries.

- Participation in activities of anti-globalisation organisations differ significantly between the countries

#### CONCLUSIONS:

- In Austria membership is most common and most frequent in comparison to the other countries within the sample.
- In Slovakia it is the other way round: participating and doing voluntary work is more common than becoming a member of a political organisation.
- In Estonia and the UK membership as well as participation and volunteering are least common throughout all political organisations.

## 2.2 Participation outside the representative democratic system

When asking for political participation of young people participation outside the well established representative system is as important or sometimes even more important for young Europeans. Most of our indicators measuring participation activity outside the representative democratic system were comparable across our eight countries. The following chapter will give an overview about the amount of young people being active within these forms.

Four factors were created for describing political participation outside the representative political system:

Factor 1: Political Consumerism – consisting of the items “buying products for political, ethical or environmental reasons” and “boycotting products for political, ethical or environmental reasons”

Factor 2: Political Discourse – consisting of the items “contacted a politician”, “collected signatures”, “held a political speech”, “distributed leaflets with a political content”, “donated money to support the work of a political group or organisation”, “contributed to a political discussion on the internet”, “written an article, e.g. in a students newspaper, organisation journal, or the internet” and “written or forwarded a letter/an email with a political content”

Factor 3: Political Protest – consisting of the items “participated in a legal demonstration” and “participated in a strike”

Factor 4: Illegal and violent forms of political participation – consisting of the items “written political messages or graffiti on walls”, “participated in an illegal demonstration”, “participated in a political event where property is damaged”, “participated in a political event where there was a violent confrontation with the police”, “participated in a political event where there was a violent confrontation with political opponents”, “occupied houses, school/university buildings, factories or government offices” and “blocked streets or railways”

### 2.2.1 Political Consumerism

**Table 49: Product boycott**

Countries		Ever	During the last 12 months...			
			once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>
	elementary	12	2	2	1	6
	intermediate	13	3	3	1	5
	maturity+	25	6	4	5	11
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>13</b>
	15-18	17	3	4	3	8
	19-25	29	4	5	4	16
	elementary	19	3	3	3	10
	intermediate	19	4	3	3	9
	maturity+	37	4	6	7	20
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>
	male	15	2	2	1	9
	female	18	1	4	4	9
	elementary	11	1	3	3	5
	intermediate	9	2	0	1	6
	maturity+	22	2	4	3	12
	In paid work	15	2	2	1	9
	in education	19	2	4	4	10
	unemployed	5	0	1	1	3
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

In Finland, product boycott is practised the most: 25% of the young people that have been asked have ever boycotted a product as means of political expression. Italian youth follows with 17%. Comparatively high frequencies are also found for Austria (16%). Product boycott is least practised in the UK, where only 4% of all respondents have ever boycotted a product. In the countries not comparable in this respect, Estonia and Slovakia, the overall frequency is low, too.

There are no significant differences between male and female respondents in both product boycott and product buying, except for Italy, where young women did both more often (18%).

Boycotting products is more widespread among those who are already eligible to vote (19 to 25 years old) in Finland (29%). The young people with elementary education have generally less often boycotted a product. This is by tendency the case in Italy (11%) and in Austria (12%), and clearly so in Finland (19%). In Italy, Austria, and Finland people with maturity significantly more often joined a boycott (20%, 25%, and 37% respectively).

For almost all countries, no significant differences among the work status groups are found. Only in Italy, young still in education boycott more often (19%) than those in paid work (15%). The unemployed in Italy seem to be divided into a vast majority of non- boycotters and a small fraction of intensive ones (3%).

Estonia is not comparable with the other countries, as “there are no boycotting but only buying campaigns in Estonia” (“Technical Report on the Comparability of Indicators”, p 46).

Concerning the other dimension of political consumerism, the buying of products, the distribution looks the following:

**Table 50: Product buying**

Countries		Ever	During the last 12 months...			
			once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>18</b>
	male	27	3	4	5	15
	female	36	3	6	7	21
	elementary	26	4	4	5	12
	intermediate	22	1	2	5	16
	maturity+	46	4	7	8	28
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>
	male	17	4	4	3	6
	female	25	7	7	4	6
	in education	25	8	7	4	7
	In paid work	19	4	5	2	7
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Again, the highest percentage of intensive political consumers is found in Finland with 31%. Italy follows with 21% and the young people of the UK show the least general intention as well as intensity of active political consumption of products: only 5% ever did. For Finland and Italy, significant gender differences are found: women buy products for political reasons more often (36%).

Also in Finland, people with elementary education less often buy products for political reasons (26%), but those with intermediate education report even less activity, although there is a large fraction of intensive consumerists (16%). On the contrary almost half (46%) of those with at least maturity have ever bought a product for political reasons.

Only in Italy, the young people still in education buy products for political reasons more often (25%) than those in paid work (19%).



## 2.2.2 Political Discourse

**Table 51: Contacted a politician**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Weighted data; percentages.

There is no country with more than 10% of the respondents having ever had contact to a politician. In the UK and Slovakia, no more than 2% ever had. Higher rates of contacts are found for Finland and Italy. In Italy 3% of the respondents have had regular contact (i.e. 5 times or more).

**Table 52: Collected signatures**

Countries	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Weighted data; percentages.

Signature collecting is not frequently practised by young people across all countries in the sample and if so, not very intensively. Collecting signatures is most frequent in Italy, where 12% ever did. Young people in most

countries, between 4% and 6% ever and usually only once collected signatures. This form of political participation is least practised in the UK.

**Table 53: Held a political speech**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
Austria	2	1	1	0	0
Estonia	1	1	1	0	0
Finland	4	2	1	1	0
France	2	1	0	0	0
Germany	3	2	0	0	0
Italy	5	1	1	1	2
Slovakia	1	0	0	0	0
UK	0	0	0	0	0

Weighted data; percentages.

Given the diminishing amount of reported activity across all countries, the Italians have held speeches relatively often (5%), followed by the young Finns (4%). On the contrary, none of the respondents in the UK has ever held a political speech.

**Table 54: Distributed leaflets**

Countries	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+ times
Austria	5	1	1	1	2
Estonia	2	2	0	0	0
Finland	4	3	0	0	0
France	3	1	1	0	0
Germany	3	2	1	0	0
Italy	12	7	2	1	2
Slovakia	4	8	6	0	0
UK	1	3	1	0	0

Weighted data; percentages.

The shading of table points out the incomparability of results of the leaflet distribution frequency, which was also mentioned above.

Concerning this form of political participation, the countries' results are not comparable due to strong semantical differences and translation problems regarding the word "leaflet" ("Technical Report on the Comparability of Indicators", p 54f). Nevertheless it is visible from the data that in Italy distributing leaflets is a more common form of political participation than in the other European countries.

**Table 55: Donated money**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>6</b>	3	1	1	1
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>4</b>	2	1	0	0
<b>Finland</b>	<b>7</b>	3	2	1	1
<b>France</b>	<b>3</b>	2	1	0	0
<b>Germany</b>	<b>7</b>	5	2	1	0
<b>Italy</b>	<b>8</b>	5	1	0	1
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>7</b>	4	2	1	0
<b>UK</b>	<b>2</b>	1	1	0	0

Weighted data; percentages.

To donate money for a party or an organisation, too, is not a very common form of participation among the young Europeans. It is least often done in the UK, France and Estonia. It is a little more common in Italy, Finland, Slovakia and Germany. In Austria 6% donated money within the last 12 months.

**Table 56: Contributed to a political internet discussion**

Countries	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>10</b>	2	3	2	3
<b>France</b>	<b>5</b>	1	1	1	1
<b>Germany</b>	<b>11</b>	4	2	1	3
<b>Italy</b>	<b>5</b>	1	1	1	2
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>5</b>	2	1	1	1
<b>UK</b>	<b>1</b>	0	0	1	0
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>16</b>	5	4	4	4
<b>Finland</b>	<b>16</b>	5	4	3	4

Weighted data; percentages.

Political internet discussions are rather usual in Estonia and Finland (16% respectively). These are, at the same time, the countries that are not comparable in this respect. The highest overall participation rate at internet discussions among the comparable countries is found for Germany with 11% and Austria with 10%, the lowest in the UK with only 1%. In France, Italy and Slovakia the rate is also rather small.

**Table 57: Written an article**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>7</b>	3	1	1	2
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>6</b>	3	1	1	1
<b>Finland</b>	<b>5</b>	3	1	0	1
<b>France</b>	<b>4</b>	2	1	1	1
<b>Germany</b>	<b>6</b>	3	2	1	1
<b>Italy</b>	<b>7</b>	3	2	1	2
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>4</b>	2	1	1	0
<b>UK</b>	<b>2</b>	1	1	1	0

Weighted data; percentages.

Only 7% of the Austrian and of the Italian young people respectively have ever written a political article. Most of them did it once during the last 12 months and even 2% respectively did it more than 5 times. In the UK only 2% have ever written a political article and 4% of the French and Slovakian young people have done so, respectively. 5% of the Finnish youth, and 6% respectively of the Estonian and German youth have ever written an article with a political content.

**Table 58: Written a letter/email with a political content**

Countries	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+ times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>11</b>	2	3	2	4
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>4</b>	2	1	1	1
<b>Finland</b>	<b>10</b>	4	3	1	1
<b>France</b>	<b>8</b>	3	3	1	0
<b>Germany</b>	<b>11</b>	3	3	3	3
<b>Italy</b>	<b>11</b>	3	2	3	3
<b>UK</b>	<b>2</b>	1	0	1	0
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>2</b>	1	0	0	1

Weighted data; percentages.

Concerning writing or forwarding political letters or e-mails Austria, Germany and Italy show higher activity rates (11%) than the other countries. On the other hand, in Estonia, the UK and also in Slovakia (which is not comparable with the other countries in this respect) only few respondents report this activity at all.

### 2.2.3 Political Protest

**Table 59: Participated in a legal demonstration**

Countries		Ever	During the last 12 months...			
			once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
	In paid work	11	6	2	1	2
	in education	18	11	4	1	1
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>
	15-18	15	8	3	2	2
	19-25	22	10	6	3	3
	elementary	12	6	4	0	2
	intermediate	17	8	4	3	2
	maturity+	28	13	7	4	4
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>
	15-18	45	17	13	9	6
	19-25	27	12	6	4	4
	elementary	39	16	11	8	5
	intermediate	30	17	8	3	3
	maturity+	28	12	7	4	5
	in paid work	35	14	5	3	2
	in education	42	15	13	8	7
	unemployed	18	9	3	6	0
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Nearly one third (32%) of the Italian youth has ever taken part in a legal demonstration. In Germany and in France, 23% and 20% respectively have ever demonstrated. On the contrary, Estonia, Finland, Slovakia and the UK are countries where the youth is less inclined to demonstrate. Austria lies in between with 14% of legal demonstration participation.

Whereas in France it is the older youth who take part in legal demonstrations more often (22%), in Italy it is the younger who do so more often (45%).

Those who finished only compulsory elementary education take less often part in France (12%), but more often in Italy (39%). The difference is less pronounced for those with intermediate education. In Italy, those with maturity show a lower frequency (28%) than the average, whereas in France this group is more active in legal demonstrations. Italians and Austrians still in school more frequently take part in demonstrations (42% and 18%, respectively). So do the young people in paid work in Italy (35%), but not in Austria (11%). Finally, Italian young unemployed stand out by a less frequent participation (18%).

**Table 60: Participated in a strike**

Countries		Ever	During the last 12 months...			
			once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>
	male	13	5	4	2	1
	female	22	11	4	4	2
	15-18	15	7	4	4	1
	19-25	17	8	4	3	2
	elementary	13	5	4	3	1
	vocational	14	5	4	4	1
	maturity+	24	14	5	3	2
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>
	15-18	54	15	16	13	11
	19-25	24	10	7	5	3
	elementary	44	13	15	10	7
	intermediate	42	14	9	9	10
	maturity	25	10	7	5	3
	in paid work	23	10	7	4	3
	in education	46	14	13	9	9
	unemployed	22	9	6	6	2
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

The overall strike participation varies between the countries comparable and ranges from one third (34%) in Italy to 1% in the UK.

In France, 17% have ever taken part in a strike. There, women strike more often (22%). Also, French people with a maturity certificate or more engaged more often in strikes (24%) than those with a lesser education (13% and 14% respectively). French people aged 15 to 18 less often take part in a strike (15%).

In Italy, more than half (54%) of the respondents aged 15 to 18 have already participated in a strike. There is a “reverse education gap”: the lower educated strike more often (44%) compared to those with a maturity certificate (25%). Parallel to this, those still in education strike much more often (46%) than the average. To put it in another way, it is namely those who have already entered the labour market successfully (in paid work: 23%) or unsuccessfully (unemployed: 22%) that strike significantly less often in Italy.



### 2.2.4 Illegal and violent forms of participation

After we have analysed youth participation within and outside the representative democratic system the last big area of illegal and violent forms of participation should be examined in the following.

**Table 61: Written graffiti on walls**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5times+
Austria	3	1	1	1	0
Estonia	2	1	0	0	0
Finland	2	0	1	0	1
France	3	1	1	1	1
Germany	2	1	1	0	0
Italy	5	2	2	1	1
UK	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

Weighted data; percentages.

Between 5% of the Italian young people down to none of the UK respondents have ever written a political message on a wall. On average, 2% to 3% have done so in Austria, Estonia, Finland, France and Germany. In Finland, France and Italy a handful (1%) of young people seem to do this rather often (5times+).

**Table 62: Participated in an illegal demonstration**

Countries		Ever	During the last 12 months...			
			once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>3</b>	2	0	0	0
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>2</b>	1	0	0	0
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>2</b>	1	0	0	0
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>5</b>	3	1	1	1
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>2</b>	1	1	0	0
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>11</b>	5	2	2	2
	male	13	6	2	2	3
	female	8	4	2	2	0
	elementary	15	6	3	4	1
	maturity+	9	4	1	2	2
	in paid work	8	5	2	0	1
	in education	15	6	3	3	2
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>1</b>	1	0	0	0
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>0</b>	0	0	0	0

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

In Italy, illegal demonstrations are accepted more frequently: 11% have at least once taken part in an illegal demonstration. 6% have taken part more than once and there are 2% in Italy that have taken part at least five times during the last months. Males (13%), those with elementary education (15%) and those still in education (15%) significantly tend to take part in illegal demonstrations more often. In Slovakia and the UK illegal demonstrations hardly attract young people. In the other countries there is a rather small amount of young people who have ever participated in an illegal demonstration: 5% in France, 3% in Austria and 2% in Estonia, Finland and Germany.

**Table 63: Political event with damage of property**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Weighted data; percentages.

There is no country where an amount of young people being worth to be reported has ever participated more than once in an event where property was damaged. In France, Germany and Italy, 2% ever and in Estonia, Slovakia and in the UK no one ever did.

**Table 64: Violent confrontation with the police**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Weighted data; percentages.

The only country where a small, but existing rate of young people searched violent confrontation with the police is Italy (5%). In the remaining countries this fraction is negligible or non-existent.

**Table 65: Violent confrontation with political opponents**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
Austria	1	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	1	1	0	0	0
France	1	1	0	0	0
Germany	1	1	0	0	0
Italy	4	3	1	0	1
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
UK	0	0	0	0	0

Weighted data; percentages.

Again, Italy seems to have more young people tending to violent political participation: 4% ever experienced violent confrontation with an opponent. There is even 1% that had several violent confrontations with political opponents and 3% had once. For the rest of the sample, this form of violent political participation is negligible or even not existent at all: no one in Estonia, Slovakia and the UK has ever experienced a violent confrontation with political opponents.

**Table 66: Occupation of buildings**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
Austria	1	1	1	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	2	1	0	0	0
France	4	3	1	0	0
Germany	1	1	0	0	0
Italy	10	7	2	1	1
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
UK	1	0	0	0	0

Weighted data; percentages.

Italy with its 10% of young people that have ever occupied buildings clearly can be distinguished from the other countries, where occupation has happened hardly ever or never and therefore is not part of the political

culture of the European youth. In France, 4% have ever occupied a building. In Austria, Finland, Germany and the UK, at least some (1-2%), but in Estonia and Slovakia, none of the respondents reports this activity.

**Table 67: Blocked streets or railways**

Countries (only total numbers)	Ever	During the last 12 months...			
		once	twice	3-5 times	5+times
<b>Austria</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Weighted data; percentages.

There is a certain small level of activity reported for Italy and France, where 4% of the youth ever blocked a street or a railway, 3% did so in Finland. In the remaining countries and especially in Estonia, Slovakia only 1% of the young people ever participated politically in this way. In the UK, this form of political participation does not seem to exist.

### **3 What makes them participate?**

#### **3.1 Political socialisation (FNSP)**

##### **3.1.1 The Framework of the Political Socialization in Europe Today**

The family, despite of the institutional and sociological changes it has undergone in the last decades, is still an important place to build convictions and to define the elements which will define the political identity of the individuals. (Percheron, 1993; Jennings and Niemi, 1981; Muxel, 2001). But despite this statement, always obvious in the studies on political socialization, some questions are concerning. If the mechanisms are still so efficient, what can be said about the contents and the effectiveness of the political transmission between parents and their children? Familial and personal relationships have been transformed but the political context has changed, too. The ideological identifications and the partisan affiliations are less structured, and in almost all the European countries there is a lack of confidence and distrust towards politics and politicians. In this context, is the familial influence still significant? What do the young people catch from their parents and what from their peers?

Before evaluating the impact the political socialization has on the political attitudes and behaviours of the young people, it is necessary to give a general overview of the level of the politicization they face within their family and their friends.

The first general statement we can make is the weakness of the level of the parental politicization as of the friendship one. Only two young people out of ten (20%) have some strongly politicized parents. The large majority is confronted with a very weak or weak family politicization (58%). The situation is quite similar what concerns their friends: there, the percentage is even lower. Only 16% present their peers as having a strong level of politicization, 66% describe their circle of friends as not politicized.

By a closer observation of the contents of the politicization of the family, one may notice that around half of the sample (48%) has some political discussions with their parents (26% always, often or sometimes with both their parents and 22% with only one parent). Politics is not missing within the family daily life, even if the global level of interest in the matter is weak.

Only 20% of the young report that they share a common interest with both of their parents, while the same proportion (20%) declares not to share any interest with them. A significant proportion seems to be less politicized than their elders: 23% define themselves as less interested in politics than their parents, and especially the youngest, while only 5% declare to be more interested than their parents.

The ideological affiliation of the young people reveals the general fading of the left-right cleavage in Europe and the scrambling of the political marks. Almost half of the sample (47%) recognizes to have a neither left nor right affiliation while only a quarter (23%) can locate themselves in the continuity of their parent's left or right choices. We can notice that a significant proportion (12%) declares having changed their political orientation compared to their parents' ones, moving from a left parental orientation to a right personal choice or from a right parental one to a left personal one (3%), or disconnected from any ideological position (9%). Only few young people are able to indicate a personal ideological orientation, defined according to the left-right cleavage: more than half the sample is neither left nor right (46%). As we can see the lack of ideological position among the youth is related to the socialization process within the family and to the political transmission between parents and children. If ideological marks are more scrambled today, whatever the places, the countries and the people, we find the printing of this trend among the new generations in Europe today.

Parental political behaviours are also very helpful to understand those of young people. The ways in which both participate are very similar. Conventional participation, and above all voting, is the most widespread form and it is used by the young and their parents. A large majority of the young people already enfranchised declare they have already voted (59%). This very high score is probably overestimated. All the studies on electoral participation show a greater abstention among the youth than among the whole electorate. But it means that voting is still considered as an important tool for democracy and is associated with a normative acceptance of the rules this one needs. To recognize not to vote makes one feel guilty. The parental voting behaviour is described by the young with more veracity: 54 % declare having parents who both always vote, and with 8%, only one parent votes always, while 33% declare their parents are not systematic voters, and 5% do not know.

Unconventional participation and protest behaviours concern few parents. Only 16% of the respondents can say that their parents have participated at

least once a demonstration while 79% respond never. The young people are not in a familial environment which gives a strong place to protest behaviour. And maybe this is the reason why we do not find in our results the level of protest behaviour which is usually measured among the European youth.<sup>4</sup>

**Table 68: Family Political Socialization (%)**

<b>Level of political discussions with parents (*)</b>	
Weak	52
Medium	22
Strong	26
<b>Political interest filiation (*)</b>	
Unknown	6
Filiation of interest	20
Filiation of non interest	20
Move to non interest	23
Move to interest	5
Non homogeneous parents + ego interested	10
Non homogeneous parents + ego not interested	16
<b>Ideological Filiation (*)</b>	
Right filiation	8
Left filiation	15
Neither nor filiation	47
Incoherent filiation	9
Change	3
Disconnection	9
Others	9
<b>Parental participation to demonstrations</b>	
Both at least once	9
Only one parent at least once	7
Both never	79
Unknown	5
<b>Parental electoral participation</b>	
Both always	54
Only one parent always	8
Both not always	33
Unknown	5
<b>Level of parental politicization (*)</b>	
Very weak	25
Weak	33
Medium	22
Strong	20

**\* Level of political discussions with parents**

We built an indicator for the level of political discussions with parents according to the answers given to question 22 items 1 and 2 *"How often do you discuss political issues when you get together with the following people - father/mother"*. We counted people who answer always, often and sometimes. We obtained a scale ranging from 0 to 2.

0 = Weak level of political discussions: people who "rarely or never" discuss political issues with their parents.

1 = Medium level of political discussions: people who "always, often or sometimes" discuss political issues with only one parent.

2 = Strong level of political discussions: people who "always, often or sometimes" discuss political issues with their both parents.

**\*\* Political interest affiliation**

<sup>4</sup> According to EVS, 30% of the 18-26 years old in Europe have already participated in a protest action (at least twice), and this proportion increased during the last decade.



We created a variable of political interest affiliation according to the answers given to question q1 *"How interested are you in politics?"* and q5 items 1 and 2 *"How interested is your... (father, mother)... in politics?"*

"Affiliation of interest" means that both parents are very/fairly interested in politics such as ego.

"Affiliation of non interest" means that both parents are not very/not at all interested in politics, such as ego.

"Move to non interest" means that both parents are very/fairly interested in politics but ego is not very/not at all interested in politics.

"Move to interest" means that ego is very/fairly interested in politics whereas his parents are not very/not at all interested in politics.

"Non homogeneous parents + ego interested" means that ego is very/fairly interested in politics while his parents have different political interest, one is very/fairly interested, the other is not very/not at all interested.

"Non homogeneous parents + ego not interested" means that ego is not very/not at all interested in politics while his parents have different political interest, one is very/fairly interested, the other is not very/not at all interested.

### **\*\*\* Ideological affiliation**

We created a variable of ideological affiliation according to the answers given to question q20 items 1 to 3 *"In politics people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Would you say that ... (you, your father, your mother)... are very left-wing, left-wing, right-wing, very right-wing, or neither left-wing nor right-wing?"*

"Right affiliation" means that both parents are rightists and ego is also rightist.

"Left affiliation" means that both parents are leftists and ego is also leftist.

"Neither nor affiliation" means that both parents have no ideological position such as ego.

"Incoherent affiliation" means that ego has an ideological position whereas parents have no position or have a non homogeneous position.

"Change" means that ego has an ideological position which is different from the homogeneous position of the parents, for example parents are both rightists and ego is leftist.

"Disconnection" means homogeneous parents, leftists or rightists, but ego declares no be neither left nor right.

### **\*\*\*\* Summary indicator: level of parental politicization**

We built a summary indicator of the level of parental politicization according to the 5 previous indicators of family socialization. We counted people who have a right or a left affiliation, an affiliation of interest, whose parents demonstrate and vote and who have a strong level of political discussions with their parents. We obtained a scale ranging from 0 to 5 and decided to merge 3, 4 and 5.

0 = Very weak level of parental politicization: no item

1 = Weak level of parental politicization: 1 item on 5

2 = Medium level of parental politicization: 2 items on 5

3, 4, 5 = Strong level of parental politicization: 3, 4 or 5 items on 5.

Even if the ideological cleavage between left and right is progressively disappearing in the generational process of the socialization, we can notice the persistency of the political cultures it supports. Young people who have a left affiliation are more likely to have parents who have already participated in a demonstration (34%, only 15% when they have a right affiliation are in the same situation, and 16% among the whole sample).

We can also notice that parental voting is more frequent and regular when young people declare a right or a left affiliation than when they have an a-

political one (neither left nor right): only 52% of the young people who do have an a-political affiliation have parents who always vote, while the parents of those who have a left or a right affiliation are to 75% and 78% regularly voting.

**Table 69: Parental Unconventional and Electoral Participation according to Ideological Affiliation**

	Both or only one parents have already taken part in a demonstration	Both or one parents always vote
	<i>0,000</i>	<i>0,000</i>
Right filiation (n=645)	15	75
Left filiation (n=1172)	34	78
Neither nor filiation (n=3735)	10	52
Incoherent filiation (n=762)	13	64
Change (n=246)	20	72
Disconnection (n=700)	19	70
Other (n=739)	16	51
<b>Total (whole sample)</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>62</b>

Now looking at the politicization of the peers, the general atmosphere is quite the same. Political discussions with friends are less frequent than those with the parents. Only 14% of the young declare always or often discussing political matters with their friends, 39% sometimes while the majority (54%) never discuss politics. The very low importance they give to the fact that their friends share the same political opinion is an additional sign for the absence of the political concerns within the context of friendship: only 17% consider it very or fairly important while 82% think it is not very important or even not at all important. Is friendship so independent from convictions? Or does it mean that convictions have nothing to do with friendship? We do not have enough elements to answer this question satisfactorily but we assume that there is no direct link between the importance the young give to politicization and the political orientation of their friends and the influence those have in fact. In that respect the portrait of their best friend completes the picture and introduces more complexity. The best friends are like a mirror of what they are themselves: 30% declare to have a best friend who is very or fairly interested in politics, 61% of them vote more or less constantly, and 19% have already participated in a demonstration.

**Table 70: Peers Political Socialization (%)**

<b>Political interest of best friend</b>	
Very, fairly interested	30
Not very interested	39
Not at all interested	23
DK-AR	8
<b>Importance of political opinion of friends</b>	
Very, fairly important	17
Not very important	39
Not at all important	43
<b>Political discussions with friends</b>	
Always, often	14
Sometimes	31
Rarely	30
Never	24
DK-AR	1
<b>Best friend frequency of voting</b>	
Always	26
Not always	35
Never	20
DK-AR	19
<b>Best friend frequency of demonstrating</b>	
At least once	19
Never	72
DK-AR	8
<b>Level of friends politicization (*)</b>	
0 : Very weak	39
1 : Weak	27
2 : Medium	19
3 : Strong	16

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**\* Level of political discussions with parents**

We built a summary indicator for the level of the friends' politicization according to 4 of the previous variables of peer's socialization (without the variable "importance of political opinion of friends"):

- Political interest of best friend (very, fairly interested)
- Political discuss with friends (always, often)
- Best friend frequency of voting (always)
- Best friend frequency of demonstrating (at least once).

We obtained a scale ranging from 0 to 4 and decided to merge 3 and 4.

0 = Very weak level of friends' politicization: no item

1 = Weak level of friend's politicization: 1 item on 4

2 = Medium level of friends' politicization: 2 items on 4

3, 4 = Strong level of friends' politicization: 3 or 4 items on 4.

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Aging has an impact on this valuation: the youngest feel their personal environment always less politicized than the oldest (64% among the 15-18 years old declare a weak level of parental politicization and 55% among the 19-25 years old, and respectively 79% and 60% a weak level of politicization in their circle of friends). So we can infer that the politicization of the individual increases with aging and, as a result, the politicization of one's personal environment, too.

The second general statement is the correlation between the level of politicization of the personal environment of the young people and their socio-economical characteristics. There is a significant link between social background and politicization, even if it is not fully explanatory.

The parents' politicization, as well as that of the peers, is higher when the standard of living of the young people also is high: 28% of the young who declare a high or a very high standard of living have strongly politicized parents and 20% of this group have strongly politicised peers. Among those who have a low or a very low standard of living, there are only 14% to have strongly politicised parents while with 67%, they are weakly politicized. The trend is the same for the peers.

The same sociological effect is visible concerning the parent's diploma. The higher it is the stronger is the politicization. It is among the young people who have educated parents that we count the most numerous to have parents strongly politicized (26% when their diploma is more than or equal to a general maturity certificate, 15% when it is lower). But we can notice that even if the parents have a higher level of education, the level of parental politicization is in majority weak (50%) or medium (23%).

The young people's status and diploma are more significant. Among those who pursue their education after the maturity certificate level, the politicization of the personal environment is often stronger. Among the students, 30% have parents with a strong level of politicization and 26% have strongly politicized friends. Among those who are already part of the work force, and especially when they are less educated, there are only 13% who have strongly politicised parents, and for only 12%, this is also the case with their friends.

**Table 71: Politicization of the Personal Environment according to Young People's Socio-demographical Characteristics (%)**

<i>Familial and personal situation</i>		<i>Level of parental politicization</i>			<i>Level of friends politicization</i>		
		Weak	Medium	Strong	Weak	Medium	Strong
<b>Age in 2 categories</b>		0,000			0,000		
	15-18 years (n= 2158)	64	19	17	79	14	6
	19-25 years (n=5825)	55	23	21	60	21	19
<b>Diploma in 4 categories</b>		0,000			0,000		
	Still at school< maturity (n=2706)	59	22	19	73	16	10
	Still at school >= maturity (n=1232)	46	24	30	50	24	26
	Working < maturity (n=2262)	66	20	13	72	16	12
	Working >= maturity (n=1659)	49	25	25	53	23	24
<b>Status</b>		0,000			0,000		
	In paid work (n=2745)	59	23	18	65	19	17
	College or high school (n=2783)	60	22	19	74	16	10
	Students (n=1358)	45	24	31	47	26	27
	Unemployed (n=578)	61	23	16	67	17	16
	Other (n=449)	64	20	16	70	15	15
<b>Standard of living</b>		0,000			0,000		
	Very low/low (n=1059)	67	19	14	69	18	13
	Average (n=5014)	59	22	18	68	18	15
	High/Very high (n= 1879)	49	24	28	58	22	20
<b>Type of settlement</b>		0,000			0,000		
	Urban area (n=2329)	55	21	24	61	21	19
	Small or medium city (n=2765)	62	22	17	68	18	14
	Rural area (n=2587)	56	24	20	67	18	15
<b>Higher diploma of both parents</b>		0,000			0,000		
	DK/AR (n=517)	80	13	6	83	12	5
	Diploma<maturity (n=3603)	62	23	15	68	18	15
	Diploma>=full maturity (n=3881)	50	23	26	61	21	18
<b>Total (whole sample)</b>		<b>58</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>

In order to better understand the impact of the socio-demographics on the political socialization within the family as well as within the peer group, we have sorted their structuring effect on each variable, with some binary logistic regressions<sup>5</sup>. Except concerning the protest participation of the parents, the standard of living has always a crucial impact, above all on the political interest affiliation and on political discussions with parents. This factor has, along with the parents' education level, the strongest influence. Religious belonging, as a cultural factor, has a loose impact on the voting behaviour, on the ideological affiliation and also on the parents' participation to demonstration. We can notice the remarkable effect of age concerning the friends' politicization. As we have already shown, the older young people are more likely to be in a politicized circle of friends. Finally, we can notice the negligible signification of the gender factor.

The third statement concerning this first overview of the politicization of the personal environment of young people is the importance of the individual's

<sup>5</sup> For details on the binary logistic regressions, see Annex 1

political characteristics themselves. If religion has not a significant impact, in return political knowledge and above all ideological position are more correlated.

Among young people who locate themselves on a left position, 45% describe their parents and 31% their friends as strongly politicized. Among those who choose a right position there are still 34% to have parents strongly politicized but only 21 % to declare their friends so. Those who do not have a clear political identification, i.e. who consider themselves neither left nor right, exhibit a weak personal environment politicisation (respectively 70% and 71%).

The higher the political knowledge, the higher is the environmental politicization. When the political knowledge is weak, the level of parental politicization is weak (79%) and also that of the peers (84%). In return, when the political knowledge is strong, the level of parental and of peer politicization is stronger too, even if it is never prevalent (respectively 34% and 25%).


**Table 72: Politicization of the Personal Environment according to the Young People's Religious and Political Characteristics (%)**

		Level of parental politicization			Level of friends politicization		
Religious and political characteristics		Weak	Medium	Strong	Weak	Medium	Strong
Religion		0,000			0,000		
	Catholics (n=3211)	50	26	24	60	21	19
	Protestants (n=1471)	60	23	17	69	17	15
	Other religions (n=1054)	67	18	15	71	18	11
	No religion (n=2093)	62	19	19	68	18	15
Left right scale		0,000			0,000		
	Left (n=1742)	27	28	45	44	25	31
	Neither left nor right (n=3703)	70	20	11	71	18	12
	Right (n=1084)	32	35	34	54	25	21
	NA (n=138)	86	10	4	87	10	3
	DK (n=1117)	86	12	3	88	9	2
	AR (n=216)	67	20	13	71	13	15
Political knowledge		0,000			0,000		
	Weak (n=1005)	79	14	7	84	11	5
	Medium weak (n=2089)	63	22	16	73	16	11
	Medium strong (n=2157)	50	24	26	59	22	19
	Strong (n=748)	38	27	34	49	26	25
Total (whole sample)		58	22	20	66	19	16

To finish this general outline of the environmental politicization young people are faced with, we must look at the differences which are noticeable between the countries. Is the weakness of the politicization widespread all over the European countries or do we find more politicized contexts?

Italy is very specific; there, the level of parental politicization is by far the highest. More than one third of the young Italians (36%) declare to have parents strongly politicized (compared with only 20% in the whole sample). Respectively France, Germany and Austria follow (27%, 25% and 21%). Far behind come Slovakia, Finland, United Kingdom and Estonia which has the lowest score (9%). Except for the very high score in Italy, our results confirm the comparative European political studies showing a greater politicization in the Northern than in the Southern countries, but we noticed a recent falling of it in Finland and in the UK.<sup>6</sup>

**Graph 5: Level of Parental Politicization according to Countries (%)**



Some significant variations are interesting to underline. They specify the weight of the national contexts and of the political cultures on the global process of the political socialization.

Concerning the political interest affiliation, German young people experience the most homogeneity: 30% of them share the same level of political interest with their parents (compared to 20% in the whole sample). On the opposite, young people coming from Estonia or Slovakia show the lowest levels in homogeneity (respectively 15%). The level of political discussions is also higher in Italy (36% declare a strong level), in Germany (34%) and in Austria (32%) while among the young Estonians and the young Finnish such discussions are the least frequent.

<sup>6</sup> Pierre Bréchon, « Générations et politique en Europe occidentale », in O. Galland, B.Roudet (eds), *Les jeunes Européens et leurs valeurs*, La Découverte, Paris, 2005.

The place and the signification of the left-right cleavage depend on the different national contexts. Two types of countries can be distinguished: those where the cleavage is still relevant, like in Italy and in France (respectively 42% of the young Italians and 33% of the young French declare to be in the continuity of the rightist or leftist choices of their parents), and all the others where, for different reasons, it seems to be less important and less structured, as noticeable in the UK where almost three quarters of the young (71%) declare a neither right nor left affiliation.

Differences within national and political cultures are even more visible concerning political behaviours. Voting is more consistent among parents especially in Italy where there was compulsory voting until 1993 (75% of the young Italians declare that both their parents always vote, compared to only 54% in the whole sample), and also in Germany (65%) and in Austria (64%). It is in Estonia that voting is least frequent among the parents: 55% of the young Estonians say both their parents do not always vote (as compared to 33% in the whole sample). In the other countries the parental electoral participation seems to be often intermittent. We can notice the particular weakness of the parents' voting behaviour in the UK (only 43% of the young Britons declare that both their parents vote always, 14% do not know).

The proportion of parents who have already participated in a demonstration is quite low in all the countries. But again Italians are an exceptional case: 31% of the young in Italy declare having two parents or at least one who has already demonstrated. French people follow: 23 % have parents to whom the same applies. Although voting and political interest seem to be more familiar in Germany and in Austria than in most of the countries, and the global level of politicization is higher there, their inclination to protest is lower (only 13% of the young Germans and 10% of the young Austrians have parents who have participated at least once in a demonstration). But it is in Finland that the score is lowest (7%).

**Table 73: Family Political Socialization according to Countries (%)**

	Level of political discussion with parents		
	Weak	Medium	Strong
<b>Europe (whole sample)</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>26</b>
Austria	46	22	32
Estonia	63	21	16
Finland	59	23	18
France	54	18	28
Germany	40	26	34
Italy	36	28	36
Slovakia	56	22	22
United Kingdom	60	15	25



	Ideological filiation			Political interest filiation			
	Right filiation	Left filiation	Neither nor filiation	Filiation of interest	Filiation of non interest	Move to no interest	Move to interest
<b>Europe (whole sample)</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>5</b>
Austria	4	15	47	24	12	23	5
Estonia	9	4	61	15	25	23	6
Finland	12	10	50	17	21	26	6
France	8	27	34	22	25	22	5
Germany	3	19	47	30	12	22	7
Italy	14	28	22	23	15	24	6
Slovakia	9	10	42	15	20	25	4
United Kingdom	4	4	71	17	29	22	4


	Demonstration homogeneity within the parents			Voting homogeneity within the parents		
	Both at least once	Only one parent at least once	Both never	Both always	Only one parent always	Both not always
<b>Europe (whole sample)</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>33</b>
Austria	5	5	84	64	6	26
Estonia	10	6	76	28	9	55
Finland	3	4	91	52	11	35
France	15	8	68	58	7	31
Germany	7	6	84	65	6	26
Italy	17	16	65	75	7	16
Slovakia	9	8	79	48	12	39
United Kingdom	6	3	81	43	4	39

Concerning the politicization of the friends, the differences between the countries are quite the same. Italians and also Germans have the most politicized circle of friends. French and Austrian young people experience also a politicized one while Britons and Estonians face the lesser one. Young Frenchmen and Austrians also have a politicised circle of friends while this holds true only to a lesser extent for Britons and Estonians.

It is among the Italians and the Germans that the political discussions with friends are most frequent: 62% and 60%, respectively regularly discuss politics. The political interest of the best friend is also higher in these two countries, particularly in Germany where 41% of the young have a best friend who is very or fairly interested. The least politicized circle of friends is in the UK: 42% of the young Britons never discuss politics with their friends (compared to 24% in the whole sample), and only 21% have a best friend who is interested in politics (compared to 30% in the whole sample).

The best friend's political behaviour corresponds to the same partition. In Italy, in Germany and also in Austria, best friends do participate more than in the others countries. In France and Slovakia, the conventional participation as well as the unconventional one are less affirmed while in Estonia, Finland and above all in the UK, the level of political participation stays very low. Only 4% of the young Britons respond that their best friend always votes (compared to 53% of the Italians, 39% of the Germans, and

26% in the whole sample). It is among the young Italians that the frequency of the best friends' demonstrating is the highest.



**Table 74: Friends Political Socialization according to Countries (%)**

	Political interest of best friend			Political discussions with friends		
	Very, fairly interested	Not very interested	Not at all interested	Always, often, sometimes	Rarely	Never
<b>Europe (whole sample)</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>24</b>
Austria	32	40	17	52	28	20
Estonia	31	43	17	38	39	21
Finland	25	45	23	40	35	25
France	28	27	33	39	31	29
Germany	41	43	12	60	29	11
Italy	36	40	20	62	22	15
Slovakia	24	46	23	34	38	28
United Kingdom	21	31	38	38	19	42

	Best friend frequency of voting			Best friend frequency of demonstrating	
	Always	Not always	Never	At least once	Never
<b>Europe (whole sample)</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>72</b>
Austria	32	36	12	23	71
Estonia	15	36	28	12	77
Finland	18	51	22	12	85
France	23	25	26	19	66
Germany	39	33	15	25	70
Italy	53	25	10	38	54
Slovakia	24	48	16	14	78
United Kingdom	4	25	32	12	77

### **3.1.2 The Influence of the Political Socialization on the Political Participation of the Young**

The general landscape of political socialization in Europe today reveals a general low level of politicization. In this context, do parents always have an influence on the politicization of the young? If the friends are interested in politics and if they participate, is there an impact on the attitudes and on the behaviour of the young people?

The political family background is always determinant. The higher the level of parental politicization, the higher is the level of politicisation of the young. The lower it is, the less the young are politicized. There is no doubt about that.

Among the young people who declare to have strongly politicized parents, the attitude towards politics is more positive: 80% declare to be interested in politics (only 14% when they have very weakly politicised ones), 29% show a party proximity (only 7% when they have very weakly ones). They are also more confident, considering the effectiveness of political actions (40%/16%) and having more trustfulness in political institutions (21%/9%). To have a politicized environment gives a more favourable framework to develop some personal links to politics. It also permits to develop some political behaviour: 83% of the young people do vote when they have parents strongly politicized (compared to 37% when they are not), 36% have already taken part to a demonstration (compared to 7% in the second case), 61% are a member of an association (compared to 36% in the second case).

The correlation is of a similar nature concerning the influence of the politicization of their friends. The more the latter are politicized, the more the young people also are.

**Table 75: Political Socialization and Political Behaviour (%)**

		Political interest	Partisanship proximity	Left-right position		
		Very fairly interested	People who declare a proximity	Left	Right	Neither nor
<b>Total</b>		37	17	22	46	13
<b>Level of parental politicization</b>		0,000	0,000	0,000		
	0 : Very weak (n= 1965)	14	7	6	5	56
	1 : Weak (n=2645)	22	13	13	9	56
	2 : Medium (n=1785)	43	21	27	21	42
	3 : Strong (n=1606)	80	29	49	23	24
<b>Level of friends politicization</b>		0,000	0,000	0,000		
	0 : Very weak (n= 3088)	13	10	11	9	50
	1 : Weak (n=2139)	35	17	19	14	50
	2 : Medium (n=1503)	56	21	29	18	44
	3 : Strong (n=1270)	72	28	43	18	34
<b>Political knowledge indicator</b> (Finland and Germany excluded)		0,000	0,000	0,000		
	Weak (n=10005)	13	7	9	6	43
	Medium-weak (n=2088)	26	12	17	12	47
	Medium-strong (n=2157)	43	22	28	16	43
	Strong (n= 748)	61	26	32	21	38

		Have already voted (q13)*	Have already taken part in a demonstration	Member of an association	Effectiveness of political actions	Trust in political institutions
		Yes	Yes	Yes	Very effective	Strong
<b>Total</b>		59	19	48	25	14
<b>Level of parental politicization</b>		0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	0 : Very weak (n= 1965)	37	7	36	16	9
	1 : Weak (n=2645)	54	14	47	20	12
	2 : Medium (n=1785)	69	22	52	28	13
	3 : Strong (n=1606)	83	36	61	40	21
<b>Level of friends politicization</b>		0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	0 : Very weak (n= 3088)	42	6	37	16	9
	1 : Weak (n=2139)	56	16	51	24	14
	2 : Medium (n=1503)	69	25	55	30	17
	3 : Strong (n=1270)	83	44	62	39	20
<b>Political knowledge indicator</b> (Finland and Germany excluded)		0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Weak (n=10005)	36	9	31	14	8
	Medium-weak (n=2088)	53	16	43	23	13
	Medium-strong (n=2157)	66	21	50	25	16
	Strong (n= 748)	74	29	56	28	16

\* For the variable vote n= 5689 because we selected people who are more than 18 years old

The ideological affiliation has also a direct impact. There is a major difference between the young people who can locate themselves in an ideological leftist or rightist continuity with their parents and the young people who cannot. The first group has more structured and more consistent political choices and behaviours while the second group stays more distant towards politics and is less involved and less participative. In contrast to 52% of the young who declare a right affiliation, and 57% who declare a leftist one, are interested in politics, there are only 25% who declare an interest in politics when they have neither a right nor a left affiliation. Young people who have changed the

political camp or those whose parents do not share the same political believes are more comparable to the former. The most important is the possibility to identify an ideological position and to locate oneself in relation to it.

Political behaviours are also very connected to this affiliation framework. When there is a rightist or a leftist affiliation, even if it concerns only one parent, and also when the young people have chosen an opposite camp, voting, demonstrating, and involvement in an association are more frequent than when young people have no ideological identification.

In contrast to the 75% of the young who declare a right affiliation and the 74% of those who declare a leftist one that have already voted, there are only 50% who did vote when they have neither a right nor a left affiliation. Young people who have a leftist affiliation are the most numerous to have already taken part in a demonstration (40%, as compared to only 17% in the case of a rightist affiliation and 19% in the whole sample). There are some particularities which distinguish the leftist and the rightist political cultures. The former are more protesting and also more trustful in political action (38% believe in the effectiveness of political actions, as compared to 30% of those who have a rightist one and only 25% in the whole sample). The latter ones show more trust in political institutions.

**Table 76: Ideological Affiliation and Political Behaviours**

	Political interest	Partisanship proximity	Have already voted (q13)*	Have already taken part in a demonstration	Member of an association	Effectiveness of political actions	Trust in political institutions**
	Very fairly interested	People who declare a proximity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Very effective	Strong
<b>Total</b>	37	17	59	19	48	25	14
	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
Right filiation (n=645)	52	37	75	17	54	30	26
Left filiation (n=1172)	57	31	74	40	56	38	16
Neither nor filiation (n=3735)	25	8	50	10	42	19	11
Incoherent filiation (n=762)	52	27	66	28	56	29	15
Change (n=246)	58	30	74	37	59	34	16
Disconnection n(=700)	29	12	54	18	47	23	9
Others (n=739)	31	10	54	16	51	21	13

\* For the variable vote n= 5689 because we selected people who are more than 18 years old

As we can notice, the impact of the family and peers' socialization on the political participation of young Europeans is important. But is it the most important source of influence? What is the respective weight of the socialization characteristics, of the individual's socio-demochart

characteristics and of political variables? And finally, what is the most decisive, the family influence or that the peers?

Some logistic regressions, selecting only the “net effect” of each variable, whilst all the others are being controlled, show interesting results. The politicization of the personal environment, concerning family as well as peers, is always very significant and in most cases more explanatory than the other variables, whether they are social or political ones<sup>7</sup>.

Concerning the political interest of the young people, the level of parental politicization is very decisive, and especially if parents show a concrete political participation, for instance in voting or demonstrating. The political choices of the young, their ideological orientation and partisan identifications, are directly related to their parents’ and especially whether they show some or not.

The conventional or unconventional political behaviours are more explained by the level of the friends’ politicization than by the politicization of the parents. The friends context comes first to explain whether the young people have already voted or not, even if their parents’ voting behaviour has obviously also an impact. It is also decisive to explain the participation of the young people in a demonstration, and to be member of an association.

Parental socialization seems more effective on political attitudes and on ideological orientations of the individuals while the peer socialization, even if the family background has an impact, seems to have more effect on political behaviours and on political participation. Ideological convictions and choices, as the core of the political identity of the individuals, and also the type of relationships towards politics, are firstly built within the family and the intergenerational process. In turn, behaviours and practices are more depending on the generational and friends context, and are produced in the framework of the actual experiences of the young. In other words, political attitudes are more printed according a vertical process of the socialization (intergenerational) while political behaviours are more generated in a horizontal process (generational).

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<sup>7</sup> For the detail of the binary logistic regressions, see Annex 2


### 3.1.3 Political Socialization and Political Participation in Europe: some Contrasted Levels of Politicization

A Multiple Correspondence Analysis produces a general picture of the explanatory determinants of the political socialization and the way they structure the conditions of the political participation.

#### 3.1.3.1 Political Socialisation and Participation

Multiple Correspondence Analysis<sup>8</sup>:

Axes 1 and 2 Cleavages



The analysis produces two major axes which organize the distribution of the individuals and the cleavages dividing them.

<sup>8</sup> For more details, you can see the technical note.

The first axis (variance: 11.4%) differentiates respondents with a strong politicization level from those with a weak one.

On the left:  Strong politicization level	On the right:  Weak politicization level
Left position Political interest: very + fairly interested Following political news every days Voted: Yes Member of an organisation: Yes Social influence: Strong Persuading others: Yes Close to a party: Yes Ever attended political meeting: Yes Ever participated in a demonstration: Yes	Do not Know position (no position) Political interest: not at all interested Following political news: less often/never Ever voted: No Member of an organisation: No Social influence: Weak Politics seems complicated: Always, often

The second axis (variance: 5.9 %) differentiates the individuals according to their political distrust and their attitudes towards economic liberalism. The classical right-left cleavage appears here.

At the top:  Strong political distrust	At the bottom:  Weak political distrust
Left position Economical liberalism: Bad image Satisfaction with government: Very dissatisfied Compared to parents: Pessimistic	Right position Economical liberalism: Good image Satisfaction with government: Very satisfied Compared to parents: Optimistic

The analysis shows how the political participation is related to politicization (first axis) and to trust in politics (second axis). The general figure looks like a triangle. We can distinguish three major types of political participation which are structured in opposition: a leftist political participation, a rightist one, and a non political participation, associated to a lack of politicization.

The quadrant at the top left concerns the politicization among the leftists. It is a more protest one, more against economic liberalism, and more associated to dissatisfaction towards government. Young people belonging to this type are more likely to be activists and also the most numerous to participate in demonstrations. They are more likely to think that political actions are effective. In a way they share a certain political opinion they do believe in the necessity of political action and are more likely to turn to political institutions for that (political parties, voting, involvements etc.).




The quadrant at the bottom right is quite a symmetrical one. The politicization among the rightists (which are anyway few in our sample), is more favourable to economic liberalism and more correlated to political trust and satisfaction with government. It is not a protest-oriented but more often a conventional relationship with politics.

The quadrant at the top right contains young people not politicized and who show more political apathy and indifference. They do trust neither in political institutions nor in political action. Most often they do not use the democratic tools as voting or demonstrating. They are not informed about politics, do not read the news and do not consider themselves to be competent on the matter.

They are also more pessimistic about the future.


When we introduce as illustrative variables those which concern the socialization, we verify the strong effect they have on the political participation of the young, whether they are related to family or to peers. As we can see in the two quadrants, top and bottom, on the left of the chart, there is a correlation between a strong politicization level and a strong parental and friends politicization (strong politicization level of friends, strong politicization level of parents, political interest affiliation, left or right positions of the parents...). In the top quadrant in the right of the chart, a weak politicization level goes hand in hand with a weak family politicization (parents do not vote, affiliation of no interest, neither left nor right affiliation, parents not interested in politics...).



Looking at the distribution of the countries within the chart, we can see how they are located according to the triangle previously described. Italy and Austria are located in the quadrant at the top left, which corresponds to the most leftist and protest politicization. The UK is located at the opposite and is associated to a very low level of political participation and to a very weak politicization. Finland and Estonia are located at the bottom of the chart, where we count the most numerous rightists and people who are most favourable to economic liberalism. But Finland shows a higher level of politicization than Estonia. Finally, France and Slovakia occupy an intermediate location in the middle of the chart. Political distrust and pessimism are noticeable concerning France.



With a Geometric Data Analysis, the level of the family socialization can be visualized and located for each group of young people. A weak parental politicization is more widespread in the quadrant at the top right where we also count the more numerous non-politicized young people. A strong parental socialization is more present on the left of the chart, where the young are the most politically active and politicized.







### 3.1.3.2 Family Politicization in Europe



If we compare now the charts which characterize each country, some interesting differences can be highlighted.

### 3.1.4 Family Politicization according to the 8 countries





We can distinguish two types of family politicization with its consequences on the political participation of the young people:

There are four countries where parental politicization is quite strong (more blue points than red ones) and where we can identify in the left top quadrant the most numerous politicized and participative young people. Italy is the most relevant. In a lesser extent Austria, Germany and France show also a more frequent presence of a strong politicization of the parents and of the young.

There are four countries where parental politicization is weak (more red points than blue ones) and where young people are also less politicized and less participative. The chart locates more individuals in the right quadrants. It is particularly visible with the UK which is by far the country with the lowest level of politicisation. The same type of weak political socialization and weak politicization can also be observed with Estonia, Slovakia and Finland.

### **3.1.5 Conclusion**

The exploratory of the political socialization in Europe today permits a better understanding of the political background of the young Europeans. It also contributes to explain the noticeable differences between the countries. Cultural and generational roots do matter with the conditions of the political participation.

The first result of our survey is the general weakness of the personal, family and peers, environment politicization of the young Europeans. But when it is strong, it has a direct impact on the politicization and the political participation of the young. This result verifies again the impact of the family socialization on the relationships to politics of the individuals.

The second result is the difference of influence we have shown between the family and the peer socializations. The effectiveness of the parental socialization is stronger on political attitudes and ideological orientations while the peer socialization has more effect on the behaviours and on the political participation.

The third one is the correlation between politicization and social as well as political competence. Our analysis has shown how the political participation is related to politicization and to trust in politics.

Finally, the comparative analysis between the countries has distinguished some national characteristics. The country where the young people are the most politicized is Italy while the one where they are the least politicised is

the UK. The former, Has the strongest family and peer socializations while the latter has the weakest.

### 3.1.6 Annex 1: The Framework of the Political Socialization: Binary Logistic Regressions

We did some binary logistic regressions with the political socialization variables in order to analyse/understand their structure according to socio-demographical variables.

We used the Wald method.

The following table shows the structure of each socialization variable. Explicative variables are sorted by ascending index of signification. The double horizontal line separates the significant variables from the non-significant variables

Indicator of Parental Politicization		Indicator of Friends Politicization		Indicator of Political Discussions with parents		Indicator of Voting Homogeneity within the Parents	
Strong		Strong		Strong		Only One Parent and Both Always	
	Wald		Wald		Wald		Wald
Parents educ. Lev. (higher)	114	Age	58	Standard of living	53	Religious Belonging	225
Standard of living	69	Standard of living	44	Parents educ. Lev. (higher)	41	Standard of living	101
Religious Belonging	63	Religious Belonging	46	Education Level	23	Type of Settlement	44
Education Level	33	Education Level	35	Age	14	Parents educ. Lev. (higher)	31
Type of Settlement	27	Type of Settlement	22	Type of Settlement	16	Education Level	28
Age	9	Activity Status	10	Religious Belonging	17	Activity Status	20
Activity Status	12	Parents educ. Lev. (higher)	3	Household	13	Gender	4
Gender	0	Household	5	Activity Status	13	Household	2
Household	1	Gender	0	Gender	1	Age	0
Constant	87	Constant	569	Constant	446	Constant	75

Political Interest Filiation		Political Interest Filiation		Ideological Filiation		Indicator of Demonstration Homogeneity	
Filiation of Interest		Filiation of No Interest		Neither Nor Filiation		Both at Least Once	
	Wald		Wald		Wald		Wald
Standard of living	79	Parents educ. Lev. (higher)	107	Religious Belonging	171	Religious Belonging	48
Parents educ. Lev. (higher)	74	Standard of living	58	Parents educ. Lev. (higher)	26	Parents educ. Lev. (higher)	28
Age	22	Religious Belonging	49	Education Level	30	Education Level	20
Activity Status	30	Activity Status	18	Gender	18	Type of Settlement	8
Education Level	23	Education Level	15	Standard of living	16	Activity Status	10
Type of Settlement	14	Age	5	Age	9	Age	1
Religious Belonging	7	Gender	2	Type of Settlement	10	Household	3
Gender	2	Household	6	Household	2	Standard of living	1
Household	2	Type of Settlement	3	Activity Status	1	Gender	0
Constant	509	Constant	450	Constant	7	Constant	611

The following table shows the variations according to the countries.

Indicator of Parental Politicization		Indicator of Friends Politicization		Indicator of Political Discussions with parents		Indicator of Voting Homogeneity within the Parents	
Strong		Strong		Strong		Only One Parent and Both Always	
Country	B	Country	B	Country	B	Country	B
Estonia	-0,829	UK	-0,810	Estonia	-0,593	Estonia	-1,040
UK	-0,476	Estonia	-0,479	Finland	-0,456	UK	-0,630
Finland	-0,369	Finland	-0,367	Slovakia	-0,218	Slovakia *	-0,118
Slovakia	-0,228	Slovakia	-0,296	UK *	-0,025	Finland *	0,013
Austria*	0,139	France *	0,020	France *	0,125	France *	0,082
Germany	0,384	Austria	0,349	Austria	0,279	Austria	0,323
France	0,476	Germany	0,684	Germany	0,397	Germany	0,376
Italy	0,905	Italy	0,898	Italy	0,491	Italy	0,993

Political Interest Filiation		Political Interest Filiation		Ideological Filiation		Indicator of Demonstration Homogeneity	
Filiation of Interest		Filiation of No Interest		Neither Nor Filiation		Both at Least Once	
Country	B	Country	B	Country	B	Country	B
Slovakia	-0,335	Austria	-0,547	Italy	-1,134	Finland	-0,845
Estonia	-0,319	Germany	-0,536	France	-0,527	UK	-0,487
UK	-0,205	Italy	-0,318	Slovakia	-0,167	Austria	-0,398
Finland *	-0,197	Slovakia *	0,068	Germany *	0,026	Germany *	-0,157
France *	0,100	Finland *	0,126	Austria *	0,046	Estonia *	0,104
Italy	0,195	Estonia	0,309	Finland *	0,144	Slovakia *	0,170
Austria	0,247	France	0,353	Estonia	0,577	France	0,584
Germany	0,515	UK	0,544	UK	1,035	Italy	1,028



### 3.1.7 Annex 2: Influence of the Political Socialization on the Political Participation of the Young: Binary Logistic Regressions

In order to analyse the influence of the political socialization on the political participation of the young people in Europe, we did some logistic regressions.

The first column of the tables shows the results of the regression for political participation variables with socio-demographical variables, political variables and indicator of socialization. In the first regressions we used the country variable in the regressions (Europe (country)), we have suppressed it in the second regressions (Europe).

Finally, we did some regressions only with the political socialization variables in order to analyse the influence of each of them separately (last columns)

Political interest / Very, fairly interested

Europe (Country)			Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Level of parental politicization	601	0,000	Level of parental politicization	596	0,000	Level of parental politicization	902	0,000
Level of friends politicization	367	0,000	Level of friends politicization	385	0,000	Parents vote	584	0,000
Political competence	241	0,000	Political competence	280	0,000	Parents demonstration	497	0,000
Gender	36	0,000	Political effectiveness	37	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	455	0,000
Political effectiveness	35	0,000	Gender	33	0,000	Level of friends politicization	439	0,000
Partisanship proximity	31	0,000	Partisanship proximity	26	0,000	Political filiation	431	0,000
Country	35	0,000	Religious belonging	25	0,000	Pol interest of parents	116	0,000
Education level	21	0,000	Education level	21	0,000	Constant	59	0,000
Satisfact towards government	17	0,001	Activity status	23	0,000			
Age in 2 categories	11	0,001	Satisfact towards government	17	0,001			
Religious belonging	14	0,003	Age in 2 categories	11	0,001			
Activity status	13	0,028	Standard of living	7	0,071			
Optimism	3	0,243	Optimism	2	0,321			
Type of settlement	4	0,309	Type of settlement	3	0,424			
Standard of living	3	0,404	Left right position	3	0,614			
Left right position	3	0,606	Constant	2	0,161			
Constant	2	0,200						

Vote (q13) / Voting people

Europe (Country)			Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Level of parental politicization	83	0,000	Level of parental politicization	91	0,000	Level of friends politicization	97	0,000
Country	86	0,000	Religious belonging	66	0,000	Parents vote	42	0,000
Age in 3 categories	52	0,000	Level of friends politicization	65	0,000	Political interest filiation	43	0,000
Level of friends politicization	50	0,000	Education level	66	0,000	Constant	26	0,000
Political interest	43	0,000	Age in 3 categories	48	0,000	Political filiation	18	0,006
Education level	48	0,000	Political interest	45	0,000	Level of parental politicization	10	0,021
Partisanship proximity	30	0,000	Partisanship proximity	40	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	4	0,108
Type of settlement	29	0,000	Type of settlement	32	0,000	Parents demonstration	1	0,768
Standard of living	13	0,004	Optimism	12	0,003			
Optimism	9	0,014	Standard of living	13	0,005			
Political competence	10	0,023	Activity status	12	0,029			
Religious belonging	8	0,037	Political competence	7	0,066			
Satisfact towards government	7	0,082	Satisfact towards government	6	0,097			
Left right position	8	0,087	Left right position	7	0,129			
Activity status	9	0,091	Political effectiveness	2	0,371			
Political effectiveness	3	0,205	Gender	0	0,607			
Gender	1	0,464	Constant	1	0,317			
Constant	1	0,381						

Left-right position / Leftist

Europe (Country)			Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Level of parental politicization	287	0,000	Level of parental politicization	325	0,000	Left right position of parents	813	0,000
Country	170	0,000	Satisfact towards government	100	0,000	Level of parental politicization	371	0,000
Satisfact towards government	92	0,000	Partisanship proximity	63	0,000	Parents vote	140	0,000
Partisanship proximity	52	0,000	Optimism	54	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	127	0,000
Standard of living	28	0,000	Level of friends politicization	41	0,000	Political interest filiation	116	0,000
Level of friends politicization	26	0,000	Political effectiveness	20	0,000	Parents demonstration	71	0,000
Political effectiveness	20	0,000	Standard of living	22	0,000	Level of friends politicization	62	0,000
Religious belonging	15	0,002	Religious belonging	20	0,000	Constant	86	0,000
Education level	15	0,005	Type of settlement	12	0,006			
Optimism	10	0,009	Education level	11	0,026			
Type of settlement	8	0,052	Political competence	8	0,048			
Political competence	2	0,210	Gender	2	0,219			
Gender	1	0,288	Political interest	1	0,543			
Age in 2 categories	1	0,316	Activity status	4	0,577			
Activity status	1	0,916	Age in 2 categories	0	0,671			
Political interest	0	0,988	Constant	0	0,998			
Constant	0	0,998						

Partisanship proximity / People who have a proximity

Europe (Country)			Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Left right position	248	0,000	Left right position	278	0,000	Political filiation	268	0,000
Country	129	0,000	Satisfact towards government	36	0,000	Political interest filiation	64	0,000
Political interest	32	0,000	Political interest	27	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	14	0,001
Political competence	29	0,000	Political competence	30	0,000	Parents vote	16	0,001
Satisfact towards government	29	0,000	Religious belonging	24	0,000	Level of friends politicization	9	0,026
Political effectiveness	20	0,000	Level of parental politicization	21	0,000	Parents demonstration	7	0,061
Type of settlement	21	0,000	Activity status	23	0,000	Level of parental politicization	3	0,355
Level of parental politicization	17	0,001	Type of settlement	18	0,000	Constant	330	0,000
Religious belonging	17	0,001	Political effectiveness	15	0,001			
Activity status	14	0,015	Education level	16	0,004			
Level of friends politicization	10	0,020	Standard of living	13	0,005			
Education level	10	0,040	Level of friends politicization	8	0,054			
Standard of living	8	0,041	Optimism	3	0,177			
Optimism	4	0,132	Age in 2 categories	2	0,216			
Age in 2 categories	1	0,344	Gender	0	0,693			
Gender	0	0,793	Constant	0	0,998			
Constant	0	0,998						

**Demonstration / People who have already taken part in a demonstration**

Europe (Country)			Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Country	437	0,000	Level of friends politicization	238	0,000	Level of friends politicization	283	0,000
Level of friends politicization	163	0,000	Left right position	122	0,000	Political filiation	186	0,000
Left right position	57	0,000	Satisfact towards government	57	0,000	Parents demonstration	83	0,000
Political effectiveness	41	0,000	Political effectiveness	45	0,000	Political interest filiation	26	0,000
Type of settlement	39	0,000	Type of settlement	44	0,000	Parents vote	11	0,013
Religious belonging	37	0,000	Education level	33	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	4	0,113
Satisfact towards government	28	0,000	Optimism	18	0,000	Level of parental politicization	5	0,153
Political interest	22	0,000	Political interest	14	0,001	Constant	205	0,000
Education level	24	0,000	Religious belonging	13	0,004			
Gender	4	0,051	Activity status	15	0,012			
Political competence	7	0,085	Level of parental politicization	8	0,042			
Activity status	8	0,181	Political competence	8	0,045			
Age in 2 categories	1	0,249	Age in 2 categories	3	0,113			
Level of parental politicization	3	0,371	Gender	2	0,176			
Partisanship proximity	0	0,505	Partisanship proximity	1	0,347			
Standard of living	2	0,672	Standard of living	3	0,372			
Optimism	0	0,927	Constant	43	0,000			
Constant	37	0,000						

**Association / People who are member of an association**

Europe (Country)			Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Country	85	0,000	Level of friends politicization	58	0,000	Political interest filiation	73	0,000
Gender	40	0,000	Religious belonging	51	0,000	Level of friends politicization	46	0,000
Level of friends politicization	44	0,000	Gender	38	0,000	Parents vote	29	0,000
Political effectiveness	38	0,000	Political effectiveness	36	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	17	0,000
Type of settlement	30	0,000	Political interest	31	0,000	Political filiation	20	0,003
Political interest	25	0,000	Type of settlement	30	0,000	Level of parental politicization	6	0,090
Religious belonging	27	0,000	Standard of living	29	0,000	Parents demonstration	5	0,159
Activity status	28	0,000	Activity status	31	0,000	Constant	0	0,693
Optimism	17	0,000	Optimism	19	0,000			
Standard of living	18	0,000	Age in 2 categories	9	0,002			
Age in 2 categories	11	0,001	Education level	16	0,003			
Education level	15	0,005	Political competence	10	0,021			
Partisanship proximity	5	0,020	Partisanship proximity	4	0,056			
Level of parental politicization	7	0,059	Level of parental politicization	4	0,223			
Political competence	5	0,139	Left right position	5	0,340			
Satisfact towards government	5	0,210	Satisfact towards government	3	0,434			
Left right position	4	0,441	Constant	0	0,984			
Constant	0	0,771						

In a second step, we included the variable knowledge in the regressions, in order to see if the political knowledge has more influence on the political participation of the young European than the family and peers' socialization. We had to exclude Finland and Germany from these regressions, because in these countries the political knowledge questions were not asked.

Political interest / Very, fairly interested

Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Level of parental politicization	386	0,000	Level of parental politicization	639	0,000
Level of friends politicization	258	0,000	Parents vote	434	0,000
Political competence	183	0,000	Parents demonstration	359	0,000
Political knowledge	97	0,000	Level of friends politicization	302	0,000
Political effectiveness	29	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	292	0,000
Religious belonging	28	0,000	Political filiation	294	0,000
Partisanship proximity	16	0,000	Political knowledge	123	0,000
Gender	11	0,001	Pol interest of parents	60	0,000
Education level	16	0,003	Constant	60	0,000
Age in 2 categories	7	0,009			
Activity status	15	0,011			
Satisfact towards government	9	0,032			
Type of settlement	6	0,114			
Standard of living	3	0,467			
Optimism	1	0,605			
Left right position	1	0,956			
Constant	0	0,993			

Vote (q13) / Voting people

Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Level of friends politicization	58	0,000	Level of friends politicization	75	0,000
Religious belonging	58	0,000	Parents vote	45	0,000
Level of parental politicization	49	0,000	Political knowledge	44	0,000
Age in 3 categories	42	0,000	Political filiation	20	0,003
Education level	44	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	7	0,030
Partisanship proximity	25	0,000	Political interest filiation	14	0,034
Type of settlement	30	0,000	Level of parental politicization	7	0,063
Political interest	22	0,000	Parents demonstration	1	0,846
Political knowledge	24	0,000	Constant	11	0,001
Standard of living	15	0,001			
Left right position	10	0,043			
Activity status	11	0,044			
Political competence	8	0,046			
Optimism	4	0,112			
Gender	1	0,404			
Political effectiveness	0	0,843			
Satisfact towards government	0	0,938			
Constant	0	0,679			

**Left-right position / Leftist**

Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Level of parental politicization	215	0,000	Left right position of parents	632	0,000
Satisfact towards government	128	0,000	Level of parental politicization	261	0,000
Partisanship proximity	47	0,000	Parents vote	101	0,000
Level of friends politicization	33	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	86	0,000
Optimism	30	0,000	Political interest filiation	79	0,000
Religious belonging	18	0,000	Parents demonstration	60	0,000
Political effectiveness	15	0,001	Level of friends politicization	43	0,000
Type of settlement	10	0,015	Political knowledge	12	0,006
Political knowledge	10	0,015	Constant	69	0,000
Standard of living	10	0,023			
Education level	11	0,028			
Political interest	4	0,154			
Political competence	4	0,263			
Activity status	6	0,306			
Gender	0	0,971			
Age in 2 categories	0	0,996			
Constant	0	0,999			

**Partisanship proximity / People who have a proximity**

Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Left right position	211	0,000	Political filiation	204	0,000
Religious belonging	24	0,000	Political interest filiation	32	0,000
Political knowledge	22	0,000	Parents vote	23	0,000
Type of settlement	17	0,001	Political knowledge	22	0,000
Political interest	15	0,001	Pol discussions with parents	9	0,010
Political competence	17	0,001	Level of friends politicization	9	0,033
Satisfact towards government	16	0,001	Parents demonstration	7	0,080
Political effectiveness	13	0,002	Level of parental politicization	5	0,206
Level of parental politicization	15	0,002	Constant	271	0,000
Activity status	13	0,025			
Level of friends politicization	8	0,047			
Education level	9	0,052			
Optimism	4	0,112			
Standard of living	5	0,206			
Age in 2 categories	1	0,380			
Gender	0	0,851			
Constant	0	0,998			

**Demonstration / People who have already taken part in a demonstration**

Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Level of friends politicization	161	0,000	Level of friends politicization	192	0,000
Left right position	90	0,000	Political filiation	161	0,000
Satisfact towards government	53	0,000	Parents demonstration	68	0,000
Political effectiveness	39	0,000	Parents vote	12	0,006
Education level	45	0,000	Political interest filiation	15	0,024
Type of settlement	25	0,000	Level of parental politicization	6	0,100
Activity status	28	0,000	Political knowledge	6	0,120
Religious belonging	21	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	2	0,412
Optimism	14	0,001	Constant	156	0,000
Age in 2 categories	7	0,009			
Level of parental politicization	6	0,102			
Political interest	4	0,119			
Gender	2	0,152			
Political knowledge	5	0,204			
Political competence	4	0,292			
Partisanship proximity	0	0,601			
Standard of living	1	0,834			
Constant	31	0,000			

**Association / People who are member of an association**

Europe			Political socialisation variables only		
	Wald	Sig		Wald	Sig
Gender	41	0,000	Political interest filiation	48	0,000
Level of friends politicization	46	0,000	Level of friends politicization	31	0,000
Type of settlement	28	0,000	Political knowledge	25	0,000
Standard of living	26	0,000	Parents vote	18	0,000
Political effectiveness	23	0,000	Pol discussions with parents	15	0,001
Religious belonging	19	0,000	Political filiation	13	0,050
Political knowledge	18	0,000	Parents demonstration	6	0,113
Political interest	15	0,001	Level of parental politicization	4	0,245
Activity status	20	0,001	Constant	3	0,099
Age in 2 categories	7	0,007			
Optimism	9	0,010			
Education level	10	0,048			
Partisanship proximity	2	0,150			
Political competence	5	0,165			
Left right position	6	0,199			
Satisfact towards government	2	0,612			
Level of parental politicization	1	0,731			
Constant	2	0,212			

### **3.1.8 Annex 3: Technical Notes for the Geometrical Data Analysis**

Respondents : n = 4934.

Age : 18 years old and more.

This Geometric data analysis does not directly include German respondents: a certain number of questions we used for this MCA were not asked in this country (questions which contained important issues for the study of political participation). Nevertheless, it is possible to visualize them in a second step.

With Geometric data analysis, we can locate respondents in the space of political participation, political interest, political trust, economic and social issues.

## DICTIONARY

<b>LABELS</b>	<b>DETAILS</b>
	<b>LEFT RIGHT SCALE OF RESPONDENT (Q20)</b>
Left	Very left-wing / Left-wing (items 1,2)
Right	Right-wing / Very Right-wing (items 4,5)
LRDK	DK (item 77)
	<b>POLITICAL INTEREST OF RESPONDENT (Q1)</b>
PolInt++	Very interested
PolInt+	Fairly interested
Polint--	Not at all interested
	<b>POLITICS IN THE NEWS (Q3)</b>
News++	Every Day (item 1)
New--	Less often / Never (items 4, 5)
	<b>WAYS WHICH CAN INFLUENCE DECISIONS (Q24) (Item 6 thru 10 for the 10 ways proposed)</b>
WaysEff++	6 thru 10 ways effective
WaysEf--	0 thru 2 ways effective
	<b>"HAVE YOU EVER... ?" (Q13A)</b>
VoteYes	Voted in elections:Yes
VoteNo	Voted in elections:No
MeetingYes	Attended a public meeting:Yes
DemonsYes	Participated in a legal demonstration:Yes
	<b>MEMBER OF AN ORGANISATION (ANYONE OF THEM) (Q18)</b>
MembOrg Yes	Yes
MembOrg No	No
	<b>GOVERNMENT'S SATISFACTION (Q32)</b>
Gvt++	Very satisfied / Satisfied (items 1,2)
Gvt--	Dissatisfied / Very Dissatisfied (items 4,5)
	<b>POLITICS SEEM COMPLICATED (Q25)</b>
PoComp++	Always / often (items 1,2)
PoComp+-	Rarely / Never (items 4,5)
	<b>INDICATOR OF LIBERALISM (q50_11 thru q50_18)</b>
Liber++	Liberal
Liber+	Fairly Liberal
Liber--	Not at all Liberal
	<b>INDICATOR OF OPTIMISM ABOUT FUTURE (Q30)</b>
Future++	Optimistic: 4 or 5 questions 'much better'
Future--	Pessimistic: 0 or 1 question 'much better'
	<b>INDICATOR OF POLITICAL DISTRUST (Q49_7, Q49_11 : items "politics means empty promises", "politics is just corrupt" ; answers "Agree strongly" and "agree")</b>
PoDistrust++	Strong Political distrust
PoDistrus--	Weak political distrust
	<b>EVER TRIED TO CONVINCE OTHERS (Q14)</b>
Persuade++	Yes (item 1)
	<b>CLOSE TO A POLITICAL PARTY (ANYONE OF THEM) (Q29)</b>
Close Parties	Very close / close (items 1,2)



### **Significant Socio-political Variables**

<b>LABELS</b>	<b>DETAILS</b>
	<b>IDEOLOGICAL FILIATION</b>
LeftFil	Left Filiation
RightFil	Right Filiation
NNFil	Neither Nor Filiation
IncoFil	Incoherent Filiation
	<b>POLITICAL INTEREST FILIATION</b>
FilInt	Filiation of Interest
FilParHetInt	Non homogeneous parents + ego interested
FilMoveInt	Move to interest
FilNoInt	Filiation of no interest
	<b>LEFT RIGHT SCALE OF PARENTS</b>
ParLeft	Both Left
ParRight	Both Right
ParDK	Both don't know
	<b>POLITICAL INTEREST OF PARENTS</b>
ParNotInt	Both not interested
	<b>INDICATOR OF VOTING HOMOGENEITY WITHIN THE PARENTS</b>
ParVote--	Both not always
ParVote++	Both always
ParVoteDK	Unknown
	<b>INDICATOR OF POLITICISATION LEVEL OF PARENTS</b>
ParPo++	Strong level
ParPo--	Weak level
	<b>INDICATOR OF POLITICISATION LEVEL OF FRIENDS</b>
FriendsPo++	Strong
FriendsPo+	Medium
FriendsPo--	Very weak
	<b>INDICATOR OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE</b>
Know++	Strong
Know--	weak
KnowDK	Unknown
	<b>DIPLOMA</b>
StudDip++	Still at school, >=maturity
StudDip--	Still at school, <maturity
Dip--	Working, <maturity
	<b>STANDARD OF LIVING</b>
StandLiv--	Very low / low

### **3.2 Influence of school and education**

The opportunity structures for participation at school differ from country to country (see chapter 2.1.4). This conclusion can also be drawn from the Civic Education Study reports quoted below, although the target population as well as the research questions of these studies are only of limited comparability to the respective parameters in this study. When studying the influence of school parameters on participation, several prerequisites have to be kept in mind:

First, there are different ways how the offer of civic education from the side of the school system is organised across countries, and across subjects (history, mother tongue, religious instructions, social studies) and therefore teachers dealing with this subjects vary in their disciplinary background (Losito & Mintrop 2001 S158f). Nevertheless, “civic education lessons lack variety in instructional formats and are mostly teacher-centered” (ebd., S 161f). The importance of teachers for the political socialisation is well documented in international research projects: U.S. ninth graders discuss international political issues more likely with teachers than with their parents or peers (Baldi et. al. 2001, 87).

Second, there is no consensus, often not even on a national societal level, whether the aim of any civic education is primarily transmission of concrete knowledge or to develop critical thinking and value orientations (ebd. S 168).

Third, besides official, systematic effort to develop skills necessary for citizenship and political awareness, the actual class climate proved to be very important; especially, whether political discussions with teachers are obviously steered towards consensus with certain and most likely the teachers’ positions or whether disagreement is tolerated or even desired (see Torney-Purta et al., ch7, S 141).

The only indicator of this study which is equivalent for all countries is the question: “How often do you discuss political issues when you get together with teachers?” But even if there is a different opportunity structure in schools across countries and indicators cannot be equivalent, on a general level we can find positive correlations between participation in school and participation outside school.

All significant correlation coefficients we looked into contain the same message:

- **The more active people are in school, the more active they are outside school.**

Correlating all indicators of political activity in school with the indicators of participation within the representative system, consumerism, in public discourse, demonstrating or even in illegal or violent actions are either positive or if they are negative they are not significant – and this is true for all countries.

And a second message is within the data:

- **The more active people have been in school, the more active they are after they left school.**

This message is important for youth policy makers. National governments in Europe have established some form of participation structures for students in schools in order to foster democracy and political participation of the citizens. Pupils should learn democratic behaviour and political skills already in school and learn to be active citizens when they leave schools.

- **Our data confirm that schools within the 8 countries covered by this study fulfil this task – the opportunity structures for participation in schools foster political participation behaviour.**

We have seven indicators for participation in school and 27 indicators of participation behaviour for the five concepts (participation within the representative system, consumerism, in public discourse, demonstrating or even in illegal or violent actions) within 8 countries – so we can calculate  $7 \times 8 \times 27 (=1512)$  correlation coefficients.

From the 1512 possible correlations between participation behaviour in school and participation behaviour outside school (for young people who already left school more than half of these coefficients (about 57%) are positive and significant), about a third (31%) is higher than 0.15, and every sixth is higher than 0.2. from these 1512 correlations not a single one is negative and significant and therefore contradicting our findings.

This relationship between participation in school and outside school can be shown in a series of examples. The only indicator which is equivalent for all participating countries was the question about discussing political issues with

teachers. In Germany, Austria, Italy and Estonia such discussions are more frequent than in Finland, France, Slovakia or the UK.

**Table 77: How often do you discuss political issues when you get together with teachers?**

Countries (total numbers)	Always and often	Seldom / rarely	never	Not applicable/ d.k.
Austria	15	34	30	21
Estonia	10	49	26	15
Finland	4	44	41	12
France	6	39	33	21
Germany	20	33	18	29
Italy	12	38	24	26
Slovakia	5	39	34	22
UK	4	25	46	25

Weighted data; percentages.

From the pupils between 15 and 18 years (table 65), which still attend school, about a third (35%) in Germany and a quarter in Austria (27%) and Italy (25%) is discussing political issues “always” and “often” in school. In Finland, France, Slovakia and the UK this percentage is less than a tenth (4 to 8%).

**Table 78: How often do you discuss political issues when you get together with teachers? (15 to 18 years, in education)**

Countries (total numbers)	Always and often	Seldom / rarely	Never	Not applicable/ d.k.
Austria	27	54	17	2
Estonia	15	64	20	1
Finland	5	55	39	1
France	8	51	39	3
Germany	35	51	12	2
Italy	24	61	15	0
Slovakia	6	63	30	1
UK	4	37	57	2

Weighted data; percentages.

In all countries we find significant correlations between discussions with teachers and political participation. The highest correlations on average in all 8 countries are found with forms of participation connected to public discourse – attending public meetings and writing articles.

The more often young people discuss political issues with their teachers, the more they attend public meetings.

**Table 79: Frequency of discussing politics with teachers (participation in school) correlates with the frequency of attending public meetings (participation outside school)**

discussing with teachers	Attending public meetings					
	never	Not during the last 12 month	once	twice	3-5 times	5 times and more
Always	58	4	11	15	5	7
Often	63	3	17	11	3	2
Sometimes	75	3	13	6	2	1
Rarely	81	3	9	3	2	2
Never	86	2	6	3	1	1

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).  
N=6128 cases, missings excluded, relationship is positive in all countries.

The more young people discuss political issues with teachers, the more they are involved in writing articles about political issues, and the more they are involved in legal demonstrations.

**Table 80: Frequency of discussing politics with teachers (participation in school) correlates with the frequency of writing articles (participation outside school)**

discussing with teachers	Writing Articles					
	never	Not during the last 12 month	once	twice	3-5 times	5 times and more
Always	79	4	7	5	3	3
Often	87	2	5	2	2	1
Sometimes	91	1	4	2	1	1
Rarely	94	1	3	1	0	1
Never	97	0	1	1	0	0

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).  
N=6258 valid cases, missings excluded, relationship is positive in all countries.

**Table 81: Frequency of discussing politics with teachers (participation in school) correlates with the frequency of participating in legal demonstrations (participation outside school)**

discussing with teachers	Participating in legal demonstrations					
	never	Not during the last 12 month	once	twice	3-5 times	5 times and more
Always	63	5	13	5	4	9
Often	68	4	15	8	2	3
Sometimes	77	4	10	5	2	1
Rarely	85	4	6	3	1	1
Never	87	3	5	2	1	1

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

N = 6206 valid cases, missings excluded, relationship is positive in all countries.

These relationships related here in the tables above are just a sample, showing strong relationships between discussing with teachers and political participation outside school.

In some school systems all pupils elect a representative of their class - in German this function is called “Klassensprecher” (speaker for the class). The term “speaker for the class” is not measuring the same in all countries, in some cases (Finland, UK) the meaning of the term covers an informal role of an active pupil.

But this role of a representative of a class correlates with political behaviour outside school. Young people who report that they have had the role of a class representative (“speaker for the class”) report as well that they are more active supporting election campaigns than others. This correlation is significant for all countries except Germany.

**Table 82: Supporting election campaigns is more often done by young people who have been a representative for their class**

Countries (total numbers)	Percentage of “speaker for the class”	Supported election campaigns	
		Not been “speaker for the class”	Been “speaker for the class”
Austria	42	6	11
Estonia	34	5	8
Finland	33	7	18
France	40	2	9
Germany	54	6	8
Italy	56	9	16
Slovakia	21	9	18
UK	12	2	17

Weighted data; percentages.

Participation structures in schools differ from country to country. In Austria 42% report, that they have been “Klassensprecher” – an elected representative of the class. This system of “Klassensprecher” is not comparable over countries – but the relationships with political participation are similar.

The fact that someone has taken this role in school fosters political participation. The example in table 82 shows a positive correlation with supporting election campaigns. Young people who have already been a representative of their school class are more likely to support election campaigns than others. This relationship is significant for all countries except Germany.

Another example to illustrate this relationship is the correlation between the role of the “speaker for the class” and political internet discussions.

Young People who have been representatives of their class are more actively discussing on the internet than others. This relationship is significant for all countries: Usually class-representatives have the double rate of participating in internet discussions (Austria, Estonia, Finland and Italy). The relationship is weaker in Germany and stronger in countries where political internet discussions are less frequent (France, Slovakia, UK).

**Table 83: Contributing to a political discussion on the net is more frequent with young people who have been representatives of their class**

	Ever contributed to a political discussion on net	
Countries	Not been “speaker for the class”	Been “speaker for the class”
Austria	7	15
Estonia	13	26
Finland	12	27
France	2	10
Germany	8	13
Italy	4	8
Slovakia	3	11
UK	0,3	9

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

A positive correlation between in school participation and out of school participation is found for participation in “protest movements in school” and the support for political parties.

**Table 84: Informal participation in election campaigns is more likely among people who have been involved in protest movements in school**

	Ever convinced others to vote for a party or candidate	
Countries	Never participated in a protest movement in school	Ever participated in a protest movement in school
Austria	22	35
Estonia	18	25
Finland	23	46
France	9	25
Germany	23	35
Italy	28	37
Slovakia	14	29
UK	3	39

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).



Young people who have been involved in protest movements in school are more likely to support parties or candidates in election campaigns. Nearly every second young Finn (46%) who was involved in protest movements in school has been involved in political internet discussion too. Being involved in protest movements doubles the probability to discuss politics on the net in at least four countries (Finland, France, Slovakia and the UK).

This relation still works after the young people left school. For young people already working we find that they are more likely to support a party or a candidate during an election campaign when they have been involved in a protest movement at school.

**Table 85: Informal support for election campaigns is more frequent if young people have been involved in protest movements in school (even if they have already left school)**

	Ever convinced others to vote for a party or candidate	
Countries	Never participated in a protest movement in school	Ever participated in a protest movement in school
Austria	22	40
Estonia	16	21
Finland	29	33
France	11	24
Germany	23	42
Italy	24	37
Slovakia	15	38
UK	4	50

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Young people in paid work; this relationship is not significant for Finland and Estonia.

## Conclusions

Fostering political participation in schools, either through formal institutions like boards, representatives or pupil unions or informal through political discussions or protest movements also encourages political participation outside school, as well as political participation after school.

Policies to encourage participation in school will strengthen European democracy.

## References

Baldi, St. et. al (2001): What Democracy Means to Ninth-Graders: U.S. Results from the International IEA Civic Education Study. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics, 2001. EJ 454 152.

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### 3.3 Trust and membership

Dekker, Koopmans and van den Broek (in: van Deth 1997) show in their study based on data of the European Value Study (1990), that among adults there is a clear relationship between perceived trustworthiness of the political system of a country and its level of social and political participation, indicating “positive side-effects of involvement for the functioning of a democratic culture” (ibid, p 236) but no relation to protest behaviour<sup>9</sup>. Unfortunately, the explicit avoidance of the term “membership” (ibid, p 223) reduces the comparability of the results presented by the authors. Trust is measured by a general trust-in-persons-indicator and trust in the government (ibid, p 231). To bridge this lack, the following chapter is dedicated to the relationship between trust in political organisations and institutions and forms of political participation explicitly including organisational membership, at least in theory.

**Table 86: Trust rates-overview**

Trust in....		Austria	Estonia	France	Italy	Slovakia	UK
Government	total*	19	18	12	13	7	12
Political Parties	total*	13	9	8	11	6	6
Parliament	total*	20	24	14	19	7	18
Politicians	total*	11	9	8	7	5	9
European Commission	total*	22 <sup>!</sup>	33 <sup>!</sup>	17	29	22	12 <sup>!</sup>
European Parliament	total*	24 <sup>!</sup>	36 <sup>!</sup>	18	33	24	12 <sup>!</sup>
Greenpeace	total*	39	49	31	39	28	33
Amnesty International	total*	49	34 <sup>!</sup>	36 <sup>!</sup>	55 <sup>!</sup>	20	35 <sup>!</sup>
Attac	total*	15 <sup>!</sup>	20 <sup>!</sup>	19 <sup>!</sup>	22 <sup>!</sup>	10 <sup>!</sup>	11 <sup>!</sup>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

\* total refers to the summed percentages of respondents indicating “4” (much) or “5 (very much)”

<sup>!</sup>... more than 10% missing values

The highest rate of young people trusting their country’s government is found for Austria (19%) and Estonia (18%). The lowest trust rate is reported for Slovakia, where only 7% express trust in their government. Given a generally

<sup>9</sup> Political participation is defined via belonging to or working voluntarily for the following organisations: “political parties or groups; Third world development or human rights; conservation, the environment, ecology, peace movement; animal rights, trade unions; professional organisations” (Dekker et. al. in: van Deth 1997, p 223).

lower trust in political parties than in the government, Austrian and Italian young people show the relatively highest trust rates (13% and 11% respectively). The lowest party trust rates are again found for Slovakia and the UK. Much higher trust is expressed for the national parliaments in all countries except for Slovakia, with again Austria (20%) and Estonia (24%) having the highest trust rates. Politicians are as well hardly trusted across all countries with Austrians being relatively trustful (11% trust rate). Higher trust rates exist when the supranational level, namely European Commission and the European Parliament is concerned. Most trust on this level is found with Estonians and Italians. Note that there are also considerable trust rates for the rather sceptical Slovaks (22% and 24%). Trust rates for NGOs, namely Greenpeace and Amnesty International are generally much higher across all countries than for state political institutions. This is not the case with Attac, but the response to this question should be interpreted carefully, as between 34% (Italy) and 61% (Slovakia) of all respondents could neither express trust nor distrust to this organisation. Young Slovaks are again those with the comparatively lowest trust in NGOs.

Across all countries, two more regularities are found that were not yet mentioned in Chapter 2.1.8, when trust variables were introduced for the first time: First, there is a relative “trust bonus” in terms of a higher rate of people expressing very much or much trust for European political institutions compared to national ones. Second, young people feel higher trust for well-established and well-known NGOs than for institutions associated with government and statehood.

**Table 87: Trust rates and voting on the national level**

Trust in...		Austria	Estonia	France	Italy	Slovakia	UK
<b>Government</b>	<b>total*</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>
Voted in national election	yes		22	16			17
	no		10	5			5
<b>Political parties</b>	<b>total*</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Parliament</b>	<b>total*</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>18</b>
Voted in national election	yes	20	27				18
	no	10	14				8
<b>Politicians</b>	<b>total*</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

\* total refers to the summed percentages of respondents indicating "4" (much) or "5 (very much)"

First of all, one has to be careful interpreting the results of Table 87, as they are based on small numbers due to the small subcategories of respondents per country.

Each figure in Table 87, and subsequently also in Table 88 and Table 89, stands for the percentage of trusting respondents. A grey cell may indicate either an overall trust rate of 10% or less, for which no subgroups are reported or a non-significant difference in the rate of trust in the subgroup concerned, or both.

Generally, with questions concerning trust, one can distinguish between those referring to trust in political institutions at the national level (i.e. trust in the government, in political parties, the parliament etc.) as well as at the EU level (i.e. trust in the European Commission and the European parliament), and trust in NGOs (i.e. trust in Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Attac). Table 87 shows the young Europeans' trust in political institutions at the national level whereas Table 88 reflects the youth's trust in EU institutions and Table 89 takes a closer look at NGOs in this context.

In Austria, voting behaviour is related to trust into the political institutions in so far as trust is a clear motive for going to the polls: consequently, those having voted in the last national election show more trust into the country's institutions than non-voters do. Austria's parliament is the best trusted political institution amongst young Austrians (20%), and in accordance with what has been said

one sentence earlier, there is a higher trust rate among those participating in the last national elections (20%) than in those who abstained from voting (10%).

In Estonia, among voting participants in general, there is again a higher trust rate for the government (22%) than among the average contestants of the survey. Clearly, voters of the last general Estonian election trust the national parliament to a higher extent than their non-voting compatriots (27% versus 14%). Political parties as well as their individual representatives - the politicians - are by far less popular among the Estonian youth: they enjoy only a little bit over a third of the trust shown into the country's democratic institutions (9% respectively).

French participants in their national election show a higher trust rate for both the government and the French Parliament (16%), whereas amongst the non-voters these percentages melt down to a mere third (5% with those not participating in the last national election).

Young Italians trust their parliament far more than any other national institution. Here, no significant difference between voters' and non-voters' inclination to trust can be commented upon.

Young Slovaks seem to be least inclined to trust their national political institutions: Less than ten percent feel they can trust their government or parliament (7% respectively), and they show only slightly more confidence into these institutions than into political parties and their individual representatives (6% and 5% respectively).

Young Britons who participated in the last national elections in the UK show over three times more trust into their government than the non-voters do. An even similar astounding gap is found in the different trust rates for the national parliament (18% versus 8%). It is thus again the non-voters who hardly trust the UK's institutions. Interestingly, young Britons seem to have more trust into individual politicians than into parties, which is in contrast to the trend prevailing in all the other participating countries.

**Table 88: Trust rates and voting on EU level**

Trust in...		Austria	Estonia	France	Italy	Slovakia	UK
European Commission	total*	22	33	17	29	22	12
	Voted in European election						
	yes	26		22		25	
	no	14		10		17	
European Parliament	total*	24	36	18	3	24	12
	Voted in European election						
	yes	25		23		29	
	no	14		9		18	

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

\* total refers to the summed percentages of respondents indicating "4" (much) or "5 (very much)"

At the European level, the following observation is to be made: all participating countries reflect an overall higher trust into the European Commission than into their own national government. With the exception of Italy and the UK, this holds also true for the young Europeans' trust in the European Parliament.

Young Austrians seem to be especially ready to trust in EU institutions. Although there is a noticeable gap of more than ten percent in expressing their trust between those who cast their vote at the last EU election and those who abstained from it, not even the latter show trust rates below 10%. It needs to be mentioned, however, that this trend might be attributed as well to a cultural-specific rating behaviour.

The Estonian youth expresses by far more trust into the European institutions than it does in its national institutions.

The column for France clearly shows that those young French who voted in the last European election also have a higher trust into the Union's institutions than those abstaining.

Italy expresses far more trust in the European Commission than it does in its own national government. Again, the different trust behaviour of voters and non-voters cannot be commented upon here. However, it is noteworthy that in contradiction with the general trend, young Italians seem to have very little trust into the European Parliament.

The young Slovaks' trust behaviour again illustrates the trend that there is a higher trust rate to be found amongst those who cast their votes at the

European general election: For all values, there is a steady difference of  $\pm$  ten percent between voters and non-voters to be observed (23% versus 13%, 25% versus 17%, and 29% versus 18% respectively).

As for the UK, the overall trust rates for the European Commission are the same as those having been indicated by the youth for their national government (12% respectively, see Table 2). However, young Britons express less trust into the European parliament than into their own. Together with the young Italians, they here contradict a trend encompassing all other participating countries.

Upon closer observation of the data collected in Table 2 and Table 3, one concludes that it is trust into the institutions which motivates young Europeans to cast their ballot in the first place. As was shown voting participation is influenced by trust in Austria, Slovakia and the UK. In these countries, there is less trust in both the EU Commission and the Parliament among EU elections non-voters. In Estonia, Italy and the UK, the trust rate among young people who did not vote in the last EU elections is not significantly lower. In these countries, other motives than distrust in EU institutions made young people stay away more often from the EU elections. Note that the significance in the relation between trust and voting is not related to being a “new” member country or being an influential country: differences are significant in Slovakia, but not in Estonia; they are significant in France as well as in Austria.



**Table 89: Trust rates for NGOs and their effect on voting behaviour**

Trust in...		Austria	Estonia	France	Italy	Slovakia	UK
<b>Greenpeace</b>	<b>total*</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>33</b>
Voted in national election	yes						41
	no						26
<b>Amnesty</b>	<b>total*</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>35</b>
Voted in national election	yes						52
	no						23
Voted in European election	ye		44			25	
	no		31			16	
<b>Attac</b>	<b>total*</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

\* total refers to the summed percentages of respondents indicating "4" or "5 (very much)"

An interest in the activities of an NGO shows an increased interest in political issues and thus distinguishes a person more likely to be more knowledgeable in politics. It is therefore very interesting to see how trust into NGOs and voting behaviour are interrelated. The three NGOs chosen to be represented in this study enjoy a very high trust rate in all participating countries, mostly outnumbering all other governmental institutions at national and EU level. The values displayed for Estonia, Slovakia and the UK clearly show a heightened trust in the listed NGOs, above all Greenpeace and Amnesty International, amongst those who voted in the last elections at either national or EU level, thus illustrating this facet of the interrelation very well.

The following tables summarize the results concerning the questions of whether political consumerism or demonstrations are related to both political and institutional trust or to a trust in NGOs and if so, whether the trust rate is actually higher or lower among active people.

**Table 90: Trust in national institutions and political consumerism**

Trust in...		Austria	Estonia	France	Italy	Slovakia	UK
Government	Total*	19	18	12	13	7	12
	Buy products		27°				
Political parties	Total*	13	9	8	11	6	6
Parliament	Total*	20	24	14	19	7	18
	Boycott products	26					
	Buy products	26	33°		25		
Politicians	Total*	11	9	8	7	5	9

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

\* total refers to the summed percentages of respondents indicating "trust much" or "trust very much"

° not comparable to the values of other countries due to different opportunity structures concerning product boycott.

First of all, the result presented in Dekker et al (in: van Deth 1997, p 233) of a negative relation between trust in government and protest activity could neither be reproduced nor refuted. In Austria, political consumers (i.e. those who either choose to boycott or buy products for political reasons) trust the government to a higher extent (26%) than the Austrian average (20%).

Looking at the results of Estonia, one has to keep in mind that the results of political consumerism are not comparable due to different opportunity structures. Therefore, as a follow-up, the trust rate differences are also not comparable with those of other countries. However, one may notice that those young Estonians who do buy products for political reasons, tend to trust their government and national parliament more than did the average respondent.

With Italy, it is especially those amongst the political consumers who buy products out of a political motivation who have more trust into their parliament than the average respondent (25% versus 19%).

**Table 91: Trust in European institutions and political consumerism and demonstrating**

Trust in...		Austria	Estonia	France	Italy	Slovakia	UK
European Commission	Total	22	33	17	29	22	12
	Boycott products	30					
	Buy products				36	33°	
European Parliament	Total*	24	36	18	33	24	12
	Boycott products	32					24
	Buy products				38	36°	
	demonstrate		50				

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

\* total refers to the summed percentages of respondents indicating "trust much" or "trust very much"

° not comparable to the values of other countries due to different opportunity structures concerning product boycott.

Austrians having ever boycotted products out of political motives tend to have more trust into the European institutions than does the average respondent (30% versus 22% with the European Commission, and 32% versus 24% with the European Parliament).

The trust rates for Estonia, again, cannot be considered here due to its incomparability because of their different opportunity structures. It is noteworthy, however, that young people participating in demonstrations and thus making active use of their basic democratic rights have by far more confidence in the European Parliament than does the average respondent (50% versus 36%).

Young Italians buying products for political reasons tend to show more trust into the European Commission and the European Parliament than does the average respondent (36% versus 29%, and 38% versus 33% respectively).

The data for Slovakia are also not comparable due to the different opportunity structures of political consumerism. However, those Slovakian political consumers who buy products for political reasons have far more confidence into the European institutions than the average respondent has (33% versus 22% with the European Commission, and 36% versus 33% with the European Parliament).

Young Britons generally seem to consider the European Parliament less trustworthy than their own national parliament (12% versus 18%, see Table 90). However, those young British political consumers who boycott products which do not agree with their political conscience show twice as much trust into the European Parliament than does the average respondent (24% versus 12%).

**Table 92: Trust in NGOs and political consumerism and demonstrating**

Trust in...		Austria	Estonia	France	Italy	Slovakia	UK
Greenpeace	Total*	39	49	31	39	28	33
	Boycott products			51	60		53
	Buy products		58°	52	55	37°	
	demonstrate			40	47		61
Amnesty International	Total*	49	34	36	55	20	35
	Boycott products			62	73		62
	Buy products		49°	61	70	33°	57
	demonstrate			43	66		71
Attac	Total*	15	20	19	22	10	11
	Boycott products			35			
	Buy products			36			

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

\* total refers to the summed percentages of respondents indicating "trust much" or "trust very much"

° not comparable to the values of other countries due to different opportunity structures concerning product boycott.

Once again, caution is to be applied with the Estonian results concerning their incomparability. It is interesting to note, though, that Greenpeace and Amnesty International, which already enjoy very high trust rates among the average respondents, receive even more trust from those buying products for political reasons (49% versus 58%, and 34% versus 49% respectively).

In France, trust in NGOs is clearly related to political consumerism: Both those boycotting as well as those buying products for political reasons express trust in Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Attac more frequent than the

French average. Trust in these NGOs, excluding Attac, is also more widespread among young French that engage in protests (40% versus 31%, and 43% versus 36% respectively).

With regard to Greenpeace and Amnesty International, the same pattern can be seen for Italy: Political consumers show far more trust in these two organisations than does the average respondent (60% and 55% versus 39%, and 73% and 70% versus 55%, respectively). Trust in these two NGOs is also considerable amongst protesters, and although their trust rates are not as high as those of the political consumers, they still outdo the average trust rate by 8% with Greenpeace and 11% with Amnesty International.

Slovakia is again not comparable due to the different opportunity structures of political consumerism. People buying products for political reasons have more trust in the NGOs than the average Slovakian.

In the UK, again, political consumerism and trust in NGOs are intertwined: of those boycotting products, 53% (versus 33%) trust in Greenpeace and 62% (versus 35%) trust in Amnesty International. Of those buying products for political reasons, 57% (versus 35%) are also more trustful concerning Amnesty International. Among the young Britons engaging in demonstrations, trust rates for Greenpeace (61%) and Amnesty International (71%) are especially high.

The crucial question whether there is a relation between political trust or trust in NGOs and membership in certain forms of youth organisations can only be answered indirectly and via the very soft measure of (marginal) activity, because the overall membership and participation rates are extremely low across all countries. Therefore, a thorough investigation has to be replaced by a more hesitating, inverted approach: is there a difference in trust between those having never participated not even in the slightest way in the activities of an organisation and those that did participate in which form or intensity ever? The results by country are summarized below:

## AUSTRIA

**Table 93: Trust in national institutions and activity within religious organisations**

Trust in		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
<b>Government</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2</b>
	<b>Not active in religious org.</b>	12	26	45	15	2
	<b>Active in religious org.</b>	3	15	52	26	4
<b>Political parties</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>National Parliament</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>3</b>
	<b>Not active in religious org.</b>	10	22	49	15	3
	<b>Active in religious org.</b>	5	16	52	25	2
<b>Politicians</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Young Austrians that are in some way active in a religious youth organisation (15% in total of the Austrian sample) stand out by their higher trust in almost all institutions and organisations. First, 30% (sum of categories 4 and 5) of those being somehow related to a religious youth organisation trust the government and only 3% distrust it strongly, whereas on average, only 19% express trust, but 11% strong distrust. Second, if taking part in activities of religious organisations has any effect on trust in the parliament, it is a positive one: 27% (versus 18% of those having no contact to a religious organisation) express trust, only 21% (versus 32%) distrust.

**Table 94: Trust in EU-institutions and activity within religious organisations**

Trust in		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
European Commission	total	13	22	42	19	3
	Not active in religious org.	14	23	43	17	3
	Active in religious org.	7	17	42	28	5
European Parliament	total	13	22	42	19	5
	Not active in religious org.	14	23	42	17	4
	Active in religious org.	5	20	41	26	8

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

People having contact to religious youth organisations in Austria do also trust more in the European Commission (33% activists versus 20% non-activists) and the European Parliament (34% activists versus 21% non-activists).

**Table 95: Trust in NGOs and activity within human rights organisations**

Trust in		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
Greenpeace	total	10	18	33	27	12
Amnesty International	total	8	14	30	32	17
	Not active in Human Rights Org.	9	13	32	32	15
	Active in Human Rights Org.	3	17	17	31	32
Attac	total	15	22	48	11	4

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Young Austrians who have some kind of relation to a human rights organisation (12% in total) do - not surprisingly - trust Amnesty International more than those who are not active (63% versus 47%) and they are also less indifferent on this matter (17% indifference of the activists versus 32% indifference of the non-activists in category 3). This means that organisational

involvement on the one hand positively influences trust in organisations and on the other hand makes young people more clearly position themselves on the poles of the scale.

## ESTONIA

**Table 96: Trust in national institutions and activity in youth organisations**

Trust in		1 (not at all)	2	3	4	5 (very much)
<b>Government</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>3</b>
	<b>Not active in youth org.</b>	13	27	43	14	3
	<b>Active in youth org.</b>	9	13	56	19	3
<b>Political Parties</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>Not active in youth org.</b>	19	36	36	8	1
	<b>Active in youth org.</b>	10	31	47	11	1
<b>National Parliament</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>4</b>
	<b>Not active in youth org.</b>	12	27	39	19	4
	<b>Active in youth org.</b>	7	19	43	29	3
<b>Politicians</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

In Estonia 15% on average are in one way or the other in contact with a youth association. This fraction of the active Estonian respondents does not necessarily express more trust in the government, but they are more indifferent (56% versus 43%) and less distrusting (22% versus 40%, sums of categories 1 and 2) than the non-active respondents. A higher rate of indifference is also found for political parties (47% versus 36%). Concerning the parliament, those being in contact with a youth association are really more trusting than their counterparts (32% versus 23%).

Concerning the impact of organisational involvement on trust in EU-institutions and in NGOs no significant correlations were found.



## FRANCE

**Table 97: Trust in NGOs and activity within cultural groups**

Trust in		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
Greenpeace	total	17	20	31	22	9
	Not active in cultural group	19	21	31	22	8
	Active in cultural group	9	19	36	24	12
Amnesty international	total	14	18	32	25	11
	Not active in cultural group	15	19	32	24	10
	Active in cultural group	6	12	32	32	19
Attac	total	20	23	38	14	5
	Not active in cultural group	22	23	37	14	4
	Active in cultural group	12	25	41	17	6

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

In France, the only significant differences – leaving aside groups where only a handful of respondents are in contact with - are found for cultural (music, dance, theatre) groups. Those being somehow active this way express more trust in Amnesty International than their non-active counterparts (51% versus 34%, category 4 and 5 put together) and by tendency in Greenpeace (36% versus 30%) and in Attac (23% versus 18%), too.

## ITALY

**Table 98: Trust in NGOs and organisational activity**

Trust in		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
<b>Greenpeace</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>14</b>
	<b>Not active in cultural group</b>	14	17	32	25	12
	<b>Active in cultural group</b>	7	19	27	27	20
	<b>Not active in peace org.</b>	13	19	31	25	13
	<b>Active in peace org.</b>	3	9	31	32	25
	<b>Not active in human rights org.</b>	13	18	31	24	13
	<b>Active in human rights org.</b>	9	12	27	33	19
<b>Amnesty International</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>24</b>
	<b>Not active in cultural group</b>	9	11	30	29	22
	<b>Active in cultural group</b>	5	8	20	35	32
	<b>Not active in peace org.</b>	9	11	29	30	22
	<b>Active in peace org.</b>	1	6	15	37	42
	<b>Not active in human rights org.</b>	9	10	29	31	22
	<b>Active in human rights org.</b>	3	8	15	33	41
	<b>Not active in charity org.</b>	9	11	29	30	22
	<b>Active in charity org.</b>	5	7	19	35	33
<b>Attac</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7</b>

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Italian young people differ concerning their trust in NGOs when being active within cultural associations, peace movements, human rights groups or charity organisations. 47% (versus 37%) of those active within cultural associations, 57% (versus 38%) of those active within peace movements and 52% (versus 37%) of those active within human rights groups express trust in Greenpeace.

Higher trust among those active within an organisation is also found for Amnesty International: 67% (versus 51%) of those active within cultural organisations, 79% (versus 52%) of those active within peace organisations, 74% (versus 53%) of those active within human rights organisations and 68% (versus 52%) of those active within charity organisations trust in Amnesty International.

## SLOVAKIA

**Table 99: Trust in EU-institutions and activity within cultural groups**

Trust in		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
European Commission	total	10	24	43	20	2
	Not active in cultural group	11	23	46	18	2
	Active in cultural group	9	27	36	26	2
European Parliament	total	10	22	43	22	2

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

The only differences that can be reported for Slovakia (because of large enough total numbers in both variable groups concerned) are the impact of activity within cultural groups on the trust in the European Commission: Young Slovaks who are not active in cultural, music or theatre groups are more indifferent vis-à-vis the European Commission (46%) than those with contacts to such groups (36%).

**Table 100: Trust in NGOs and activity within animal rights groups**

Trust in		1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (Very much)
Greenpeace	total	15	19	38	22	6
	Not active in animal rights org.	16	19	38	21	7
	Active in animal rights org.	7	19	37	33	4
Amnesty International	total	17	21	43	16	4
Attac	total	22	25	43	8	2

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Young Slovaks who are active in animal rights groups also express more trust for Greenpeace (37%) than do those who are not active in such groups (28%).

### United Kingdom

For the UK, no combination was found where both the dependent as well as the independent variable had more than 100 cases in total. Therefore, no results of the impact of organisational activity on trust are reported.

#### 3.3.1 Organisational Involvement and Participation Experience

The next section of this chapter is dedicated to the relation between forms of political participation and organisational involvement. In other words: Does organisational involvement in organisations - either political in the traditional sense or focused on a certain sphere of public interest - lead to greater and broader experience with various forms of political participation? Does the social capital expressed in organisational experience entail more and richer political participation? Can civil society organisations thus be viewed as agents of political socialisation that foster young people's participation in society?

The topic that we were interested in has accompanied political participation research almost from its very beginning: In their seminal work, Almond and Verba (1963) defined membership in all kinds of organisations and associations as essential feature of "civic culture". Their results confirmed a

connection between membership in organisations and (inter alia) political participation. Similarly, social capital theory integrated and developed this train of thought: Since institutions and networks are part of the “structural aspects” that constitute social capital, membership in organisations increases one’s social capital which in turn is necessary for political participation:

“Putnam presumes that membership in associations is of crucial importance for the level of civic virtue and political involvement of citizens...(he) defends the thesis that the decline of civil society is partly a result of a decline on membership in many types of associations, clubs, groups and organisations” (van Deth, 2000, p.123).

Olsen (1972, as cited in van Deth, 2000) argued that involvement in organisations (even non-political ones) increases participation because it broadens spheres of interests, brings in contact with new people and the resulting relationships draw into political activity, increases one’s level of information, trains in social interaction and leadership skills and provides resources needed for effective political action. Although this activation theory was questioned by others, van Deth in the above cited review of existing studies concludes that most studies confirm it: People who are active in social organisations will also be more active in political life.

In an earlier study, van Deth (2000) examined whether high social capital leads to higher political involvement. In contrast to previous research, van Deth differentiated between “political interest” and “saliency of politics” (relative importance of politics compared to other areas in one’s life). His results yielded an interesting paradox: Social capital in fact increases interest in politics – but at the same time may decrease the saliency of politics, thus it produces spectators who are informed and interested but regard politics as something rather irrelevant (compared to other areas in their life like family, friends, leisure, religion).

Our exploration of the topic is based on these considerations but works with different definitions: Firstly, we defined “political activity” as self-reported “participation experiences” (i.e., the number of diverse activities already performed). Secondly, “organisational involvement” was defined not only as membership but as any connection with an organisation<sup>10</sup>, including voluntary work or attending an event.

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<sup>10</sup> Because of the low activity percentages, we decided not to differentiate between the forms indicated in q18

Of all organisations listed in question 18, we selected those that proved comparable. Because of the limited comparability, we had to reduce the number of countries in the following data analysis to five (Italy, France and Slovakia were excluded because they would have reduced comparability of organisations to an intolerable minimum).

The remaining organisations were grouped into two types:

- “Party involvement” was defined as an activity in a political party (q18\_5) or a youth organisation of a party (q18\_2) or both.
- “NGO- involvement” refers to an activity in an environmental (q18\_6), an animal rights (q18\_7) or a human rights organisation (q18\_9), a consumer association (q18\_12), an immigrants’ organisation (q18\_14), a women’s organisation (q18\_15), an anti-globalisation organisation (q18\_16) or in any combination of them.

We operationalised the “forms of political participation” based on the range of participatory activities in Q13. Again, incomparable items were excluded from the analysis.

In a first step we computed a simple sum index to depict the general activity level of young people. Nevertheless, we decided to exclude voting questions (voting - q13\_1; cast an invalid vote - q13\_2; not voted out of protest - q13\_3) because we wanted to focus on political activities that need a minimum level of personal effort. The impact of organisational involvement on voting is tested separately and precedes the analysis of activity in the above sense and organisational involvement.

Altogether, the sum index “general activity level” is based on the following items:

- contacting a politician (q13\_4)
- collecting signatures (q13\_7)
- holding a political speech (q13\_8)
- boycotting products (q13\_10)
- writing political messages/graffiti on walls (q13\_12)
- wearing badges (q13\_13)
- participating in a legal demonstration (q13\_14)
- participating in a illegal demonstration (q13\_15)

- donating money (q13\_17)
- writing an article (q13\_19)
- writing/ forwarding a letter or an email with political content (Q13a20)
- participating in event where property was damaged (q13\_21)
- participating in event with violent police confrontation (q13\_22)
- participating in event with violent opponents confrontation (q13\_23)
- occupying houses/ school/ university/ factor/ government buildings (q13\_24)
- blocking streets or railways (q13\_25)

Our research question translates into the following hypothesis:

H1: Voting behaviour in both the last general national elections and the last EU elections is not related to organisational involvement of any kind.

H2: There are no significant differences in the mean level of activity between young people who are involved and those who are not involved in organisations.

We start by looking for significantly higher rates of organisational involvement among voters than among non-voters. Table 103 gives an overview for the selected five countries.

**Table 101: Influence of overall involvement, party and NGO involvement on EU voting participation – results by country**

EU election participation by country		involvement		
		overall	party	NGO
<b>Austria</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>21</b>	28
	<b>no</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>7</b>	29
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>
	<b>No</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>25</b>
	<b>No</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>11</b>	18
	<b>No</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>1</b>	14
<b>UK</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>2</b>	9
	<b>no</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>0</b>	5

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Figures indicate the percentage of active respondents among voters or non- voters. Significant differences appear bold.

It is shown how many of all voters or non voters are active in general, in a party or youth organisation of a party and in an NGO. So, for example, in Austria 73% of all those that did vote in the last European elections in 2004 are involved in any organisation of whatever kind. On the contrary, only 64% of the Austrian non-voters are generally involved in any kind of organisation.

All differences between voters and non-voters by country concerning the overall as well as the party involvement are significant. This means that young Europeans that did vote in the last European elections are also more often in contact with one or more organisations - at least via voluntary work. NGO involvement is not systematically related to voting in all countries. There is a significantly higher rate of NGO- involved respondents in Estonia and Finland, but apart from these countries, no significant differences are found. Note that in Austria there seems to be even a reverse tendency of less NGO involvement among voters. Due to small numbers, this tendency cannot be considered significant.

Repeating the same analysis at the national level leads to the following results:



**Table 102: Influence of overall involvement, party and NGO involvement on national voting participation – results by country**

national election participation by country		involvement		
		overall	party	NGO
Austria	yes	71	<b>18</b>	29
	no	70	<b>5</b>	33
Estonia	yes	<b>61</b>	<b>12</b>	12
	No	<b>48</b>	<b>5</b>	11
Finland	yes	<b>83</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>25</b>
	No	<b>69</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>14</b>
Germany	yes	<b>71</b>	<b>7</b>	19
	No	<b>46</b>	<b>1</b>	12
UK	yes	<b>54</b>	<b>4</b>	11
	no	<b>41</b>	<b>0</b>	6

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Figures indicate the percentage of active respondents among voters or non-voters. Significant differences appear bold.

Being involved in any organisation at all makes no difference with respect to national voting in Austria, whereas it does in all other countries. Only Austrians that are involved in party organisations are also significantly more often found among the voters. This is consistent with all other countries. On the contrary NGO involvement is generally not related to voting. The only exception is Finland.

In sum, hypothesis H1 of no influence of organisational involvement on the voting behaviour cannot be confirmed. NGO involvement is less obviously related to voting than party involvement on both levels.

To test hypothesis H2, we first computed the means of the general activity level for the selected five countries (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, UK). Then we applied two separate procedures to establish whether there are significant differences in political participation behaviours: First, means differences were tested for significance (ANOVA, Eta-statistic) and additionally, nonparametric correlations were calculated.

The results clearly confirm our hypothesis (Table 103): Involvement in organisations encourages political activity of young people. It leads to a higher level of participation activities and to a broader range of experiences.

**Table 103: Effect of organisational involvement on the mean level of participation (5-country-comparison)**

5 countries	involvement	general activity level (means of sum index) range: 0–16 possible activities
<b>total</b>		0.82
<b>Party involvement</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>2.72</b>
	<b>no</b>	0.73
<b>NGO involvement</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>2.62</b>
	<b>no</b>	0.62

Weighted data; all results reported here are statistically significant (F-Test, alpha = 5% AND significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%)

- On average, young people have ever done 0.82 out of 16 possible general activities mentioned above.
- Involvement in a political party or a party youth organisation has an effect on participation experiences (Eta=0.311; rank correlation 0.256): Those involved in party organisations have done more than three out of 19 types of activities. This is more than twice the general average.
- An even stronger effect comes from NGO involvement (Eta=0.36; rank correlation 0.337): Young people involved in NGOs reported 2.62 activities on average.

The absolute (Eta-values, mean differences) and relative strength (higher Eta-value for NGO involvement) of the effects do not change much when the voting variables are included in the general activity index.

### Relation between types of participation

An additional focus of interest concerned how the various forms of participation may be interrelated. We grouped the various forms of political activities into three types:

1. “Representational activity”: includes active support of an election campaign (q14\_1) and support of specific candidates or parties by trying to convince others to vote for them (14\_2).
2. “Illegal and violent participation” includes on the one hand holding a political speech (q13\_8)<sup>11</sup>, on the other hand writing messages on walls

<sup>11</sup> The assignment to this group is based on the cluster analysis reported in D16.

(q13\_12), participating in an illegal demonstration (q13\_15), in an event where property was damaged (q13\_21) or with a violent confrontation with the police or with political opponents (q13\_22, q13\_23), occupying buildings (q13\_24) or blocking streets or railways (q13\_25).

3. "Information work": Collecting signatures (q13\_7), donating money to support a group or organisation (q13\_17), writing articles (q13\_19) and letters or emails (q13\_20).

A first overview by nonparametric correlation coefficients reveals a significant relationship between representational participation and information work (correlation coefficient 0.293): Young people who helped in a party campaign are more likely to also engage in information work (and vice versa).

However, there is also a significant relation between representational and illegal participation (0.175) and between information work and illegal participation (0.266): Politically active young people tend to engage in a variety of activities. Once they are active, they do not simply stick to one means of expression.

### **Relation between organisational involvement and representational participation, illegal participation and information work**

An additional hypothesis was that organisational involvement leads young people in Europe to significantly more experiences with representational participation than those who are not involved in any organisation.

Table 104 shows the results:

**Table 104: Effect of organisational involvement on the mean level of representational activity (5-country-comparison)**

5 countries	involvement	Representational participation (means of sum index) range: 0–2 possible activities
<b>total</b>		0.27
<b>Party involvement</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>1.04</b>
	<b>no</b>	0.22
<b>NGO involvement</b>	<b>yes</b>	0.52
	<b>no</b>	0.23

Weighted data; all results reported here are statistically significant (F-Test, alpha = 5% AND significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%)

Not surprisingly, the hypothesis was confirmed. There is a strong relation between representational participation and involvement in party organisations (Eta=0.367, correlation coefficient 0.329).

NGO involvement also increases representational participation experiences (Eta=0.193, correlation coefficient 0.187), but to a lesser extent than party involvement.

Concerning the effect of organisational involvement on experiences with illegal and violent forms of participation, significant means differences were found (Table 105): Young people who are involved in party organisations or any type of NGO are more likely to also have experiences with “direct action” participation.

**Table 105: Effect of organisational involvement on the mean level of illegal participation (5-country-comparison)**

5 countries	involvement	illegal participation level (means of sum index) range: 0–8 possible activities
<b>total</b>		0.14
<b>Party involvement</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>0.47</b>
	<b>no</b>	0.12
<b>NGO involvement</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>0.41</b>
	<b>no</b>	0.09

Weighted data; all results reported here are statistically significant (F-Test, alpha = 5% AND significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%)

However, the explanatory power of the involvement items is smallest here: party involvement also leads to an increase in the average activity frequency (Eta=0.15, correlation coefficient 0.164), but there seem to be other and stronger factors that explain illegal and violent activity.

The same holds for NGO involvement (Eta=0.197, correlation coefficient 0.198). Altogether, direct action in political participation is stronger related to other factors than party and NGO involvement.

The effects of organisational involvement on “information work” are summarised in table (Table 106):

**Table 106: Effect of organisational involvement on the mean level of information work (5-country-comparison)**

5 countries	involvement	Information work level (means of sum index) range: 0–4 possible activities
<b>total</b>		0.27
<b>Party involvement</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>0.94</b>
	<b>no</b>	0.23
<b>NGO involvement</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>0.70</b>
	<b>no</b>	0.20

Weighted data; all results reported here are statistically significant (F-Test, alpha = 5% AND significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%)

The effects of both types of organisational involvement are almost equally strong. Party involvement raises the average activity level to 0.94 (Eta=0.276, correlation coefficient=0.265) and NGO involvement to 0.70 (Eta=0.28, correlation coefficient=0.236). So political parties and NGOs are not different with respect to the participation in the political discourse they evoke.

### Conclusions and policy implications

- Young people's political participation is not exclusively, but substantively connected with political organisations.
- Young people who are involved in organisations – be it party related organisations or civil society organisations – possess a wider range of participation experiences<sup>12</sup>.
- Organisational involvement fosters young people's capacity and habits of participation. This is true for the standard democratic activity (voting, supporting election campaigns) as well as for non-institutional and action oriented ways of participation (information work, illegal and violent participation).
- Political organisations that offer young people a platform for discussion, formation of opinion, exchange with other (young) people and last but not least acting out their ideals are thus significant agents of politicisation. They teach how to participate politically – and why this makes sense.

<sup>12</sup> We tend to assume a direction of causality: Organisational involvement teaches how to participate rather than participation experience is a prerequisite for organisational involvement.

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### 3.4 The influence of identity on voting

In this section we clarify whether identity has an impact on the voting of young Europeans. Were those who regard themselves strongly as Europeans more likely to vote at the last European elections in 2004? And did the ones who have a strong national identity more frequently vote at the national elections? To analyse this, correlations are computed. First, however, we are looking at how many respondents identify themselves strongly in various ways. Then we will test whether the various identities can be subsumed to certain basic stages. These stages might not be similar across countries.

The following table indicates how many of the respondents in each country feel part of the different communities.

**Table 107: Identity by country**

“To what extent, on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means “not at all strong” and 5 means “very strong”, do you feel yourself to be....?”

	Part of....							
	World Citizen	European	country	region	Town/ community	School /university	company	family
Austria	25	49	79	77	69	49	56	91
Estonia	38	49	73	76	80	74	66	92
Finland	34	61	93	66	71	54	49	91
France	34	44	80	67	68	59	48	92
Germany	32	57	66	62	63	48	65	95
Italy	40	47	77	69	71	56	57	91
Slovakia	18	44	85	71	76	58	50	94
UK	35	18	73	78	58	57	54	92

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Figures indicate sum of percent of people reporting “very strong (5)” and “strong (4)”.

Concerning the identity as a “world citizen” the Slovakian young people seem to share this idea the least (18%), followed by Austrians, where only 25% regard themselves as a world citizen. In all the other countries, this rate varies between 32% (Germany) and 40% (Italy). Be it for merely geographical or more political factors, British young people see themselves as Europeans to a much lesser extent (18%) than that all other “continentals”. In Finland (61%) and Germany (57%) a majority of the respondents places their identity strongly on the European level. In the countries remaining, between 44% (France, Slovakia) and 49% (Austria, Estonia) do so.

The national self-placement rate is the second highest in absolute terms, but nevertheless there are remarkable differences across countries: whereas in Germany, most likely due to historical political reasons, only two thirds strongly feel being German, almost all (93%) of the Finns do so.

Between 62% (Germany) and 78% (UK) locate their identity strongly at a regional level. The differences by country are not very pronounced.

Differences between the countries are more pronounced concerning the strength of a town or community identity. Whereas in Great Britain 58% are rooted in their town or community, 80% are in Estonia. Estonians stand out in terms of identification with one's school or university (74%). On the contrary Austrians (49%) and Germans (49%) do not feel being rooted in their schools or universities so much. A different pattern can be seen concerning the strength of a workplace identity: two thirds of the Estonian young people have a strong workplace identity. This is more or less consistent with their school or university identification. Germans, on the contrary, feel much more rooted in their workplace. The least identificational strength with the workplace is found for Finland (49%) and France (48%). Finally, in all the countries the vast majority, namely between 91% and 95%, strongly identifies oneself with being a part of the family.

A factor analysis for each country reveals that certain identities are closely related to each other in all countries, whereas others do not fit together.

**Table 108: Related identities – factor analysis results by country**

	World	Europe	country	region	Town/ comm unity	School /univer sity	com pany	family
All countries	supranational		national to local			social		
Austria	supranational		national to local					
Estonia	national to supranational			regional		social		
Finland	supranational			regional				
France	supranational			regional				
Germany	supranational			regional		social		
Italy	supranational		national to local				family- company	
Slovakia	supranational			regional		social		
UK	supranational		national to regional			social		

Weighted Data; Variables grouped according to factor analysis (principal axes).



If the analysis is performed for all countries at once, a three-factor solution comes out that is easy to interpret: First, feeling a “world citizen” and “European” seems to be same supranational identity. Second, the national, regional and the community identity go together. Third, being part of a school, university or a company makes up an identity of its own. Fourth, the family does not load strongly on any of these factors. Therefore, identity created via family membership is a strong and separate concept not related to the social or geographic identities mentioned.

Behind this overall structuring in identities there are great differences between the countries like Table 108 shows.

Altogether, six different patterns can be distinguished:

1. Austria: A supranational and a national-to-local-factor as in the general solution, but the workplace and the school/university identities do not go together to form a “social” identity factor.
2. Estonia: The world, European and the country identity go together to form a national-to-supranational-factor. Then there is a regional and community identity. A separate social identity factor exists.
3. Finland, France: A supranational identity factor as in the general solution, but the national is an identity of its own neither related to the supranational nor to the regional level. No clear social factor emerges.
4. Germany, Slovakia: A supranational factor as in the general solution, but the national is an identity of its own neither related to the supranational nor to the regional level. Here, a social factor can be distinguished. Workplace and school or university membership forms an identity of similar kind.
5. Italy: Supranational and national-to-regional factors as in the general solution, but in this country the family and the company form a common factor, that does not include the school or university identity. This is the only country where the family identity is related to other identities.
6. UK: A supranational factor as in the general solution. Then country and regional identity go together, but the town or community identity is not related to these two identities. So in the UK belonging to a certain community and to a certain family are two identity milestones separated from other contexts of identity. Nevertheless, a social identity factor emerges.

To sum up, the different identities do not group together in a similar manner across all countries. Especially the national identity is often a separate level and countries differ with regard to whether the workplace and the school or university membership create comparable and subsumable identities.

To test the hypotheses, whether the voting in the last national as well as in the last European elections is related to young people's identity on a national or European level, we compute nonparametric correlations per country and test them for significance.

**Table 109: Nonparametric correlations between degree of identity (ID) and voting participation – results by country**

Voting by country		ID: Europe	ID: country
Austria	EU	<b>0.11</b>	-
	national	-	-
Estonia	EU		-
	national	0.12	-
Finland	EU	<b>0.10</b>	-
	national	-	-
France	EU	<b>0.19</b>	0.18
	national	0.18	<b>0.15</b>
Germany	EU	<b>0.17</b>	0.09
	national	0.09	-
Italy	EU	-	-
	national	-	-
Slovakia	EU	-	-
	national	0.10	-
UK	EU	<b>0.17</b>	0.09
	national	0.15	-

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Figures indicate significant (alpha= 0.05) correlations. A minus indicates no significant correlation.

Table 109 shows the assumed relationship between young people's identity as Europeans and their voting in the last European elections: in Estonia, Italy and Slovakia neither the European identity nor citizenship does have an influence.

The relationship between national identity and participation in the last general national elections is only significant in France. Surprisingly, this doesn't change when excluding the respondents, who were not born in the country concerned. It also doesn't change when all respondents with a different nationality are excluded from the analysis.

Nevertheless, there is a significant relation on the EU level between the European identity and EU voting in Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the UK.

To sum up, there is evidence that identity is related to voting participation on the EU level. Feeling as young European to a certain extent also means feeling obliged to vote at European elections. The same hardly goes for patriotic self-location and national election participation among young people.

### **3.5 The influence of knowledge on voting and trust in institutions**

In this section we investigate the influences of knowledge on trust in political institutions and organisations and on youth election participation for both the European and the national level.

Within the questionnaire we had a knowledge-battery consisting of eight items. In the first four questions young people were asked to indicate whether a certain statement related to general EU facts is true or false according to their knowledge. The following four items of this battery then test the knowledge about the political system of the young peoples' home country.

Table 110 gives an overview of the degree to which the respondents gave the right answers in each country. Note that these questions were optional and not asked in Finland and Germany.

**Table 110: Percentage of right answers – results by country**

Countries	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item 4	Item 5	Item 6	Item 7	Item 8
<b>Austria</b>	80	68	66	44	91	68	78	58
<b>Estonia</b>	66	52	60	29	91	46	87	59
<b>Finland</b>								
<b>France</b>	62	78	55	24	93	61	57	48
<b>Germany</b>								
<b>Italy</b>	63	48	72	37	96	78	58	52
<b>Slovakia</b>	71	68	72	41	93	79	93	48
<b>UK</b>	36	46	30	16	97	40	46	37

Weighted data; percentages:

Figures indicate the frequency of correct answers as a percentage of all respondents.

Item 1: "Serbia is a member of the European Union".

Item 2: "There are 25 member states of the European Union".

Item 3: "The European flag is blue with white stars".

Item 4: "Serbia is a member of the European Union".

Item 5: "(Name of Prime Minister) is the ((country) Prime Minister (or Chancellor))".

Item 6: "The (name of the principal rightist or conservative party of your country) is a leftist political party".

Item 7: "In (country), national elections must be held every (correct number of) years".

Item 8: "The (Prime Minister or chancellor) has the right to dissolve parliament".

The first item, whether Serbia is a member of the EU, was answered correctly by a majority of the respondents in all countries except the UK, where only 36% gave a correct answer. For Item 2 - 25 being the right number of EU member states -, more variance is found: 78% of the French young people but only 48% of the Italians and 46% of the British answered correctly. The European flag's exact star colour (Item 3) is well known by 72% in Italy and Slovakia, but only by 30% in the UK. Looking at the absolute level across countries, the percentage of right answers is smallest for item 4, "José Barroso follows Romano Prodi as the Head of the European Commission". This is the most demanding item: it refers to both person- and institution-related knowledge. Whereas 44% in Austria and 41% in Slovakia gave the right answer, only 16% in the UK did so.

Items 5 to 8 are statements about the national political system. Almost all (91 to 97%) respondents know their countries' Prime Minister (item 5). In this case the UK respondents perform best (97%). This is not the case when it comes to answering whether the strongest conservative or right-wing party is a leftist one (item 6): young people in Italy (78%) and Slovakia (79%) do best, whereas only 40% of the young people in the UK correctly recognize the strongest conservative party as not leftist. It could well be that the strong differences by country for this item are influenced by the different numbers of parties within a political system. The answers to item 7: "In (country), national elections must be held every (correct number of) years" may also have been influenced.

Differences by country may be due to different length of time passed since the last national elections took place. Leaving aside these concerns, 93% of the Slovaks know the right time period, followed by the Estonians (87%) and Austrians (78%), whereas only 57% do so in France. Finally, only about one half of the young people in all countries know whether their countries' Prime Minister has the right to dissolve parliament (item 8). Austrians (58%) and Estonians (59%) perform relatively well. British young people perform worst (37%).

Altogether, about 6% of all respondents gave no right answer to the four EU items, with Estonia slightly (10%) and the UK clearly (33%) standing out. The amount of least informed about the questions at the national level is somewhat different: between 1% (Slovakia) and 3% (UK, France and Estonia) of the respondents gave not a single correct answer. Thus there seems to be a better knowledge among young people about politics on the national level.

In order to test whether a higher degree of knowledge is related to a higher participation rate on the European as well as on the national level, sum indices of right answers are computed. These indices as well as the single items are then crossed with the voting variables. Table 111 shows the results for the influence of knowledge about the EU on EU voting participation.

**Table 111: Influence of EU knowledge on EU voting participation – results by country**

EU election participation by country		Sum index (mean)	Serbia= EU member (Item 1)	25 member s (Item 2)	EU Flag (Item 3)	Barroso fol-lows Prodi (Item 4)
Austria	yes	<b>2.84</b>	94	80	72	86
	no	<b>2.41</b>	94	77	66	85
Estonia	yes	<b>2.44</b>	91	68	67	72
	no	<b>2.13</b>	86	69	61	66
Finland						
France	yes	<b>2.45</b>	81	<b>90</b>	60	<b>72</b>
	no	<b>2.05</b>	84	<b>82</b>	61	<b>61</b>
Germany						
Italy	yes	<b>2.36</b>	88	<b>69</b>	74	70
	no	<b>1.96</b>	86	<b>53</b>	69	69
Slovakia	yes	<b>2.73</b>	85	80	74	72
	no	<b>2.49</b>	86	80	74	73
UK	yes	<b>1.73</b>	70	<b>90</b>	39	49
	no	<b>1.32</b>	64	<b>78</b>	44	50

Weighted data; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Figures of the sum index are means of right answers. Figures of the single questions indicate the frequency of correct answers as a percentage of all respondents. Significant differences appear bold.

On average, there is a significant effect of EU-knowledge on the voting participation in the last European elections. This can be seen from the differences in the mean of right answers, shown in the first column of Table 111. For example, in Austria EU voters gave almost three (2.84) out of 4 possible correct answers, but the non-voters only 2.41. The absolute differences between voters and non-voters are almost equally strong across all countries. Relatively speaking, the differences are biggest in the UK.

Looking at the single knowledge items, there are only few significant differences. Among young French non-voters, there are significantly less correct answers to item 2 “There are 25 member states of the European Union” (82% versus 90% of the French voters) and to item 4 “Josè Barroso follows Romano Prodi as the head of the European Commission” (61% versus 72% of the French voters). In Italy, among non-voters knowledge about the correct number of EU member states (item 2) is less widespread (53% versus 69%). This item is also the one that significantly separates young British non-voters from voters (78% versus 90%).

All in all, there is evidence that non-voters are generally less informed about EU facts. In particular, knowledge about the correct number of members seems to have an impact on voting participation. One can conclude that taking part in the European elections is influenced by the knowledge about the EU they are voting for. Raising the knowledge about the EU and its institutions may foster youth participation at EU-elections.

But does knowledge also influence the national voting behaviour in the same way, irrespective of geographical aspects? The results concerning the influence of knowledge on the national voting behaviour are presented in Table 112.

**Table 112: Influence of national knowledge on national voting participation – results by country**

EU election participation by country		Sum index (mean)	Prime Minister (item 5)	Conservative is leftist (item 6)	Nat. elections every X years (item 7)	Right to dissolve parliament (item 8)
Austria	yes	3.26	95	80	89	62
	no	2.74	87	70	70	47
Estonia	yes	3.22	96	66	92	68
	no	2.75	93	41	90	52
Finland						
France	yes	2.90	97	70	68	56
	no	2.55	92	64	55	45
Germany						
Italy	yes	3.02	99	85	65	54
	no	2.73	91	86	48	48
Slovakia	yes	3.30	93	86	97	54
	no	3.04	92	74	95	43
UK	yes	2.40	95	49	55	41
	no	2.38	99	50	48	41

Weighted data; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Figures of the sum index are means of right answers. Figures of the single questions indicate the frequency of correct answers as a percentage of all respondents. Significant differences (alpha=.05) appear bold.

On the national level, knowledge about the national political system has no influence on voting behaviour in Italy and the UK. In the remaining countries, there are significant differences in the overall knowledge (sum index) between

voters and non-voters in the countries' last general elections. These differences are more pronounced in Austria and Estonia, less pronounced in Slovakia.

A closer look at the single items reveals that it is not always the same item that causes significant knowledge differences in a country. Three patterns can be distinguished:

1. Austrian and French non-voters significantly differ from voters in their knowledge about the Prime Minister, knowledge about the correct election period and about who has the right to dissolve parliament. In these countries only the left-right recognition of large parties is not related to voting participation.
2. Estonian and Slovakian young voters differ from non-voters in terms of left-right recognition and the knowledge about who has the right to dissolve parliament. More general knowledge like about the Prime Minister's name or the frequency of elections is equally widespread among voters and non-voters.
3. In Italy significantly fewer non-voters know the Prime Minister, even though the knowledge level is very high. Nevertheless, in sum, the knowledge about the national political system does not have an influence on the voting behaviour of young Italians.

Finally, the hypothesis whether a higher level of knowledge is related to higher trust is tested for the EU as well as for the national level, using nonparametric correlations.



**Table 113: Nonparametric correlations between EU knowledge and trust in EU institutions – results by country**

Trust by countries		Sum index	Serbia= EU member (item 1)	25 members (item 2)	EU Flag (item 3)	Barroso follows Prodi (item 4)
<b>Austria</b>	In EU Commission	0.15	-	0.14		0.12
	In EU parliament	0.13	-	0.11	-	0.10
<b>Estonia</b>	In EU Commission	-	-	-	-	-
	In EU parliament	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Finland</b>						
<b>France</b>	In EU Commission	-	-	-	-	-
	In EU parliament	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Germany</b>						
<b>Italy</b>	In EU Commission	0.14	0.10	0.10		
	In EU parliament	0.10		-	-	
<b>Slovakia</b>	In EU Commission	0.15		0.11	-	0.10
	In EU parliament	0.16		0.12		0.10
<b>UK</b>	In EU Commission	0.17	0.15		0.13	-
	In EU parliament	0.23	0.20	0.10	0.14	0.10

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).

Figures indicate significant (alpha= 0.05) correlations of at least 0.10 in magnitude.

In two of the six countries, for which the analysis can be performed, absolutely no correlations are found. There seems to be no relation between the knowledge about the EU and the trust in the EU Commission or the EU Parliament. Looking at the remaining countries and taking a look at the sum index, one can see that the strongest effects are found for the UK (0.17 and 0.23). This is an indicator for a possibly nonlinear relationship between knowledge and trust: the young people in the UK are by far the worst informed among the youth of the six countries. Knowledge and the degree of trust in EU institutions are strongly related (0.15 and 0.20), as knowledge is concentrated

on a minority of young people. The relationship between trust and knowledge becomes insignificant in most countries with an overall better knowledge than in the UK. In Austria, a country much closer to Serbia than the UK, knowledge about the membership status is not significantly related to trust. The geographical distance can thus be considered as an intervening variable in the influence of certain forms of knowledge on trust.

Item 2 “There are 25 member states of the European Union” is a slightly better indicator for higher trust in Austria (0.14 and 0.11) than in the other countries. With the possible exception of Britain, it can be argued that mere knowledge about symbols (i.e. a flag detail) does not generally lead to higher trust in EU institutions. The most demanding knowledge item 8 “José Barroso follows Romano Prodi as the head of the European Union” is significantly, though not very strongly related to trust in EU institutions. Although it explicitly refers to the European Commission, there are no higher correlations between trust in the Commission and this item. Therefore, it has to be concluded that even knowledge about procedures within the EU doesn’t result in higher trust in the EU institutions.

The research procedure conducted above shall now be applied for measuring the effect of national knowledge on trust in national institutions. Among the knowledge items on national politics there are none that test pure symbol recognition.

**Table 114: Nonparametric correlations between national knowledge and trust in national institutions – results by country**

Trust by countries		Sum index	Prime Minister (Item 5)	Conservative is leftist (Item 6)	Nat. elections every X years (Item 7)	Right to dissolve parliament (Item 8)
Austria	politicians	-	-	0.12	-	-
Estonia	parliament	0.13	-	-	-	-
Finland						
France	government	-	-	-0.10	-	-
Germany						
Italy	parliament	0.14	-	-	-	-
	parties	0.17	-	-	-	-
	politicians	0.11	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	government	0.12	-	-	-	-
	parliament	0.10	-	-	-	-
	parties	0.12	0.10	-	-	-
UK	government	-	-	0.16	-	-
	parties	-	-	-	0.10	-

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5% AND/OR significant nonparametric correlations, alpha= 1%).  
Figures indicate significant (alpha= 0.05) correlations of at least 0.10 in magnitude.

There are only few significant correlations between national knowledge and trust in national political institutions: Generally, in most countries there is some sort of relation in terms of the sum index. Young people in Estonia, Italy and Slovakia with a higher general knowledge express more trust in the parliament. Comprising knowledge is also related to trust in political parties (Italy and Slovakia), to trust in politicians (Italy) and the government (Slovakia).

Taking the single items 5 to 8, only a handful of country-specific correlations are found to be significant. In Slovakia, knowing the Prime Minister is related to higher trust in parties. Austrian and British young people that correctly recognize the biggest conservative party as not leftist are also more trusting in the parliament (Austria) or in the government (UK). In France, a negative relationship is found, meaning that those who correctly identify the strongest conservative French party as conservative, express less trust in the government. Better informed French young people seem to be more distant toward the current French government. Finally, knowing the number of years

an election period comprises is related to trust in parties in the UK. Besides their rather low magnitude, these correlations do not reveal a systematic relation between certain forms of national political knowledge and trust in national institutions. Therefore, the hypothesis that higher knowledge leads to higher trust cannot be confirmed for the national level.

## **3.6 Influence of media (IARD)**

### **3.6.1 Foreword**

The relationship media-political participation is an important focus of analysis to understand the influence processes that are forming the basis of European young people's political attitude and behaviour.

This topic will be further investigated by briefly introducing the main approaches that have so far developed within the media effect theory, whose validity and limits will be then evaluated in relation to the specific context of analysis, to the different media and to the specific characteristics of the research sample.

Starting from the distinction between active participation (self-directed) and passive participation (hetero-directed), different contrasting theories will be presented about the power of the media to influence people and the level of civic and political activism.

Lazarsfeld (1944), in the late Forties, put forth the view that growing amounts of mass communication could divert people's energy from active participation to passive reception. Far from proving an opportunity for greater information and awareness, media could therefore produce a greater detachment from civic and political commitment, operating a "narcotizing dysfunction".

On the other hand other sociologists such as Cooley, Park and Wirth made the hypothesis that media diffusion would favour a process of social democratization, by creating more informed, more aware and thus more active individuals.

From the beginning of the Seventies, new factors were being taken into account in behavioural analysis, such as cognitive, communicative and symbolical processes that are the basis for opinion and behaviour formation, and led to a new revaluation of media effects, which were defined as "non-neglectable", particularly when associated with certain circumstances (McQuail, 1993).

Media effect began thus to be studied in relation to the influence of several variables: personal variables (attention, interest, level of elaboration,

background knowledge and attitudes), and contextual variables (fruition context, consume vs. interpretation, other people's co-presence).

In addition, this approach allows to establish a hypothesis on how the importance of media effects changes throughout history, acquiring greater importance and influence in times of crisis and social change, when the need for information and shared representations is stronger, when some socio-political traditional institutions lose their strength and when the role of traditional mass socialization agencies is shaken (Livalsi, 2003).

It is exactly in these contexts that media power can be transformed into a real institution and socialization agency, covering an important educational role, which is able to shape individuals' social representations.

With reference to the European context and to the phenomena of social change which affect young people on the one hand, and participative democracy on the other hand, it seems meaningful to point out that elements such as the young generations' disorientation/lack of interest towards politics, the loss of traditional ideological points of reference, the crisis of traditional political socialization agencies (family, political parties, trade unions) produce the consolidation of juvenile individual subjectivism through processes of privatization of the political socialization (Tronu 2001) and individualization of the political identity construction processes (Caniglia 2002). The young person, increasingly centred on his/her subjectivity, risks becoming more exposed to undetermined and undeterminable behaviour in terms of political activism and therefore more exposed to "proximal" factors such as the role of mass media, political leaders' characteristics, election campaign themes and the international situation (Raniolo 2002).

Though not aiming at an exhaustive interpretation of the "media and political participation" phenomena, this report presents the relationships between the choice of some mass media (TV, radio, newspapers and internet) and young people's democratic behaviour.

In particular, the analysis will be focused on the relationship between actions of and attitudes towards political participation (which were broadly analysed through the EUYOUNGPART questionnaire) and the different types of media consume. The main distinction is drawn on the basis of the choice between passive-reception media (like TV and radio for some aspects), which imply a rather "passive and uncritical" consumer, and active-reception media (like newspapers and the Internet), which require a more "selective and participative" consumer.

The present study moves from the hypothesis that the first type of media is associated with a passive behaviour (heterodirected participation) in young people towards the democratic life of society, while the second type is associated with a higher degree of democratic activism (self directed participation).

### **3.6.2 Media diffusion within the sample: Sex and generation differences**


The percentage of people that follow politics daily through mass media ranges from 38.4% to 11.3% in the EUYOUNG sample, depending on the country. Italy presents the highest percentage (closely followed by Germany – 38.2% - and at greater distance by Estonia 29.2% - with the lowest percentage of young people keeping informed less than once a week). The United Kingdom is the country with the lowest percentage of young people following politics, the only one with less than 20% (and precisely only 11.3%) of young people who follow politics on a daily basis. It is noteworthy that, as it was reasonable to expect, the frequency by which people keep informed is closely associated with their interest in politics: Italy and Germany are the only two countries with a higher percentage of young people who are fairly or very interested in politics (respectively 43.4% and 47.9%), while the United Kingdom, on the other hand, is the country where young people are least interested in politics (43.1% declared not to be interested at all).

Television is the media most frequently used to follow politics in all of the eight countries under investigation. Italy turned out to be the country where television is the most important media (4 out of five young people follow politics principally on TV, against only 3 out of 4 in France and Slovakia). Newspapers and the Internet, media where “reading” is required, feature in the second position of most regularly used media. Austria is the country where newspapers are the most widespread media among young people (24.9%, and it is also the only country where television is predominant for just less than half of young people, precisely 46%), whereas in France newspapers have the lowest impact on young people (they are the prevalent media for only 7.3% of the sample). Internet features higher than newspapers in France, Slovakia and even more in Finland and Estonia (in the latter two countries it resulted to be remarkably more widespread, used by more than 1 out of 4 young people).

Finally, radio needs being dealt with separately, as it turned out to be almost irrelevant in some countries, (under 5% in Finland, Italy, and the United Kingdom) while it resulted non-neglectable in German speaking countries

(Germany and even more Austria, where it is the principal media for 16.7% of the young people).

Graph 6: Frequency of young people following politics through the mass-media



Graph 7: Principal media through which young people follow politics






Table 115: Frequency percentage distribution of young people following politics for sex and country

		Every day	Several/once times a week	Less often/never	Total
Austria	1 male	25,3	45,1	29,6	100,0
	2 female	25,1	47,9	27,0	100,0
Estonia	1 male	29,7	54,5	15,9	100,0
	2 female	26,8	58,0	15,3	100,0
Finland	1 male	23,0	50,9	26,1	100,0
	2 female	24,5	47,2	28,3	100,0
France	1 male	24,4	41,6	34,0	100,0
	2 female	21,1	42,8	36,1	100,0
Germany*	1 male	33,1	51,6	15,3	100,0
	2 female	37,4	43,4	19,2	100,0
Italy	1 male	43,2	39,3	17,5	100,0
	2 female	37,4	40,1	22,5	100,0
Slovakia*	1 male	23,4	48,6	28,0	100,0
	2 female	17,7	48,7	33,7	100,0
UK*	1 male	12,9	32,3	54,8	100,0
	2 female	9,0	27,1	63,8	100,0
Total	1 male	27,0	46,4	26,6	100,0
	2 female	24,6	44,4	31,0	100,0

\* The Chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 116: Percentage distribution of media mainly used by young people to follow politics, for sex and country

		1 TV	2 radio	3 newspaper	4 internet	5 none of these	Total
Austria*	1 male	48,4	13,5	23,6	8,5	6,0	100,0
	2 female	45,9	18,5	25,9	2,9	6,8	100,0
Estonia*	1 male	54,1	6,4	6,2	30,8	2,5	100,0
	2 female	57,0	5,5	9,7	27,3	,6	100,0
Finland	1 male	55,0	3,1	15,0	25,4	1,5	100,0
	2 female	55,1	1,4	18,0	24,6	,8	100,0
France	1 male	72,5	5,1	7,4	7,8	7,2	100,0
	2 female	75,2	5,0	7,8	7,6	4,3	100,0
Germany*	1 male	67,6	7,3	17,0	6,7	1,4	100,0
	2 female	64,2	17,4	14,3	1,9	2,3	100,0
Italy	1 male	79,0	3,4	10,5	5,6	1,4	100,0
	2 female	82,1	3,7	10,4	2,3	1,5	100,0
Slovakia*	1 male	71,4	5,3	10,8	10,5	2,0	100,0
	2 female	73,5	10,3	5,7	6,2	4,3	100,0
UK	1 male	67,8	2,8	11,2	6,8	11,4	100,0
	2 female	63,8	2,7	14,2	6,9	12,5	100,0
Total	1 male	64,4	6,0	12,8	12,8	4,0	100,0
	2 female	64,5	8,1	13,3	10,0	4,1	100,0

\* The Chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 117: Percentage distribution of media mainly used by young people to follow politics, for age and country

		Q4 Main information channel				
		1 TV	2 radio	3 newspaper	4 internet	5 none of these
Austria	15 -18 years	51,6	13,4	23,2	4,9	6,8
	19 - 25 years	44,1	17,6	25,8	6,4	6,1
Estonia*	15 -18 years	57,2	4,7	5,7	31,4	1,0
	19 - 25 years	54,0	7,1	10,2	26,7	2,0
Finland	15 -18 years	54,4	,8	16,4	27,5	,8
	19 - 25 years	55,5	3,3	16,8	23,1	1,4
France*	15 -18 years	73,9	6,0	4,0	9,1	7,1
	19 - 25 years	73,8	4,5	9,8	6,9	5,0
Germany	15 -18 years	67,9	11,1	14,5	4,2	2,4
	19 - 25 years	63,8	13,5	17,0	4,6	1,2
Italy	15 -18 years	84,5	1,6	9,8	2,5	1,6
	19 - 25 years	78,7	4,5	10,7	4,7	1,4
Slovakia	15 -18 years	73,3	6,1	6,7	10,3	3,6
	19 - 25 years	72,0	8,6	9,1	7,4	2,9
UK	15 -18 years	66,8	2,9	11,0	6,6	12,7
	19 - 25 years	64,8	2,6	14,1	7,0	11,5
Total	15 -18 years	65,3	6,2	11,6	12,6	4,3
	19 - 25 years	63,9	7,6	14,1	10,5	4,0

\* The Chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.05 level.

The two questions about the use of media were analysed with the stratification for sex and age, using chi-square tests in order to test the hypothesis that males and females, as well as distinct generation groups, behave differently.

Males and females present different behaviours in the use of media in Germany, Slovakia and the UK. Compared to their male compatriots, the attitude of young German women to information is more polarized: both the number of those who declare to follow politics everyday and the number of those who occasionally follows politics (less than once a week) are higher among females. In Slovakia and Great Britain sex stratification shows a more regular attention to politics with the male youth. To a lesser extent the same can be observed also in Estonia, Italy and France (even though differences are not statistically significant).

For what concerns media preferences, the choices of males and females differ specially in Austria, Estonia, Germany and Slovakia. Both in Austria and Germany young men follow politics mainly through TV and the Internet, while young women more frequently favour the radio. In Estonia, TV and Newspapers are the most widespread media among females while males mainly keep informed through the Internet. It is noteworthy that in all countries but Great Britain the Internet is mostly used to follow politics by males.

As for the two age classes which were compared, 15 to 18 year-olds on the one hand and 19 to 25 year-olds on the other, one may observe that with a rising age, there is also an increase in the frequency by which politics is followed (the most remarkable case being Finland, where only 13.8% of 15-18 follows politics everyday, while the percentage rises to 30.1 among 19-25 year-olds – table not reported). Also newspaper-reading increases with age, and mainly at the expense of TV (with Finland as the only exception). The trend is less clear-cut for as far as radio and the internet are concerned (though it is noteworthy that in the two countries where internet is more widespread the percentage of those who keep informed mainly via web sensibly decreases as age rises).

Table 118: Frequency percentage distribution of young people following politics for principal media used and country

		Austria	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Slovakia	UK	Total
TV	Every day	23,2	27,4	20,0	21,2	31,0	38,8	20,3	11,3	24,6
	Several/once times a week	50,2	57,5	49,2	44,4	51,4	40,2	50,7	31,0	46,4
	Less often/never	26,6	15,1	30,8	34,4	17,6	21,1	29,0	57,8	28,9
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Radio	Every day	24,5	25,9*	27,3*	36,2*	43,8	37,1*	23,7*	8,0*	30,0
	Several/once times a week	56,0	60,3*	54,5*	46,8*	41,3	51,4*	43,4*	44,0*	49,7
	Less often/never	19,5	13,8*	18,2*	17,0*	14,9	11,4*	32,9*	48,0*	20,3
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Newspaper	Every day	32,0	19,2*	34,0	26,8*	45,2	39,2	27,2*	17,6	31,6
	Several/once times a week	50,6	61,5*	45,9	46,5*	43,2	46,1	40,7*	42,9	47,1
	Less often/never	17,4	19,2*	20,1	26,8*	11,6	14,7	32,1*	39,5	21,2
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Internet	Every day	43,1*	29,2	25,7	20,8*	39,5*	46,2*	17,1*	14,3*	27,6
	Several/once times a week	41,4*	56,3	47,7	48,6*	44,2*	25,6*	53,7*	50,8*	49,8
	Less often/never	15,5*	14,4	26,6	30,6*	16,3*	28,2*	29,3*	34,9*	22,7
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

\* data that require caution: percentage distribution calculated on less than 10% of the national sample.

Crossing the two questions analysed so far (frequency of use and type of media used for political information), it can be observed that in all the countries (with the exception of France) the highest percentage of people following

politics everyday is concentrated among those who read newspapers or surf the internet, thus confirming the initial hypothesis. In addition, in a good six countries (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) TV is associated with young people who follow politics less than once a week, a trend which is likely to be connected with interest in politics.

### **3.6.3 Political behaviour, attitude and knowledge with reference to the media - consume**

In each country the choice of media can vary sensibly on a settlement basis. This is particularly the case as far as Internet is concerned: in Finland and Estonia the web is mainly used in urban areas than in rural ones (with variation of respectively 7 and 5 percentage points). Television, on the other hand, proved a more widespread instrument of information in rural areas than in big cities (excepted for Austria and Germany), even more remarkably in the countries where politics is generally followed mainly on TV, i.e. Italy and France.

The average score featured in the left-right scale is another element of characterisation in relation to the media that young people choose. Young people who choose to keep informed through newspapers generally tend to be concentrated more on the left of the scale. The same is true for the use of the internet in Finland whereas in Estonia, on the contrary, the majority of people getting their political information from the Web tended to place themselves more on the right of the scale.

A further element of characterization that distinguishes young people on the basis of their favourite media is the democratic/non-democratic attitude, as revealed by the analysis of their political values. With regard to this, we calculated the average score of the factor drawn by the items related to non-democratic values (see the note to Table 121: Average “scores” related to “severity” factor for principal media chosen and country for details), obtained from the respective factor analysis carried out separately for each country.

It is noteworthy that in all of the eight countries the scores calculated on the young people who follow politics mainly on TV and those who prefer newspapers go into opposite directions compared to the average score calculated on the whole population, with non-democratic attitude featuring higher among those who keep informed through television.

In a similar way the chosen media appears to be relevant in relation to the indicators of knowledge calculated in the survey. People who follow politics through newspapers or the Internet are more informed than those who watch politics on TV or listen to it on the radio. However, the media chosen by the more informed young people varies in the different countries (alternatively newspapers or the internet). Other elaborations showed that even among the young people who follow politics everyday, those who follow it by reading newspapers are the more informed. This result testifies that Internet and newspapers offer higher diversification and better quality of information than TV and radio. The press usually offers a wider range of sources, increased pluralism (McQuail, 1993) and therefore greater opportunity of knowledge. Besides, considering the different media influences on the individual information elaboration process, the press can be considered as the media that implies much more cognitive involvement and, as consequence, a deeper knowledge acquisition.

Other elaborations (not reported in this document) provided further evidence that television allows or a more superficial acquisition of political information. Also among people who follow politics everyday, in all countries but Germany those who follow it on TV more frequently declare that politics is “often or always too complicated to be understood” (as the Italian political commentator Giovanni Sartori (1997) put it, “watching without understanding”).

In this case, the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger (1957), according to which people would attempt to reduce the interior perceived dissonance in order to confirm the own self representation, can be used to understand the behaviour of the young coming off the political information (watching without understanding), as they do not perceive themselves interested in politics or able to understand the political information.

Finally we examined whether there is a relationship between the level of exposition to mass media and satisfaction with the current government in the different countries, and more specifically whether the satisfaction degree is influenced by the frequency of exposure to mass media and by the type of media chosen. It emerged that in many countries young people who follow politics regularly present a more clear-cut polarization as for their satisfaction, compared to the average (there is higher concentration both on modes which express satisfaction and on those which convey a message of dissatisfaction with the government). Among those who follow politics everyday, satisfaction is higher in all countries but the United Kingdom (Slovakia is where difference is largest)

In Finland, France, Germany and Italy the percentage of dissatisfaction is also higher among the young people who follow politics everyday (though in Slovakia the opposite is the case).

Table 119: Percentage distribution of the principal media through which young people follow politics for type of settlement and country

		Austria	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Slovakia	UK	Total
Urban area	1 TV	50,1	54,5	50,5	70,2	66,0	75,3	71,4	62,6	61,9
	2 radio	11,4	6,4	1,4	5,3	12,2	3,9	7,0	1,9	6,3
	3 newspaper	23,0	7,1	19,7	10,4	17,4	11,8	7,0	18,9	14,3
	4 internet	6,6	30,3	28,0	10,4	3,1	8,2	10,6	5,7	13,6
	5 none of these	8,9	1,7	,3	3,6	1,4	,7	4,0	10,9	3,9
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Small and medium city	1 TV	39,6	56,9	56,0	76,4	68,8	82,1	70,7	65,4	65,1
	2 radio	18,9	5,3	2,2	3,6	13,1	1,8	8,0	2,1	6,3
	3 newspaper	27,8	6,3	14,3	4,6	11,6	11,8	9,6	11,0	11,5
	4 internet	6,1	29,6	25,7	6,1	5,0	1,8	9,2	6,5	11,8
	5 none of these	7,5	1,9	1,7	9,3	1,5	2,5	2,6	15,0	5,3
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Rural area	1 TV	48,4	55,7	58,4	77,0	63,3	83,5	75,2	69,2	66,2
	2 radio	18,3	5,9	3,4	6,3	11,6	4,6	7,9	4,9	8,6
	3 newspaper	24,6	11,8	16,0	6,3	18,2	8,2	7,3	9,8	13,5
	4 internet	4,9	25,7	21,0	5,0	4,4	2,3	6,2	8,9	8,7
	5 none of these	3,8	,8	1,1	5,4	2,5	1,3	3,4	7,1	3,0
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Table 120: Self-collocation on the left-right scale for principal media chosen and country (0 extreme left, 10 extreme right)

	Austria	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Slovakia	UK	Total
1 TV	4.51	5.25	5.16	4.31	4.45	4.73	4.97	5.05	4.77
2 radio	4.41	5.15*	5.53*	4.07*	4.61	3.71*	5.31*	5.28*	4.66
3 newspaper	4.31	5.12*	4.93	3.73*	4.35	3.67	5.21*	5.03	4.51
4 internet	4.65*	5.32	5.08*	4.44*	4.27*	4.32*	5.37*	4.69*	5.00
5 none of these	3.97*	5.90*	5.40*	5.13*	4.75*	5.43*	4.90*	5.12*	4.89
Total	4.43	5.26	5.11	4.29	4.45	4.57	5.05	5.04	4.76

\* data that require caution: percentage distribution calculated on less than 10% of the national sample.

Table 121: Average “scores” related to “severity” factor for principal media chosen and country

	1 Austria	2 Estonia	3 Finland	4 France	6 Italy	7 Slovakia	8 UK
tv	0,008	-0,023	0,080	-0,103	-0,100	0,037	0,009
radio	-0,111	0,158*	0,213*	0,391*	0,159*	-0,203*	0,008*
newspaper	0,119	-0,116*	-0,195	0,595*	0,660	-0,043*	0,054
internet	0,208*	-0,182	-0,093	0,128*	0,346*	-0,194*	-0,563
none of these	-0,399*	-0,220*	-0,195*	-0,108*	-1,354*	-0,026*	-0,299
totale	0,026	-0,073	-0,011	0,006	0,004	-0,010	-0,059

\* data that require caution: percentage distribution calculated on less than 10% of the national sample.

Table 122: Percentage distribution of the political knowledge indicator for principal media through which young people follow politics and country

		1 Austria	2 Estonia	4 France	6 Italy	7 Slovakia	8 UK	Total
1 TV	Medium-weak	36,5	61,6	51,7	45,4	42,3	76,5	63,4
	Medium-Strong	63,5	38,4	48,3	54,6	57,7	23,5	36,6
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
2 radio	Medium-weak	42,1	58,6*	38,3*	45,7*	36,8*	64,0*	59,3
	Medium-Strong	57,9	41,4*	61,7*	54,3*	63,2*	36,0*	40,7
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
3 newspaper	Medium-weak	28,3	57,7*	29,6*	36,3	33,3*	74,8	59,6
	Medium-Strong	71,7	42,3*	70,4*	63,7	66,7*	25,2	40,4
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
4 internet	Medium-weak	29,3*	56,0	41,7*	25,6*	41,5*	55,6*	64,5
	Medium-Strong	70,7*	44,0	58,3*	74,4*	58,5*	44,4*	35,5
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Total	Medium-weak	34,9	59,4	48,4	43,6	41,0	74,2	62,7
	Medium-Strong	65,1	40,6	51,6	56,4	59,0	25,8	37,3
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

\* data that require caution: percentage distribution calculated on less than 5% of the national sample.

Table 123: Level of satisfaction with the government for frequency by which young people follow politics and country

		Austria	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Slovakia	UK	Total
Every day	very satisfied /satisfied	26,7	21,4	42,7	19,7	19,1	12,7	19,4	8,5	21,5
	neither/nor	34,6	46,5	35,4	30,8	32,8	28,5	45,7	42,2	36,1
	dissatisfied/very dissatisfied	38,7	32,1	21,9	49,6	48,1	58,8	34,8	49,3	42,4
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Several/once times a week	very satisfied /satisfied	19,1	19,7	45,3	18,6	11,0	9,8	8,5	17,1	18,9
	neither/nor	42,3	48,5	41,9	38,4	44,7	34,6	45,0	39,4	42,3
	dissatisfied/very dissatisfied	38,6	31,7	12,8	43,0	44,3	55,6	46,5	43,5	38,8
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Less often/never	very satisfied /satisfied	18,0	15,6	34,6	15,8	11,6	8,3	3,2	11,8	14,6
	neither/nor	40,1	43,8	49,8	42,8	34,2	47,5	44,7	59,4	47,8
	dissatisfied/very dissatisfied	41,9	40,6	15,6	41,3	54,2	44,2	52,1	28,8	37,6
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Total	very satisfied /satisfied	20,8	19,7	41,8	17,9	14,2	10,6	9,3	13,2	18,4
	neither/nor	39,8	47,3	42,3	38,2	38,5	35,0	45,1	50,8	42,1
	dissatisfied/very dissatisfied	39,5	33,1	15,9	43,9	47,3	54,4	45,6	36,0	39,4
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

### 3.6.4 Active participation and media consume

We have so far analysed the characteristics of media use by young people as far as some behaviours/attitudes of political participation are concerned (frequency with which they keep informed, interest, knowledge, democratic attitudes). Now we are going to consider the relationship between different types of media use and some active participation behaviour in the democratic life of one's country.

First of all the analysis will be concerned with the relation between chosen media and rate of participation in the last European elections. In all countries newspaper readers feature higher rates of participation in the elections than other media users. The opposite is true for young people who follow politics mainly on TV (with Italy, the country where participation in the elections is higher, as the only slight exception).



Associationism/social participation is another form of active participation. In question q13 young people were given a list of assorted organizations and were asked whether they had taken part in any of their activities during the previous twelve months. The sum of organizations in which an individual claimed participation was thus considered as an indicator. On the basis of the different media categories, the average number of organizations in which young people belonging to each category took part was then calculated. Again a clear-cut difference emerged between newspaper readers and/or Internet surfers on the one hand, and TV watchers on the other, with the latter being correlated with a lower rate of participation in a narrower range of associations, compared to the former ones.

The following table offers a closer examination of this issue, by drawing a distinction between organized and spontaneous forms of political organization to observe how these correlate with different types of media used by young people. Organizational/associational activities were stratified according to the distinction between people who took part just in extra-party organizations and those who took part in political party associations or contributed to a party's electoral campaigns. It is noteworthy that the young people belonging in the latter category do not necessarily chose other media than television to keep informed, as is the case with Estonia, France, Germany and Slovakia.

Among those who took part in party activities, newspapers appear to have a more important role compared to the other types of media chosen by the young people (even though with the exception of Germany and Slovakia).

However, the most interesting data concern the use of the internet, where no clear-cut results come from the comparison between people who took part in political and extra-political organizations (in some countries – Estonia, France, Slovakia and the United Kingdom – Internet is more popular among the latter than the former, suggesting that it has a more directly observable influence on extra-political participation). On the other hand, for its being a horizontal form of communication, the Internet allows for direct participation, where the traditional social and institutional mediators can be bypassed (Della Porta, 2001).

Table 124: Percentage of young people voting in 2004 European elections for principal media used to follow politics and country (only young people admitted to vote)

		1 Austria	2 Estonia	3 Finland	4 France	5 Germany	6 Italy	7 Slovakia	8 UK	Total
TV	% voters	58,1	36,3	33,2	50,2	53,1	84,7	47,7	22,1	50,7
radio	% voters	59,2	34,6*	36,8*	76,9*	55,7*	89,3*	49,1*	50,0*	57,2
newspaper	% voters	62,8	47,9*	44,7	55,0*	61,1	84,0*	52,5*	25,4	55,5
internet	% voters	71,8*	35,3	46,5	43,9*	60,7*	86,2*	57,1*	34,2*	48,9
Total	% voters	58,6	37,4	38,2	50,5	54,7	84,5	47,9	22,4	50,6

\* data that require caution: percentage calculated on less than 100 units.

Table 125: Average number of associations in which young people took part during the last 12 months for principal media used to follow politics and country (sport clubs are excluded)

	1 Austria	2 Estonia	3 Finland	4 France	5 Germany	6 Italy	7 Slovakia	8 UK	Total
TV	.53	.52	.62	.38	.67	1.16	.63	.20	.61
radio	.75	.38*	.95*	.74*	.88	1.49*	.84*	.24*	.78
newspaper	.79	.74*	.97	.82*	.94	2.26	1.11*	.37	.96
internet	1.10*	.57	1.21	.64*	.70*	1.36*	1.09*	.57*	.87
Total	.64	.54	.84	.43	.74	1.29	.72	.25	.68

\* data that require caution: percentage distribution calculated on less than 10% of the national sample.

The table is highlighted in grey because it refers to an indicator built on several variables, some of which are not comparable among all the countries.

The table is highlighted in grey because it refers to an indicator built on several variables, some of which are not comparable among all the countries.

Table 126: Percentage distribution of the principal media used for association type and country

		Country								
		1 Austria	2 Estonia	3 Finland	4 France	5 Germany	6 Italy	7 Slovakia	8 UK	Total
No associations extra-sport	1 TV	48,8	55,3	61,6	76,2	69,5	83,1	76,1	66,7	66,5
	2 radio	15,0	6,9	2,9	4,1	11,0	3,4	7,0	3,0	6,7
	3 newspaper	21,9	8,3	12,9	5,6	13,1	7,0	6,7	14,2	11,4
	4 internet	5,6	27,6	21,0	6,8	4,2	3,6	6,6	5,0	10,0
	5 none of these	8,6	2,0	1,6	7,3	2,3	2,9	3,6	11,1	5,3
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Only participation in extra-politic associations	1 TV	43,9	52,8	48,8	67,0	58,6	81,7	66,0	54,9	60,3
	2 radio	18,9	5,4	1,6	9,0	15,2	4,5	6,0	2,8	7,9
	3 newspaper	27,8	8,2	18,3	9,3	20,5	9,5	11,2	14,3	15,0
	4 internet	4,7	32,8	30,5	13,1	4,7	3,8	13,1	24,5	15,0
	5 none of these	4,7	,8	,8	1,6	1,0	,4	3,8	3,5	1,8
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Participation in political associations	1 TV	38,0	55,1	44,7	67,3	59,2	75,3	66,1	51,9	58,5
	2 radio	20,7	5,2	1,8	6,4	14,3	3,2	11,8	5,5	8,4
	3 newspaper	33,0	11,0	22,6	15,4	19,6	16,1	10,6	24,3	18,7
	4 internet	7,6	27,4	30,5	8,7	5,1	4,7	10,1	12,8	13,0
	5 none of these	,6	1,3	,5	2,2	1,8	,7	1,4	5,6	1,4
	Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

The table is highlighted in grey because it refers to an indicator built on several variables, some of which are not comparable among all the countries.

Table 127: Percentages of young people who have already taken part in legal demonstrations for principal media used and country

		Austria	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Slovakia	UK	Total
TV	% ever been in legal demonstration	18,6	5,3	5,7	23,7	25,4	44,2	4,3	2,3	17,4
radio	% ever been in legal demonstration	13,2	1,1*	14,6*	36,3*	27,5	50,5*	5,4*	8,7*	17,9
newspaper	% ever been in legal demonstration	23,1	13,9*	15,3	58,5*	40,9	72,1	12,5*	10,8	28,4
internet	% ever been in legal demonstration	31,5*	9,6	17,9	33,7*	36,3*	68,5*	12,8*	10,3*	19,4
Total	% ever been in legal demonstration	18,6	7,1	10,5	26,7	28,3	47,9	5,8	4,3	18,7

\* data that require caution: percentage distribution calculated on less than 10% of the national sample.

The media type is even more determinant for participation in demonstrations than it was for election participation. The percentage of young people who

have already participated in a demonstration is higher among those who keep informed through newspapers or the Internet, and this is the case in every country. What changes from country to country is the proportion between Internet and newspaper usage (in Estonia, France, Germany, Italy and the UK the percentage is higher among those who read newspapers, in touch with what emerged about the European elections).

Finally Internet and newspapers characterize young people also in terms of the importance they attach to attracting the media attention. As a matter of fact, those who keep informed through these two channels place greater importance to the role of the media.

Table 128: Average score of effectiveness (0 = not effective at all; 10 = very effective) attached to “attracting media attention” on the decisions that affect society, for principal media used to follow politics and country

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
	Austria	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Slovakia	UK	Total
1 TV	5.3	5.4	5.5	4.9	5.8	6.1	5.7	5.8	5.6
2 radio	5.6	5.4	4.6*	5.3	5.8	6.3*	6.4	5.7*	5.7
3 newspaper	5.7	5.7	6.0	5.2	6.0	6.8	6.6	6.1	6.0
4 internet	6.4	5.7	6.3	4.9	6.4*	7.0*	6.3	5.9	6.0
Total	5.5	5.5	5.7	4.8	5.8	6.2	5.8	5.8	5.7

\* data that require caution: percentage distribution calculated on less than 5% of the national sample!

### 3.6.5 Final considerations

One of the main results emerged from the analysis is the clear-cut differentiation among countries for what concerns both the use of the media for political information and the relationships which exist between media use and other variables related to political participation. Such distinctions were immediately apparent from the very beginning of the analysis, as shown in graph 7, which reveals that even if television is the main media, its importance can remarkably decrease to the advantage of other media which vary from one country to another. In this regard each country presents its peculiarities:

in Austria and Germany, radio still retains an influential role

in Estonia and Finland, the use of the internet for political purposes is already established

in France, Italy and Slovakia television is heavily predominant

In the UK, a remarkable number of young people does not make use of any mass media for political information

The characteristics of the young people who represent such national peculiarities, which can be inferred from by previously reported tables, are

summarized in Table 128: Average score of effectiveness (0 = not effective at all; 10 = very effective) attached to “attracting media attention” on the decisions that affect society, for principal media used to follow politics and country, where comparisons on a national scale are made between young people that use the media in a way peculiar to their country and the remaining young people from the same country.

In Austria and Germany politics is listened to on the radio mainly by females over 18 who live in extra-urban areas and take part in associations. Knowledge about politics proved poorer in Austria, where also dissatisfaction with the current government is less widespread, while in Germany a larger amount of people follows politics everyday.

Young “surfers” of politics are concentrated in Estonia, among those younger than 19 years old, who have better knowledge of politics and actively participate in the country’s democratic life, though featuring lower participation in the elections. Finland, on the other hand, contrasts Estonia principally with regards to this aspect.

Young French, Italian and Slovakian “politics watchers” share a more passive participation in democratic life (with lower percentages of association and demonstration experiences), are less frequently dissatisfied with government and more frequently live in extra-urban areas. The association with the variable sex appears weak in all the three countries, even if TV watchers are often females. In Italy, young people belonging to this category feel less left-wing, while in Slovakia the contrary is the case.

Finally, the nearly 10% of young Britons who claim not to follow politics through any of the proposed mass media turned out to be, as could be expected, less interested in any form of political participation, with weak association to sex and type of settlement variables (even if they are more frequently females living in extra-urban areas).

Table 129: Comparisons between young people following politics through “peculiar” media and the remaining young people in the same country

	1 Austria	5 Germany	2 Estonia	3 Finland	4 France	6 Italy	7 Slovakia	8 UK
	Radio	Radio	Internet	Internet	TV	TV	TV	None of
% male	(-)*	(-)*	(+)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
%>18	(+)*	(+)	(-)*	(-)	(+)	(-)*	(-)	(-)
% follow news every day	(-)	(+)*	(+)	(+)	(+)	(-)	(+)	(-)*
% urban area	(-)*	(-)	(+)	(+)	(-)*	(-)*	(-)	(-)
% link	(+)	(-)	(-)	(+)	(-)	(-)*	(+)*	(-)*
% knowledge medium-strong	(-)*		(+)*		(-)*	(-)	(+)	(-)*
% unsatisfied government	(-)*	(-)	(-)	(+)	(-)*	(-)*	(-)	(-)
% voted in European elections	(+)	(-)	(-)	(+)*	(-)	(+)	(-)	(-)*
% participation almost 1								
association	(+)*	(+)*	(+)	(+)*	(-)*	(-)*	(-)*	(-)*
% ever been in manifestation	(-)*	(-)	(+)*	(+)*	(-)*	(-)*	(-)*	(-)

(+) higher percentages than those of the remaining young people; (-) lower percentages than those of the remaining young people

\* significant differences: Chi square Test (significance at 10%)

As a last step, in order to monitor several variables at the same time a model of binary logistic regression was applied, thus obtaining a comprehensive view of the relationships existing between the use of media and political participation. The type of media through which politics is mainly followed is the dependent variable and we asked which variables influence the likelihood that a young person might follow politics through newspapers/Internet rather than on radio/TV.

The model summarizes many of the considerations already presented (thus reducing the possibility that the relations we found out could be spurious) and offers new insights.

The likelihood of keeping informed through the internet or newspapers is higher among politically active young people (Exp (B) is > 1 for all the variables in Table 130, always with clear statistical significance and it is highest for those who have taken part in legal manifestations). On the other hand the likelihood is lower among females (Exp (B) < 1), their interest for politics being equal (another variable of the model which resulted determining for the dependent variable).

Among the new variables which were not previously analysed, a negative relation emerged between the dependent variable and religion (those not belonging to any religious denomination are about 25% more likely to follow

politics through the newspapers or the radio), whereas a positive relation was shown with being students (30% more likely than workers). Also social condition proxy variables turned out to be determining (newspapers and the Internet prevail among people whose parents have higher level of education and who declare middle-to-high living standards).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the relation with the age variable disappeared from the model but the variable concerning interest for politics entered it (so this is the factor that increasing with age might lead to choosing other media than television to follow politics). Similarly, the variable about political information frequency lost its significance (people who are not very interested in politics, but follow it frequently do so on TV, therefore passively).

Table 130: Model of Logistic Regression; dichotomous dependent variable (0= follows politics through TV or radio, 1= follows politics through Internet or newspapers)

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Country (reference: Austria)				
Estonia	0,2643	0,1184	0,0256	1,3026
Finland	0,5432	0,1083	0,0000	1,7215
France	-1,0525	0,1344	0,0000	0,3490
Germany	-0,8250	0,1155	0,0000	0,4383
Italy	-1,4624	0,1291	0,0000	0,2317
Slovakia	-0,7125	0,1230	0,0000	0,4904
UK	-0,0871	0,1248	0,4849	0,9165
Gender (reference Male)				
Female	-0,1483	0,0598	0,0131	0,8622
Political Interest (reference fairly/very interested)				
not very interested	-0,3119	0,0673	0,0000	0,7320
not at all interested	-0,4099	0,1006	0,0000	0,6637
Religion (religious)				
Not religious denomination	0,2304	0,0727	0,0015	1,2591
Actual standard of living (reference low/very low))				
Average	0,1443	0,0964	0,1345	1,1552
high very high	0,3078	0,1104	0,0053	1,3604
Higher Diploma of Both Parents (diploma<full maturity)				
full maturity	0,2346	0,0641	0,0003	1,2644
Type of Settlement (urban area)				
SETTLE (small, medium city and rural area)	-,0176	0,0723	0,0154	0,83
STATUS (reference in paid work)				
Student	0,2642	0,0699	0,0002	1,3024
Unemployed	0,0044	0,1378	0,9744	1,0044



Other	-0,2025	0,1487	0,1731	0,8167
Ever attended political public meeting (reference no)				
Yes	0,3331	0,0756	0,0000	1,3953
Ever participated in legal demonstration (reference no)				
Yes	0,5097	0,0837	0,0000	1,6647
Ever supported election campaign (reference no)				
Yes	0,2574	0,1037	0,0130	1,2936
Ever voted (reference no)				
Yes	0,2534	0,0656	0,0001	1,2884
number of participation in associations extra sport	0,0829	0,0236	0,0004	1,0864
Constant	-0,9846	0,0793	0,0000	0,3736

In conclusion, and with reference to the initial hypothesis, it is possible to establish an association between active-reception media and political participation on the one hand, and passive-reception media and lower participation on the other.

However, the relation between these two variables cannot be further investigated in this analysis so to ascertain causal relation, for example: is it the use of certain media that encourages active and democratic participation in politics, or is it the other way round, that the interest for active participation is determining the choice of media?

In addition, though newspapers and internet are the media chosen by the more active, interested and informed young people, while television correlates with more passive, uncritical and sometimes even less democratic attitudes, some questions still need answering: what is their media consume like for extra-political themes? How frequently is every media consumed?

Finally some internet-related aspects should be further investigated, such as the reason why in some countries the web's relation with active participation is stronger than the one between newspapers and participation, or internet's role evolution in the future (in pioneer countries such as Finland and Estonia, internet is more widespread among teenagers: is this a generational phenomenon, or is it age-determined?). Moreover, it would be interesting to understand whether internet represents an "added value" as a new source of information adding to the others, or whether it is simply replacing newspaper reading.

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### 3.7 Understanding of politics, motivation, effectiveness and self-efficacy

#### 3.7.1 The context & background: Future expectations & perceived problems

##### Future expectations (Q30) – Comparison of the eight countries

How do young people across eight European countries feel about their future? Is there a sense of optimism or of pessimism prevalent when it comes to estimating one's own social mobility? Will it be better, about the same or worse ten years from now, compared to the situation of one's parents now?

These are the questions that we sought to answer by introducing an item battery about "future expectations":

*"What do you think about your future? Do you think that in ten years your **income/ job situation/ social security/ quality of life/ education and training** will be much better, better, the same, worse or much worse than the current income/ job situation/ social security/ quality of life/ education and training of your parents?"*

This item battery proved to be comparable across all eight countries. Therefore, a country comparison was possible that yielded significant differences for all items across the eight countries:

**Table 131: Expected income compared to parents' in 10 years**

country	much better	better	same	worse	much worse	total
Austria	6	25	24	38	7	100
Estonia	26	64	8	2	0	100
Finland	25	50	18	6	1	100
France	14	49	22	11	4	100
Germany	8	30	22	34	6	100
Italy	14	47	19	16	4	100
Slovakia	21	57	12	9	2	100
UK	31	48	14	7	0	100

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

### Income:

- The Estonian youth is most optimistic: Stunning 90% expect an upward mobility in regard to income.
- UK (79%), Slovakia (78%) and Finland (75%) also show a vast majority of optimists (“much better” and “better” combined)
- The French (63%) and Italian (61%) youth is overall optimistic. However, in both countries there is a considerable number of young people who expect deterioration in regard to their income (15% in France, 20% in Italy).
- The Austrian and German youth are most pessimistic: Not even a third of young Austrians and 38% of young Germans expect an improvement of their income situation compared to their parents’. Reversely, 45% of young Austrians and 40% of young Germans believe that their income will be worse than their parents’ (“worse” and “much worse” combined).

**Table 132: Expected job situation in 10 years compared to parents’**

country	much better	better	same	worse	much worse	total
Austria	3	16	19	45	17	100
Estonia	20	64	12	3	0	100
Finland	15	51	28	6	0	100
France	17	49	22	8	4	100
Germany	4	21	19	44	13	100
Italy	17	48	16	15	3	100
Slovakia	15	52	20	10	3	100
UK	30	49	16	5	0	100

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

### Job situation:

- Estonian youth can again be called „enthusiastic“ in regard to the job situation they expect (84% “better”). The situation is similar for the British youth (79% “better”).
- Youth in the remaining countries is still optimistic (about two thirds of “better”) – however, in Finland there are slightly more young people who expect a stable job situation, while in the other countries in this group, between 12% and 18% of youth expect deterioration.

- Also when it comes to the job situation, future expectations are the gloomiest in Austria and Germany (Austria - 61% “worse”, Germany 57% “worse”). In these two countries, only a fifth to a quarter of the youth expects an improvement for themselves.

**Table 133: Expected social security in 10 years compared to parents’**

country	much better	better	same	worse	much worse	total
Austria	1	11	25	46	16	100
Estonia	18	64	14	4	0	100
Finland	6	30	48	15	1	100
France	5	17	36	30	12	100
Germany	2	12	23	49	15	100
Italy	9	33	31	23	4	100
Slovakia	11	43	20	20	6	100
UK	17	36	34	12	1	100

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

**Social Security:** The picture is more ambiguous when young people think about their future social security.

- In Estonia (82% “better”) and the UK (53% “better”), the majority of young people expects improvements of their social security. Only a clear minority expects deterioration.
- In Finland, the overall impression is stability: If it will not be better, it will be at least not worse (36% “better”, 48% “same”, 16% “worse”).
- The Slovakian and Italian youth have the highest share of optimists (Slovakia: 54% “better”; Italy: “42% “better”). However, in both countries about one fourth of young people expect worse social security in ten years from now (tendency for polarization)!
- In France, Austria and Germany the highest share of young people expects deterioration of social security, with Germany and Austria showing even a majority of pessimists (France: 22% “better”, 36% “same”, 42% “worse”; Germany: 64% “worse”; Austria: 62% “worse”).

**Table 134: Expected quality of life in 10 years compared to parents'**

country	much better	better	same	worse	much worse	total
Austria	4	24	38	29	5	100
Estonia	24	61	13	2	0	100
Finland	10	45	41	4	0	100
France	8	35	27	21	8	100
Germany	3	24	45	25	4	100
Italy	14	37	25	20	4	100
Slovakia	16	47	18	15	4	100
UK	24	43	26	7	1	100

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

### Quality of Life:

- The Estonian youth continue their enthusiastic stance towards their future: 91% expect that their quality of life will be „much better“ or „better“, and almost nobody (2%) expects deterioration.
- Similarly, youth in the UK (67% “better”, 26% “same”) and in Finland (55% “better”, 41% “same”) rather expects improvements than reduction of their quality of life. Both countries have a low percentage of young people expecting deterioration; in Finland, there is a significantly higher share that expects a stable quality-of-life situation.
- In a third group of countries, the majority of young people also expect improvement or at least a stable situation. However, in Slovakia, Italy and France there is a growing number of young people (19%-29%) who think that their quality of life will be worse or much worse than the one of their parents.
- Finally, Austrian and German youth is split up among optimism, stability/stagnation and pessimism (Austria: 28% better, 38% same, 34% worse; Germany 27% better, 45% same, 29% worse). They have the lowest share of young people having positive future expectations in regard to their quality of life.

**Table 135: Expected education and training in 10 years compared to parents'**

country	much better	better	same	worse	much worse	total
Austria	7	40	27	19	6	100
Estonia	28	55	14	3	0	100
Finland	22	56	20	3	0	100
France	10	35	35	14	7	100
Germany	6	36	31	23	5	100
Italy	25	47	19	6	3	100
Slovakia	16	49	22	10	3	100
UK	20	46	26	7	1	100

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

#### **Education & training:**

- Again, the Estonian youth leads the range of optimists (83% “better”), followed by Finland (78% “better”), Italy (72% “better”) and the UK (66% “better”).
- In Slovakia, the predominant stance is still expectation of improvement (65% “better”), however, 13% of Slovakian youth expect that their education will be worse than their parents’.
- France, Austria and Germany display a similar trend: In these countries, the highest share of answers (although not the majority!) is optimistic, and about a third of youth in these countries expects stability/ stagnation. A significant share of young people (21% in France up to 28% in Germany) expects that their education will actually be worse than their parents’ education.

**Table 136: Overview about country differences in re. to future expectations**

country	Income	Job situation	Social security	Quality of life	Education and training
Austria	Pessimistic (45% worse; only 31% better)	Pessimistic (61% worse)	Pessimistic (62% worse)	Not much hope (28% better, 34% worse)	Rather polarized (47% better, 25% worse)
Estonia	enthusiastic (90% better)	Enthusiastic (83% better)	Enthusiastic (82% better)	Enthusiastic (91% better)	Enthusiastic (83% better)
Finland	Very optimistic (75% better)	Optimistic (66% better)	Stable (48% the same)	Optimistic (55% better)	Very optimistic (78% better)
France	Optimistic (63% better)	Optimistic (66% better)	Pessimistic (42% worse)	Rather polarized (43% better, 29% worse)	Rather polarized (45% better, 21% worse)
Germany	Pessimistic (40% worse; only 38% better)	Pessimistic (57% worse)	Pessimistic (64% worse)	Not much hope (27% better, 29% worse)	Rather polarized (42% better, 28% worse)
Italy	Optimistic (61% better)	Optimistic (65% better)	Rather polarized (42% better, 27% worse)	Rather polarized (51% better, 24% worse)	Very optimistic (72% better)
Slovakia	Very optimistic (78% better)	Optimistic (67% better)	Rather polarized (54% better, 26% worse)	Optimistic/polarized (63% better, 19% worse)	Optimistic/polarized (65% better, 13% worse)
UK	Very optimistic (79% better)	Very optimistic (79% better)	Optimistic (53% better or same 34%)	Optimistic (67% better)	Optimistic (66% better)

**Summary of results:**

- There are significant differences across the eight European countries in regard to each of these future expectations.
- The Estonian result sticks out clearly: Estonian young people show distinct optimism. For each of the five areas, more than 80% expect either much better or better conditions for themselves compared to their parents. Almost nobody (3%) expects worse conditions.



- The Finnish, British and Slovakian youth is generally optimistic. In these countries, the percentage of “pessimists” is very low (though a little higher in Slovakia).
- In some countries (e.g. France, Italy), there are “mixed emotions”: Although for several areas, there is an expectation of improvement, youth is not overall optimistic. A significant share expects deterioration.
- Austria and Germany stick out as Estonia does, however on the other side of “the extreme”: the Austrian and German youth has a pessimistic stance throughout. In all five areas of life (income, job, social security, quality of life and education) they expect a worse situation for themselves than their parents have now (there is a little more optimism in regard to education). This result possibly reflects the real political developments in these countries in the past years that brought severe budget cuts in social spending.
- The comparative analysis of this questions shows that European youth in these eight countries have very different feelings towards their social mobility and their future – in some countries, an upward trend is expected (Estonia, Finland, UK, Slovakia), in other countries, the predominant feeling is stagnation or even a downward development (Italy, France, Austria, Germany).

### **Future expectations (Q30) – Comparison of subgroups within the eight countries/ differences within countries**

A further analysis looks for relevant differences *within* each of the eight countries, i.e. gender differences. As with the comparative country analysis, only statistically significant distinctions will be discussed here.

### **Summary of Results**

- For future expectations in regard to “income”, no significant differences within the subgroups were found in any of the countries.
- Also, there were no statistically significant differences in any of the subgroups in Estonia, Finland, Slovakia and the UK.
- There are some significant differences in some of the areas in Austria Germany, and Italy (see Table 137).

- However, in none of the countries there are systematic differences between young women and young men in *all* of the areas.

**Gender Differences: Women are more pessimistic (Austria, Germany, Italy)**

Young women are more pessimistic than young men. In Austria and Germany significantly more young women expect a worse job situation than young men (64% - 66% compared to 51% - 59%). In Germany, this difference is also true for future expectations in regard to “education and training”.

This pattern is repeated in a different country for a different topic: Also in Italy, young women expect less social security for themselves compared to their parents’ situation now (31% “(much) worse” of young female Italians compared to 24% “(much) worse” of young male Italians).

**Table 137: Future expectations – gender differences within countries: Job situation, Social security, Education & Training**

Country		much better	better	same	worse	much worse	total
<b>Area: “Job Situation”</b>							
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>100</b>
	male	4	17	19	43	16	100
	female	1	15	19	48	18	100
<b>Germany</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100</b>
	male	5	24	19	39	12	100
	female	2	16	18	49	15	100
<b>Area: “Social Security”</b>							
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>100</b>
	male	9	32	35	18	6	100
	female	9	33	27	28	3	100
<b>Area: “Education &amp; Training”</b>							
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>100</b>
	male	6	38	33	19	4	100
	female	5	33	29	28	5	100

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

### **Most important problem in own country (Q31)**

The question of how important a number of specific problems in one's own country is turned out not be comparable across countries (see EUYOUNPART technical report: factor structure not equivalent across countries, partially low factor loadings and/or low discriminating power).

However, although the understanding, underlying concepts and links between types of problems are different across countries, one can see interesting similarities and differences in regard to problem perception.

The following tables (Table 138 to Table 145) provide a ranking of the nine problems that were asked for each country. They give an overview about problem perception within each country.

Aside from these details, there are some common trends:

- There is a rather high homogeneity across countries: “unemployment” and “crime and violence” are in most countries ranked among the top three problems, followed by “environmental pollution”.
- “Terrorism” only is a top three problem in the UK.
- The “number of immigrants” is at the end of the ranking in seven out of eight countries (either position 8 or 9) except for Italy (number 6).

**Table 138: Ranking of problems in AUSTRIA**

rank	Problem	Importance in % (very/fairly important added)
1	unemployment	95
2	pollution	87
3	crime & violence	83
4	racism	80
5	drugs	76
6	poverty	76
7	reduction of welfare state	73
8	number of immigrants	72
9	terrorism	59

**Table 139: Ranking of problems in ESTONIA**

rank	Problem	Importance in % ( very+fairly important)
1	crime & violence	98
2	drugs	98
3	unemployment	97
4	poverty	96
5	pollution	94
6	reduction of welfare state	86
7	terrorism	66
8	number of immigrants	48
9	racism	48

**Table 140: Ranking of problems in FINLAND**

rank	Problem	Importance in % ( very+fairly important)
1	unemployment	91
2	crime & violence	85
3	drugs	81
4	pollution	80
5	reduction of welfare state	80
6	racism	70
7	poverty	63
8	number of immigrants	51
9	terrorism	38

**Table 141: Ranking of problems in FRANCE**

rank	Problem	Importance in % ( very+fairly important)
1	poverty	98
2	unemployment	98
3	pollution	96
4	crime & violence	95
5	reduction of welfare state	93
6	racism	92
7	drugs	89
8	terrorism	89
9	number of immigrants	78

**Table 142: Ranking of problems in GERMANY**

rank	Problem	Importance in % ( very+fairly important)
1	unemployment	97
2	pollution	90
3	poverty	86
4	crime & violence	84
5	racism	83
6	reduction of welfare state	76
7	terrorism	73
8	drugs	69
9	number of immigrants	64

**Table 143: Ranking of problems in ITALY**

rank	Problem	Importance in % ( very+fairly important)
1	crime & violence	96
2	unemployment	96
3	pollution	95
4	poverty	91
5	reduction of welfare state	88
6	number of immigrants	86
7	terrorism	85
8	drugs	85
9	racism	85

**Table 144: Ranking of problems in SLOVAKIA**

rank	Problem	Importance in % ( very+fairly important)
1	unemployment	98
2	poverty	98
3	crime & violence	95
4	pollution	92
5	drugs	89
6	reduction of welfare state	79
7	terrorism	76
8	racism	74
9	number of immigrants	66

**Table 145: Ranking of problems in the UK**

rank	Problem	Importance in % ( very+fairly important)
1	crime & violence	99
2	pollution	97
3	terrorism	97
4	unemployment	97
5	drugs	97
6	poverty	96
7	racism	95
8	number of immigrants	94
9	reduction of welfare state	92

Furthermore, there are interesting differences in the answering patterns:

- In the UK, the importance assigned to each problem is high. Percentages lie within a very close range (92%-99%). This could be due to a specific national answering pattern that prefers high values. Alternatively, these results could mean that young people in the UK feel endangered by many problems.
- Finland displays the biggest variety: problem importance lies between 91% (unemployment) and 38% (terrorism).
- Similarly, the pattern in Estonia allows for a clear ranking (98% crime and violence; 48% number of immigrants, racism).

### **3.7.2 Understanding of politics & attitudes about political participation**

#### **Attitudes about being politically active (Q28)**

- Q28 (pp): equivalent (“Partly low factor loadings”)

A series of questions was asked about attitudes in regard to political participation. We were interested in exploring which attitudes the youth have about being politically active: Do they perceive it merely as means to advance

one's own career and to make useful contacts for the future? Is there a feeling of resignation prevalent ("it is pointless trying to change things"), or do the youth feel that one needs at least to try to change things, regardless of the odds to effect something?

Also, we were interested in the main reasons for not being active, e.g. lack of time or exhaustion from school or work.

The data analysis in the technical report (EUYOUPART, deliverable 16) revealed a three factor structure that is comparable for all eight countries:

The first factor is "political inactivity" and includes the items "I do not have enough time to be politically active", "I am too busy to be politically active" and "I am too exhausted to engage in politics".

The second factor is called "political benefits" and contains the items "It is interesting to be politically active because it is good for your career", "It is interesting to be politically active because you meet influential people" and "It is interesting to be politically active because you learn a lot of useful things".

As a third factor we identified "political idealism" with the following items: "Even if I cannot change things it is still important to try", "It is important to play one's part to make a better world", "If you are bothered by something you need to try to change it" and "It is pointless trying to change things".

### **The general picture: Youth has an idealistic understanding of political activity**

If for all countries the numbers are taken together and ranked, a quite encouraging picture emerges (**Figure 1**): The top three items express an idealistic, participatory attitude towards political participation.


Among the options offered, idealism and a feeling of responsibility seem to be the prime source of motivation to be active. This is followed – albeit with a clear gap – by the impression that by being politically active, one can learn a lot of useful things. Meeting influential people or creating career advantages for oneself is a feature of participation only for about one third of young people.

Around 40% of young people in these eight countries indicate that they have no time or are too busy for being active.



Last in the ranking is the reverse statement “It is pointless trying to change things”: In the total population of youth in the eight countries, 68% oppose this view.


**Figure 1: Overview about all items (total numbers incl. all countries)**



### Analysis by factor structures - differences between the countries

Because the items loading on the first factor “political inactivity” are quite similar in content, only the first item (with the highest factor loading) will be presented here for the comparison of the eight countries.

**Figure 2: Selected item of factor “political inactivity”: “Do not have time to be politically active” (comparison of 8 countries)**



Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)


Summary of the results: There are significant differences between the eight countries.

- The majority of young people in Slovakia (52%) agrees with this statement (lack of time as reason for inactivity)
- Estonia (45%), France (42%), UK (42%), Austria (41%) form a “middle group”.
- In Italy, Finland and German, the share of youth agreeing with this reason for inactivity is lowest (34%-38%).
- Analysed for gender differences, the item shows significant results only for Austria: Young Austrian women indicate more often than men that

they do not have the time to be politically active (46% of young women “strongly agree” or “agree” to this statement, compared to 37% of young men in Austria).

The second factor - constituting reasons and motivations for being politically active – consisted of three beneficial aspects of political participation. Across all countries, the statement that being politically active is interesting because of the acquisition of useful knowledge received most support (43% “strongly agree” and “agree” added; see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Factor 2 – „Being active is interesting because you learn useful things“ (comparison of 8 countries)**



Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

There are significant country differences:

- In Slovakia, this statement receives most support (51% of young people), followed by Estonia and France.

- Around 41% of British and Austrian youth agree with this benefit; in the UK, an eye-catching 24% of young people oppose this view.
- This number is similarly high for young Italians.

**Gender differences about benefit “learning”: Estonia, France and Italy**

In Estonia and France, young women have a more positive stance towards the learning effect of political participation (in both countries, 53% women strongly agree/ agree compared to 44% of young men in Estonia and 48% of young men in France).

In Italy, there is a similarly high number of supporters. But young female Italians seem more insecure than their male counterparts (39% “neither nor” compared to 33% of young male Italians).


The second item for the factor „political benefits“ reveals very interesting country differences (Figure 4):

More than two thirds of young Slovaks (68%) agree that meeting influential people is one of the benefits of being politically active. This is by far a higher number than in any other of the seven countries.

In all other countries, there is no majority among young people for this statement.

Young Britons, Italians and Finns have the highest share of disagreement with this statement (31%-34%).

**Figure 4: Factor 2 – „Being active is interesting because you meet influential people“ (comparison of 8 countries)**



Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

**Gender differences about benefit “influential people”: Germany and Italy**


In Germany and Italy, significantly more young men agree with this statement than young women (Germany: 38% compared to 33% young women; Italy: 32% young men compared to 22% young women).

In these countries, the benefit of getting to know people of influence through political participation is more recognized among young men.

Finally, we asked about young people's perception whether political activism is conducive to one's career. Again, significant differences between the countries were found (Figure 5):

- In Estonia and Slovakia, the majority of young people agree with this statement. Being politically active is associated by many with better career opportunities.
- Most opponents to this perception are found in Austria: Almost half of the young Austrians (47%) disagree (strongly) with this idea.
- Also in France, Italy, the UK and Germany, most young people disagree that better career opportunities is what makes political activism interesting.

**Figure 5: Factor 2 – „Being active is interesting is good for career“(comparison of 8 countries)**



Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

**Gender differences about benefit “good for career”:** Finland, Germany, Slovakia

In Finland, Germany and Slovakia, the career motivation is even stronger developed among young men. (Slovakia: 59% compared to 53% of young women; Germany: 19% compared to 11% of young women; Finland: 25% compared to 22% of young women).

However, the main difference between young women and young men in Finland consists in a higher share of young women answering “neither nor” (47% compared to 40% of young men).


The third factor, “political idealism”, combines four items that express variations of hope and idealism in regard to politics as a means to improve unsatisfying circumstances. They also explore whether young people feel there is a need to make an effort to change things – regardless of the chances for success.

For the item “It is important to play one’s part to make a better world”, there are significant differences between the eight countries in our study (Figure 6): If the measures for agreement (“strongly agree” and “agree”) are taken together, there is strikingly high agreement across all countries: Between 73% (Estonia) and 90% (Italy) of young people support this idealistic understanding of political participation.

The one big exception to this encouraging result is Slovakia: For this country, the extent of agreement plummets drastically to 27%. In addition, the highest number of young people across all countries (30%) disagrees actively with this idealistic position.

There are no significant gender differences in any of the countries for this item.

**Figure 6: Factor 3 – „It is important to play one’s part to make a better world“(comparison of 8 countries)**



Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

The sceptical and disillusioned attitude of young Slovaks shows once again in the reverse statement “It is pointless trying to change things”: Only 44% of young Slovaks express disagreement with this. In the other countries, this number is considerably higher (e.g., Germany, Italy and Finland 79%; Estonia 61%).

Similarly, Slovakia ranks last for the statement “Even if I cannot change things it is still important to try”, a prototypical idealist stance that expresses the necessity to try despite realistic odds and objections. However, for this statement there is no drastic gap to the other countries (Slovakia: 70% strongly agree/ agree as compared to the highest number in Italy: 85% strongly agree/agree).

Finally, youth across the eight countries show an understanding that it is one’s responsibility to try to change what is bothering you (

**Figure 7).** The data analysis shows overwhelming support (81%) for this stance of responsibility and proactivity.




Support for this statement is highest in Germany (88%) and weakest in France (but still high with 73%).

If only the first category – agree strongly – is regarded, Austrian youth (46% strongly agree) sticks out, followed by Estonian youth (38%).

There are no significant gender differences for this item.

**Figure 7: Factor 3 – „If you are bothered by something you need to try to change it“(comparison of 8 countries)**




### Understanding of Politics (Q49)

The item battery exploring the youth's understanding of politics was only partially comparable across the seven countries<sup>13</sup>. We therefore present first an overview about the comparable items, second the three items that cannot be compared (different factor structures for the factor "institutional politics" for Austria, Estonia and Slovakia).

The analysis of all items shows that the youth across the seven countries share an idealistic understanding of politics: The top three items describe politics as a necessary<sup>14</sup> solution oriented approach to solve problems (either nationally or internationally) or to take care of social issues (**Figure 8**).

**Figure 8: Overview about comparable items (total numbers incl. all countries except Germany)**



However, almost half of the young population in these countries also agrees with the statement "politics means empty promises". Similarly, there is considerable doubt that politics are a way to create a better world (42% strongly agree/ agree, 32% strongly disagree/disagree).

<sup>13</sup> This question was optional and not administered in Germany.

<sup>14</sup> The top three item formulations contained all „necessary” (way)

The statements “politics does not deal with things important to people like me” (a statement that may express alienation) and “politics is just corrupt” tend to polarize the entire young population: Supporters and opponents of these statements hold a similar share, with almost a third of young people answering “neither nor”.

The item “politics is a game played by old men” receives the least support (30%) and the highest number of young people who oppose this view (46% strongly disagree/ disagree).

In the analysis for equivalence, three items were not comparable across all seven countries (deviations for Austria, Estonia and Slovakia).

The association of politics with voting in elections (Table 146) is strong in France (69%) and the UK (57%), medium in Italy (47%) and surprisingly weak in Finland (33%).

In Austria, a very high percentage (74%) of the young people agrees with politics refers to voting in elections.

In Estonia, the highest share of interviewees (37%) disagrees with this idea.

The majority of Slovakian youth (56%) associate politics with voting.

There are only minor gender differences (Estonia, Finland, Italy).

**Table 146: „Politics = voting in elections“**

country		Strongly agree	agree	Neither nor	disagree	Strongly disagree
Finland	total	4	29	28	34	5
France	total	26	43	15	11	4
Italy	total	7	40	21	26	6
UK	total	5	52	21	21	1
Austria	total	32	42	15	8	3
Estonia	total	9	26	29	26	11
Slovakia	total	13	43	26	16	2

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

The association of politics with party activities is more homogeneous across the comparable countries (Table 147): In each country, at least half of the young people (lowest number: Finland – 52%; highest number: France – 69%) agree with this idea.

In Italy, there is the strongest opposition to the association of politics with political parties (22% strongly disagree/ disagree).

In Estonia, a majority of the interviewees agree that politics means activities of parties. Contrary to the statement that politics means voting, there is no distinct opposition to this idea.

In Slovakia, 75% of young people agree with the statement.

For this item, there were no significant gender differences found.

**Table 147: „Politics = activities of parties“**

country		Strongly agree	agree	Neither nor	disagree	Strongly disagree
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	16	44	27	10	3
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	4	48	34	13	1
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	15	54	22	7	2
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	4	49	25	19	3
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	6	58	25	10	0
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	22	42	25	8	3
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	17	58	21	3	1

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

The equation of politics with discussions on parliament – also referring to a traditional or classic understanding of politics – shows significant differences across the comparable countries: From strong support of this statement (UK: 72%) to a rather weak one (Italy: 34%).

In Estonia, significantly more young men than women associate politics with discussions in parliament.

**Table 148: „Politics = discussions in parliaments“**

country		Strongly agree	agree	Neither nor	disagree	Strongly disagree
<b>Austria</b>	<b>total</b>	15	52	22	8	3
<b>Finland</b>	<b>total</b>	4	47	32	14	2
<b>France</b>	<b>total</b>	12	47	31	9	2
<b>Italy</b>	<b>total</b>	1	33	38	25	3
<b>UK</b>	<b>total</b>	6	65	21	8	0
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>total</b>	19	44	28	7	2
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>total</b>	11	49	28	10	1

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

## Effectiveness of different forms of political participation and self-efficacy

In which ways of political participation do young Europeans believe? What is effective according to them, and how can one best influence decisions in society?

A ranking of ten diverse ways of political participation across all eight countries (Figure 9) shows that the number one effective way of participating is voting: 62% of young people give it a value of 7 or more on an 11 point scale<sup>15</sup>.

Rank number two goes to “work to get the attention of the media”: 44% of young people think this is a rather effective way of participating. Young people assign a surprisingly high influence to the media.

Both “work to get media attention” and “work in voluntary organisations” is considered more effective than working in a political party!

The classical means of political participation is only considered the fourth effective by young people.

The lowest effectiveness is assigned to illegal and violent protest. Only a minority of European youth consider this an effective way to influence decisions in society.

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<sup>15</sup> The question was asked on an 11 point scale (0 – not at all effective to 10 – every effective). To make it easier to gain an overview about the results, the question was recoded into five categories.

**Figure 9: Overview about effectiveness of forms of participation (all countries)**






Figure 10 and Figure 11 illustrate the various country profiles about beliefs in effectiveness.

**Figure 10: Country differences in the 5 most effective forms of political participation (values “7,8,9,10” added)**



**Figure 11: Country differences of less effective forms of participation (values “7,8,9,10” added)**





A comparison of the country profiles yields the following characterization:

- The Austrian youth thinks that voting is the most effective means of influencing decisions in society (69%). Almost a quarter (24%) believes in boycotting products. Compared to the other countries, they have little confidence in the effectiveness of signing petitions (24%).
- The Estonian youth believes less in the effectiveness of working in voluntary organisations (NGOs – 28%), in signing petitions (25%) and in boycotting products (12%) than young people in other countries. Overall, they express less belief in effectiveness.
- Young people in Finland have a stronger belief in the effectiveness of working in a political party (42%). They have an outstanding share of young people who believe in contacting politicians (35%).
- French youth are the most sceptical in regard to media attention (33%) – they break the trend. They have the least confidence in working in a political party (21%) and a slightly higher tendency to assign influence to illegal (12%) and violent (8%) protest activities.
- Young Germans are most convinced that voting is an effective way to influence decisions in society (74%). All in all, young Germans tend to assign effectiveness to various forms of political participation more than the youth in other countries (e.g. media attention, work in voluntary organisations, work in a political party, signing petitions). Germany has the smallest share of youth who believe in illegal and violent protest forms.
- Italian youth ranks among the top believers in regard to voting (69%), media attention (53%), NGO work (55%) and demonstrating (38%).
- Young Slovaks - similar to young Estonians – tend to be in general sceptical about the effectiveness of participating politically: The number of believers tends to rank lowest across the ten ways of participating. In particular, there are fewer people who believe in the effectiveness of NGO work (27%), of demonstrating (23%), of contacting politicians (17%) and of illegal protest (7%).
- Youth in the UK tends to be a little more sceptical in regard to voting (52%) and working in NGOs (34%). Compared to youth in other countries, they put more trust in the effectiveness of signing petitions (38%), contacting politicians (30%) and boycotting products (26%).

Interestingly, the UK has the highest share of youth who think that illegal (17%) and violent (13%) protest is an effective means of influencing decisions in society.

### **Gender differences**

**The analysis by gender for each country yields the following results (for detailed analysis please refer to Table 149):**

- There are no significant gender differences for “illegal protest”
- There are almost no significant gender differences in Austria and France (in Austria, only for “violent protest”, in France only for “sign petitions”).
- In Estonia and Finland, there are the most differences between the sexes.
- For six of the ten items, more young women than men think the specific way is effective: Vote, work in NGOs, sign petitions, demonstrate, contact politicians, boycott products. However, the countries for which this trend is true vary.
- In two countries, more young women than men think that violent protest is ineffective.
- In two countries, more young men think that working to get the attention of the media is effective.

**Table 149: Overview about gender differences**

Political activity (item)	Difference	Countries concerned:
vote in elections	More young women think this is effective	Estonia: 55% effective compared to 50% of young men Finland: 67% effective compared to 62% of young men Italy: 71% effective compared to 68% of young men UK: 55% effective compared to 48% of young men
work to get media attention	More young men think this is effective	Italy: 56% effective compared to 51% of young women Slovakia: 51% effective compared to 45% of young women UK: 42% effective compared to 39% of young women (Stronger difference with "ineffective": 17% compared to 24% of young women)
work in NGOs	More young women think this is effective	In almost all countries gender differences except for Austria & France:  Estonia: 34% effective compared to 22% of young men Finland: 47% effective compared to 31% of young men Germany: 55% effective compared to 45% of young men Italy: 60% effective compared to 49% of young men Slovakia: 31% effective compared to 22% of young men UK: 42% effective compared to 27% of young men
work in a political party	More young men think this is ineffective	Estonia: 27% ineffective compared to 19% of young women Finland: 17% ineffective compared to 12% of young women
sign petitions	More young women think this is effective	Estonia: 28% effective compared to 22% of young men Finland: 35% effective compared to 23% of young men France: 36% effective compared to 30% of young men Germany: 41% effective compared to 34% of young men
demonstrations	More young women think this is effective	Germany: 40% effective compared to 30% of young men
contact politicians	More young women think this is effective	Finland: 38% effective compared to 33% of young men
boycott products	More young women think this is effective	Estonia: 15% effective compared to 10% of young men Finland: 24% effective compared to 14% of young men Germany: 20% effective compared to 16% of young men
violent protest	More young women think this is ineffective	Austria: 90% ineffective compared to 86% of young men UK: 70% ineffective compared to 63% of young men

Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%); "ineffective" = value 0,1,2,3 added; "effective" = value 7,8,9,10 added

### Young people's sense of self-efficacy

In the questionnaire, we also asked about young people's sense of self efficacy: "How often does politics seem so complicated that you cannot really understand what is going on?"


However, for this item an analysis of comparability by exploratory factor analysis was not feasible (only one item asked).

Across the eight countries, only one fifth (21%) of young people feel politically savvy and say that they rarely or never have problems to understand the complexities of political life.

36% feel sometimes overwhelmed by politics.

Rather alarming is the fact that 43% of young people feel often or even always that politics is too complicated to understand (Figure 12).

**Figure 12: Self-efficacy (comparison across the eight countries): "How often does politics seem so complicated that..."**



Weighted data; percentages; all results reported here are statistically significant (chi square test, alpha = 5%)

Country differences:

- Young Austrians (27% rarely/ never) and young Germans (26% rarely/ never) have a higher sense of self-efficacy in regard to politics.
- Significantly more young people in the UK (61%), in Slovakia (53%), Italy (53%) and France (46%) feel that politics is too complicated to understand.

### **3.8 How do specific participation behaviours correlate with selected attitudes**

The following chapter focuses on the relation between specific attitudes and political participation behaviors. We were specifically interested to explore whether beliefs about effectiveness (Q24) of various forms of political participation are connected with actual behaviors (Q13).

The guiding assumption behind the data analysis was that young people engage more in those forms of political participation that they think are effective (belief in effectiveness increases political participation behavior).

This assumption is related to the discourse about political efficacy. Political efficacy was initially defined by Campbell, Gurin & Miller (1954) as the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about changes. Political efficacy was thought to have an impact on political participation by contributing a sense of empowerment for political activities.

In these early stages of developing the concept of efficacy, items on political efficacy included the following (Political Efficacy Scale, Campbell et al 1954), with two items referring to a specific participation behaviour (i.e., voting):

“I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think”

“The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country”

“Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things”

“People like me don’t have any say about what the government does”

“Sometimes politics seems so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what is going on”

In subsequent years, the definition was refined into a widely accepted differentiation (e.g., Balch, 1974; Lane, 1959) : A sense of political efficacy consists of one’s own competence to bring the change about (internal efficacy) and the system’s responsiveness toward influencing attempts by the citizens (external efficacy).

Internal political efficacy thus expresses the individuals’ sense of her/ his own competence and that she/ he is able to make a difference. Internal efficacy is typically measured by items like “politics seems so complicated that I cannot understand what is going on”.

External political efficacy is system-oriented. It describes the responsiveness of the democratic system to attempted changes and includes the belief that decision makers will listen to citizen’s opinions. External efficacy is typically measured by items like “people like me don’t have any say about what the government does” or “Public officials don’t care much what people like me think”.

However, this factor is less clear than internal efficacy: An analysis of commonly used scales about efficacy (Reef & Knoke, 1999) shows that the concept of external efficacy tends to be less precise as it underwent various operationalizations and overlaps at times with the concepts like “trust” and “alienation/ estrangement” (from the political system).

Amnå, Munck & Zetterberg (2004), based on their findings about political efficacy and self-predicted participation among adolescents in a 24 country study, make a strong case for keeping internal and external efficacy separate since the factors vary in meaning and explanatory power, with internal efficacy having rather strong effects on participation measures.

The item battery that we used to measure the effectiveness of various forms of political participation originates from the CID study (Citizenship, Identity and Democracy). The wording was slightly adapted to fit also the young age groups in our sample. The wording is as follows:

*Q24: "There are many opinions on how one can effectively influence decisions in society. I will read you some of the ways that are used. Please tell me on a scale from 0 to 10 how effective you think it is: 0 means "not at all effective" and 10 means "very effective". How effective is it to..."*

The original item in the CID was not intended to measure any sort of efficacy but to enable comparisons of non-instrumental and instrumental motives for participation<sup>16</sup>.

However, the item may be viewed as special case of external efficacy, in that it describes the assumed extent to which various forms of participation induce system responses. In our analysis, we linked the items about the effectiveness of specific forms of political participation with actual participation behaviour. Our results thus describe the behavioural consequences of this special case of external efficacy.

To restrict the plethora of the data we introduced as selection criterion "minimum frequency for Q13 items": Items that reached in none of the countries unweighted frequencies of >100 persons were excluded from the analysis. This reduced the number of behavioral items to 12 out of 25.

The connection between attitudes and behavior was computed with correlations (Pearson correlations, significant results on a 0,01 level) to gain a first overview about possible influences.

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<sup>16</sup> email communication with Jan van Deth, August 23<sup>rd</sup> 2005

Since the amount of information and the potential for analyses in our data exceed by far the possibilities of this report, these results are a selection of some of the interesting questions that can be explored with the EUYOUPART data. They are far from comprehensive.

### **3.8.1 Influence of beliefs in effectiveness on behavior**

In general, the guiding assumption was confirmed across countries: Belief in the effectiveness of a specific form of political participation correlates significantly and positively with the actual behaviour. Three examples that can be compared across the eight countries illustrate this finding (for detailed results of example 1 and 2 please refer to Table 152 in the annex).

#### **Example 1: Demonstrating**

Young people who agree that “participating in public demonstrations” (Q24\_7) is an effective way to influence decisions in society have a higher likelihood to already have participated in a demonstration (Q13\_14) - and vice versa.

This connection shows across all eight countries.

The same is true for the behaviour “participated in an illegal demonstration” (Q13\_15). The exception to this rule is the UK, where no significant effects were found for this behavioural item.

#### **Example 2: Consumerism**

Young people who believe in the effectiveness of “boycotting certain products” (Q224\_6) are more likely to already have participated in a consumerist activity (Q13\_10 “boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons”, Q13\_11 “bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons”).

In most countries, beliefs of effectiveness in NGO work and media work are also related to this area of participation (note: limited comparability of Q13\_11).

#### **Example 3: Representative democracy (voting & election campaigns)**

As a third example serve behaviours that relate to the framework of representative democracy in an almost classical manner: voting in elections (Q13\_1), supporting an election campaign (Q14\_1) and trying to convince others to vote for a candidate or party (Q14\_2).

Table 150 provides an overview about the highest significant correlations for each country for belief in effectiveness with the three behavioural items (for detailed results please refer to the annex – and Table 154).



For voting, belief in the effectiveness of voting correlates in all countries with the actual voting behavior.

Also related to voting seems the belief in the effectiveness of contacting politicians (exception: Italy and Slovakia)

There are some major components that repeatedly occur for all three behaviors – voting, supported an election campaign and convinced others to vote for a candidate or a party – across the eight countries: belief in the effectiveness of voting, contacting politicians, NGO work and of media work.

However, there are variations across the countries (different political cultures): For example, in some countries, also belief in the effectiveness of NGO work is related to voting (Austria, Estonia, Italy), in others there is a connection with media work (Estonia, UK).

In France, belief in the effectiveness of demonstrating correlates with the three behaviors

In Slovakia, belief in the effectiveness of signing petitions plays a role for all three behavioral items

Table 150: OVERVIEW – Selected correlations of beliefs in effectiveness (Q24) with actual behavior for voting and election campaigns (Q13\_1, Q14)

	<b>Austria</b>	<b>Estonia</b>	<b>Finland</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>UK</b>
Ever voted (q13)	voting, contacting politicians, NGO work	voting, contacting politicians, NGO work media work	voting, contacting politicians, party work	voting, contacting politicians, demonstrating	voting, contacting politicians, party work	voting, NGO work	voting, petitions	voting, contacting politicians, media work
supported an election campaign (q14_1)	contacting politicians, party work, media work	voting, contacting politicians,	contacting politicians, party work	voting, party work, media work, demonstrating	contacting politicians, party work, <i>media work</i>	voting, contacting politicians, party work, demonstrating	<i>voting</i> , contacting politicians, petitions	voting, party work, NGO work,
tried to convince others to vote for a party/ candidate (q14_2)	voting, contacting politicians, party work, media work	voting, contacting politicians, media work	contacting politicians, <i>party work</i> , product boycott	voting, party work, demonstrating, media work	contacting politicians, party work, media work	voting, contacting politicians, party work, <i>demonstrating</i>	<i>voting</i> , <i>contacting politicians</i> , petitions	<i>voting</i> party work, NGO work,

N for voting: filtered - only those who were eligible to vote either for EP or last national elections n = 5078;  
Correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Definition of external efficacy: An inspiration for change?

Our results show that external efficacy - if the definition is expanded to include concrete forms of influencing attempts again – does indeed have a significant effect on political participation behaviour. This finding would supplement the results of Amnå et al (2004), who found effects of internal efficacy but none of external efficacy with a definition based on “what people think and want, and whether they think leaders are listening (p.13)<sup>17</sup>.

In the light of these findings, future research could look into existing operationalisations of internal and external efficacy to examine whether an elaboration of the concept may in fact prove useful.

### **3.8.2 Influence of attitudes about political participation on behavior**

The analysis for equivalence (EUYOUPART report D16 – Analysis of Comparability and Technical Report) revealed a three factor structure for attitudes on political participation (Q28). One factor describes attitudes that explain or justify “political inactivity” (am too busy to be active/am too exhausted/don’t have enough time). The second factor - “political benefits” - summarizes utilitarian viewpoints on being politically active (meet influential people/good for career/learn a lot of useful things). The third factor - “political idealism” – describes basic idealistic stances in contrast to disillusioned and despairing attitudes on trying to change things with political activity (important to play one’s part to make a better world/ pointless trying to change things/ even if...it is still important to try/ if you are bothered by sth you need to try to change it).

Of these factors, the last one – political idealism – seems most interesting in regard to participation. If the sample is viewed as a whole (all eight countries), the correlations show the expected results: There are weak but significant correlations between idealistic attitudes (agreement that it is important to play one’s part to make a better world & that trying matters) and frequency of behaviour (Table 151).

Those young people who support the idealistic attitudes about political participation are more likely to engage in political activities. Vice versa, young people who agree

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<sup>17</sup> Their operationalisation of the external dimension of efficacy included the following 5 items: 1) „The government cares a lot about what all of us think about new laws” 2) “The government is doing its best to find out what people want” 3) “The powerful leaders in government care very little about the opinions of people” 4) “The politicians quickly forget the needs of the voters who elected them” 5) “When people get together to demand change, the leaders in government listen” .

with a stance of despair (“it is pointless trying to change things”) show significantly less activity. This connection is true for a wide range of political participation activities.

**Table 151: Influence of political idealism on behaviour; all countries  
(selected Q28 with comparable Q13)**

	Factor "Political Idealism"			
	Q28_1 It is important to try to make world better	Q28_3 It is pointless trying to change things	Q28_4 Even if I cant change things, still important to try	Q28_8 If bothered try to change things
Q13_1 Voted	<b>-0,10</b>	<b>0,13</b>	-0,10	-0,08
Q13_2 Cast an invalid vote				
Q13_3 NOT voted out of protest				
Q13_4 Contacted a politician	-0,10	<b>0,11</b>	-0,06	-0,06
Q13_7 Collected signatures	-0,10	0,07	-0,08	-0,07
Q13_8 Held a political speech	-0,07	0,07	-0,03	-0,05
Q13_10 Boycotted products	<b>-0,16</b>	<b>0,17</b>	-0,10	-0,10
Q13_12 Written political graffiti	-0,03	0,03	-0,03	-0,05
Q13_13 Worn a political badge	-0,10	<b>0,12</b>	-0,09	<b>-0,11</b>
Q13_14 Participated in legal demonstration	<b>-0,17</b>	<b>0,17</b>	<b>-0,12</b>	-0,10
Q13_15 Participated in illegal demonstration	-0,09	0,05	-0,05	-0,05
Q13_17 Donated money to a political group	-0,08	0,08	-0,06	-0,07
Q13_19 Written an article	-0,08	0,08	-0,06	-0,08
Q13_20 Written/forwarded a political letter	<b>-0,12</b>	0,14	-0,09	<b>-0,11</b>
Q13_21 Participated in pol event where property was damaged		0,04		-0,04
Q13_22 Participated in event where violence with police	-0,07	0,05	-0,04	-0,07
Q13_23 Participated in event where violence with opponents	-0,05	0,05		-0,05
Q13_24 Occupied buildings	-0,10	0,05	-0,06	
Q13_25 Blocked streets/railways	-0,07	0,07	-0,05	-0,06

Weighted data. Pearson correlations significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed), missings excluded; negative correlations mean positive connection (agreeing with item Q28 correlates positively with frequency of behaviour); only comparable items selected; only significant correlations displayed

However, the country level analysis reveals some significant differences: The two transition countries in our sample - Estonia and Slovakia - show for some of the correlations different results. For example, there is no significant correlation between the factor "political idealism" and participation in legal demonstrations. Similarly, the factor does not (Slovakia) or only in a limited manner (Estonia – only item q28\_2 and q28\_3) significantly affect the boycotting of products.

To increase political participation, the message to young people must thus be:

Your involvement makes a difference – at least it is important to try to change the things that bother you.

To strengthen young people's political involvement, they need positive participation experiences: They need the experience that their efforts do in fact make a difference.

Participation offers to youth that lack practical consequences and thus remain mainly in the realm of theory produce attitudes like "It is pointless trying to change things". These token offers need to be avoided because they are likely to reduce young people's willingness to engage in political participation in the future.

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## ANNEX

**Table 152: Correlations between beliefs in effectiveness and demonstrating/consumerism (Q24 with Q13\_10, Q13\_11, Q13\_14, Q13\_15)**

Country		Q24_1 party work	Q24_2 NGO work	Q24_3 voting	Q24_4 contacting politicians	Q24_5 media work	Q24_6 product boycott	Q24_7 demonstrati ng	Q24_8 petitions	Q24_9 illegal protest	Q24_10 violent protest
Austria	Boycotted products				0,132	0,138	0,271	0,197	0,162	0,161	
	Bought products		0,113		0,123	0,123	0,258	0,174	0,167	0,131	
	legal demonstration	0,093	0,090			0,100	0,139	0,215	0,149	0,142	
	illegal demonstration									0,223	0,200
Estonia	Boycotted products		0,094			0,125	0,105				
	Bought products		0,099			0,142	0,163				
	legal demonstration		0,117				0,110	0,099			
	illegal demonstration									0,136	0,147
Finland	Boycotted products	0,155	0,167		0,121	0,174	0,307	0,229	0,115	0,147	
	Bought products	0,177	0,203		0,155	0,264	0,288	0,191	0,121	0,149	
	legal demonstration						0,157	0,198	0,094	0,096	
	illegal demonstration	-0,163	-0,114	-0,110				0,104		0,199	0,183
France	Boycotted products		0,137	0,114		0,125	0,268	0,131		0,113	
	Bought products		0,135	0,166		0,145	0,202	0,145		0,088	



	legal demonstration	0,111	0,137	0,138		0,134	0,133	0,279	0,169	0,142	
	illegal demonstration									0,157	
Germany	Boycotted products	0,086			0,094	0,169	0,246	0,127	0,088	0,121	
	Bought products	0,094	0,102		0,087	0,167	0,232	0,157	0,088	0,122	
	legal demonstration			0,094	0,102	0,128	0,086	0,265	0,107	0,117	
	illegal demonstration							0,099		0,224	0,144
Italy	Boycotted products					0,167	0,417	0,234	0,283	0,210	0,104
	Bought products		0,109			0,160	0,395	0,195	0,248	0,196	0,116
	legal demonstration		0,131			0,105	0,231	0,329	0,285	0,229	0,127
	illegal demonstration						0,140	0,230	0,137	0,244	0,147
Slovakia	Boycotted products					0,121	0,179				
	Bought products	0,150	0,180			0,183	0,218	0,170		0,099	
	legal demonstration					0,103	0,086	0,133	0,094	0,097	
	illegal demonstration					0,106	0,098	0,109		0,191	0,114
UK	Boycotted products			0,111							
	Bought products	0,118		0,125	0,090	0,137	0,091				
	legal demonstration	0,103						0,100			
	illegal demonstration										

Only significant correlations (At the 0.01 level, 2-tailed) displayed.

**Table 153: Correlations between beliefs in effectiveness and voting (Q24 with Q13\_1)**

	Q24_1 party work	Q24_2 NGO work	Q24_3 voting	Q24_4 contacting politicians	Q24_5 media work	Q24_6 product boycott	Q24_7 demonstrating	Q24_8 petitions	Q24_9 illegal protest	Q24_10 violent protest
Q13_1 Voted		0,14	0,21	0,21	0,14			0,13		
Q13_1 Voted		0,17	0,23	0,17	0,18					
Q13_1 Voted	0,21	0,15	0,18	0,21	0,14	0,16	0,13	0,11		
Q13_1 Voted	0,16	0,11	0,36	0,18	0,12		0,17	0,13		
Q13_1 Voted	0,19	0,14	0,26	0,18				0,10		
Q13_1 Voted		0,15	0,12							
Q13_1 Voted	0,12		0,27	0,11				0,14		
Q13_1 Voted			0,25	0,19	0,14			0,13		0,13

Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Only significant correlations (At the 0.01 level, 2-tailed) displayed.

**Table 154: Correlations between beliefs in effectiveness and election campaigns (Q24 with Q14); only significant correlations (at the 0.01 level) displayed**

Country		Q24_1 party work	Q24_2 NGO work	Q24_3 voting	Q24_4 contacting politicians	Q24_5 media work	Q24_6 product boycott	Q24_7 demonstra tions	Q24_8 petitions	Q24_9 illegal protest	Q24_10 violent protest
Austria	supported election campaign	0,18	0,14		0,15	0,15			0,12		
	convinced others to vote for party/ candidate	0,16	0,10	0,15	0,13	0,14		0,10	0,12		
Estonia	supported election campaign		0,09	0,11	0,10						
	convinced others to vote for party/ candidate	0,09	0,11	0,13	0,13	0,13	0,10	0,09	0,11		
Finland	supported election campaign	0,12			0,15			0,09			
	convinced others to vote for party/ candidate	0,09			0,11		0,11				
France	supported election campaign	0,11		0,16		0,15		0,13			
	convinced others to vote for party/ candidate	0,20	0,10	0,23		0,17		0,21	0,11	0,09	
Germany	supported election campaign	0,12	0,09	0,10	0,13	0,08					
	convinced others to vote for party/ candidate	0,13	0,12	0,11	0,17	0,14	0,09	0,11	0,12		
Italy	supported election campaign	0,15		0,10	0,13	0,09		0,16	0,12		
	convinced others to vote for party/ candidate	0,14	0,09	0,13	0,13	0,09		0,09	0,14		
Slovakia	supported election campaign			0,09	0,10				0,12		
	convinced others to vote for party/ candidate	0,08	0,10	0,17	0,09	0,08		0,09	0,13		
UK	supported election campaign	0,17	0,11	0,10							
	convinced others to vote for party/ candidate	0,18	0,11	0,09	0,09			0,09			

## 4 Summary

The following summary highlights the main findings of our Final Comparative Report. To guarantee a better overview we structured the results according to the main chapters of the report.

### Voting behaviour

- Youth interest in politics varies greatly among the eight EUYOUNGPART countries: it is highest in Germany (51%) and lowest in Slovakia (28%). The interest increases with a higher standard of living, higher parental education and the own level of education.
- Young people are aware that they should vote. Thus the national as well as the European voting rates mirror the tendency for over-reporting in social surveys: besides this effect we found the highest participation in Italy and the lowest in the UK
- The better educated young people are the higher their voting rate and their perceived effectiveness of voting are.

### Trust and closeness to parties

- Trust in NGO's (like Greenpeace and Amnesty International) is highest. For the European Institutions like the EC and the EP higher trust is reported than for national institutions. On the national level politicians and political parties are trusted least. There, however, is a „trust bonus“ for the national parliaments, with the exception of Slovakia.
- Even though young people don't trust parties in general, they feel close to specific parties: Right-wing (extremist) parties are generally regarded with greater distance and this distance is more explicit among the better educated. Above all Green parties, but Social Democratic parties as well, attain higher rates of closeness among the better educated.

### Youth engagement in politics

- Party Work: To work for a party is most common in Italy and Finland and least in the UK, in Estonia and France. The Slovakian youth is mostly engaged in supporting election campaigns, whereas the German and the Austrian youth put its efforts in convincing others to vote for a candidate or a party.

- Political Consumerism: Buying and boycotting products for political reasons is most frequent in Finland, followed by Italy and Austria.
- Political Discourse: Activities like contacting a politician, collecting signatures or writing articles or emails with a political content show rather low frequencies (10% and below)
- Political Protest: The participation in legal demonstrations is highest in Italy, followed by Germany and France. The Italians are although very active in participating in strikes, the French youth comes second.
- Illegal and violent forms of participation are generally rare (3% and below)

#### Membership

- In Austria membership is most common and most frequent in comparison to the other countries within the sample.
- In Slovakia it is the other way round: participating and doing voluntary work is more common than becoming a member of a political organisation.
- In Estonia and the UK membership as well as participation and volunteering are least common throughout all political organisations.
- Involvement in organisations encourages political activity of young people: It leads to a higher level of participation and to a broader range of experiences within organisations. Politically active young people tend to engage in a variety of activities.

#### Political socialisation

- Politically interested and active parents do have interested and active children who also show a higher trust in political institutions.
- The political socialisation by parents is most effective on the political attitudes and the ideological orientations of the young people.
- The political socialisation by peers is most effective on the political behaviour of the young people.

### Influence of school

- The more active young people are at school, the more active they are outside school and the more active they are after they have left school.
- The opportunity structures for participation at schools foster political participation even though they differ from country to country.

### Influence of knowledge and identity

- The better informed young people are about the EU and its institutions the more likely they are to take part at EU-elections. Knowledge, however, does not raise the trust in the EU institutions.
- There is evidence that identity is related to voting participation on the EU level: Feeling as young European to a certain extent also means feeling obliged to vote at European elections.

### Influence of media

- Politics is followed most frequently on TV. In Germany and Austria the radio still has an influential role, whereas in Estonia and Finland the internet is used more than in all the other countries.
- There is a relationship between the choice of a certain mass media and the young people's participation activity:
  - Active media reception, which is necessary for newspapers and the internet, strengthens political participation. Thus young people who read newspapers or use the internet are active within a broader range of political activities and their participation at demonstrations is higher.
  - Passive media reception, which is common for TV and radio, leads to lower participation rates. Even non-democratic attitudes are more frequent among them.
- The frequency of following politics via media increases with age.

### Future expectations

- The Estonian youth is nearly enthusiastic concerning its future income, job and social security situation.
- In Finland, Slovakia and the UK the youth is rather optimistic, whereas the Austrian and German youth reveals a pessimistic stance throughout.

- In France and Italy the youth is polarised: income and jobs will be fine, but social security goes down the drain.
- The most striking problems they expect to have to cope with are unemployment, crime and violence and environmental pollution.
- Young women are more pessimistic than young men.

#### Understanding of politics & attitudes about political participation

- In general, the youth has an idealistic understanding of politics (lowest in Slovakia): Politics is seen as a way to solve international problems, social conflicts and to create a better world.
- On the other side cynical attitudes were visible: politics is also empty promises, just corrupt and a game played by old men.
- Idealism and a feeling of responsibility seem to be the prime source of motivation for being active.
- Around 40% indicate that they have no time or are too busy for being active. The political inactivity is highest in Slovakia, lowest in Italy, Finland and Germany. Young Austrian women indicate more often than men that they do not have time to be politically active

#### Effectiveness

- Voting is considered to be the most effective way of participating.
- Both “work to get media attention” and “work in voluntary organisations” is considered more effective than working in a political party.
- The lowest effectiveness is assigned to illegal and violent protest. .
- For six of the ten items, more young women than men think the specific way is effective: Vote, work in NGOs, sign petitions, demonstrate, contact politicians, boycott products. The countries for which this trend is true vary.
- Young people who agree that participating in legal and illegal demonstrations is effective have a higher likelihood to already have participated in a demonstration in all eight countries.
- Young people who believe in the effectiveness of product boycott are more likely to already have participated in a consumerist activity.

- The belief in the effectiveness of voting positively correlates in all countries with the actual voting behaviour.
- Those young people who support the idealistic attitudes are more likely to engage in political activities and those who agree with a stance of despair show significantly less activity.

All in all the European youth has a very different outlook into the future. A majority is not very interested in politics, but there is hope that interest increases with age. Young people believe in the effectiveness of voting and voting is the most frequent form of participation. And although there is only a minority of political activists the representative democratic system is not in danger – but a significant share of young people is not involved.